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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the ministerial career of Patrick Hogan between 1922 and 1932 
as a member of the first functioning government of Ireland. This period has been 
characterised by commentators and historians as one of consolidation and conservatism. 
Given the turbulent time in which Hogan operated it would have been quite an achievement 
even to have consolidated and conserved. But he did more than that and it says a lot about 
attitudes towards Ireland’s most important industry that this has been largely ignored. 
There are historical and political reasons for this neglect. After 1932 politics and 
economics became entangled through the so called economic war. The Fianna Fail 
government’s actions have been represented as Ireland making a stand against the Empire 
in order to establish the sort of economic independence which Griffith had proposed, 
namely, self-sufficiency. In contrast the preceding decade is portrayed as one in which the 
governments were pro-British, slavishly following policies which Britain approved. 
Criticism of government during the 1920s has been coloured by this attitude which has 
tended to discount the achievements which were made by all its branches while 
concentrating on the dead hand of conservatism which is seen to pervade every policy and 
activity. One of the main objectives of this study is, therefore, to determine if these 
criticisms are justified or if the unpopularity of Cumann na nGaedheal was the natural 
consequence of being in government during a particularly difficult decade.
There have been few scholarly studies of how the first governments actually operated on 
how cabinet government in Ireland worked in the 1920s. Very little attention has been paid 
to the working relationships of ministers and their civil servants which played a key role
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m preventing the breakdown of the administrative system which would have threatened the 
stability of the new state Recently there has been some work carried out in this area 
Valiulis’ biography of Richard Mulcahy, Portrait of a Revolutionary, General Richard 
Mulcahy and the Founding of the Free State might have thrown light on these areas 
However the work concentrates on the army crisis which took place in 1924 and which was 
an extraordinary event rather than on the more mundane years which Mulcahy spent as 
Minister for Local Government and Health and says nothing about Mulcahy’s relations with 
his officials Seamas O’Buachalla’s interesting work on Education Policy in Twentieth 
Century Ireland does look at Cumann na nGaedheal mimsters for Education as part o f his 
study of policy making and the politics of education in Ireland Neither study supplies 
enough material from which to draw any broad conclusions 1
Patrick Hogan is a good candidate for a study of this kind His ministry, Agriculture, 
embraced the most important industry m the country in which more than fifty per cent of 
the population were directly engaged Farming also covered a wide variety of groups 
ranging from agricultural labourers, small farmers, and comfortable farmers to the remnants 
of the old landlord class The addition of Lands to his portfolio in 1922 put him in charge 
of the dangerous area of land distribution and reform The violence and lawlessness 
associated with the land question had again become endemic during the civil war This put 
Hogan at the forefront of the drive to restore law and order in the countryside at a 
particularly sensitive time He was, therefore, involved in a significant number of areas 
which touched the lives of the majority of Irish people
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Hogan’s agricultural policies were not influenced to any great extent by constitutional 
issues This is important as before independence the Department of Agriculture and 
Technical Instruction (DATI), established in 1899, built an identity of its own While its 
early years were dogged by controversies, after the ousting of its founding minister, Sir 
Horace Plunkett in 1907, DATI carried out its legislative and regulative work away from 
the political limelight and without much of the bureaucratic friction it had initially 
encountered This appears to have remained the case during Hogan’s ministry as there is 
little evidence of any other departments becoming involved m the business of the 
Department of Agriculture between 1922-1932 Under Hogan, a gifted and energetic 
minister, autonomy was reinforced and its resources were never used to increase 
employment or to implement social policies On the contrary, Hogan did nothing to 
improve the pay and conditions of farm labourers who made up a large section o f the 
industry His mam concern was how to export the maximum amount of agricultural 
produce at the best possible price because Ireland was ‘exceptionally dependent on foreign 
trade’ 2
In 1930 the department summed up its policy succinctly in a statement to the Department 
of Industry and Commerce
The agricultural policy of the Government has been largely directed to helping the 
farmer make the most productive use of his land and to secure for him against 
world-wide competition a remunerative market for exports of agricultural produce 
which constitute the main source of the country’s trade 3
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Hogan’s policy appears to have depended to a large extent on what seems to have been a 
naive belief in the judgement of the farming community to decide what was best for 
agriculture He gave the farmers credit for understanding their own industry He was not, 
however, blind to its defects in the area of quality control and livestock breeding At the 
heart of his policy was the objective of supplying the almost insatiable British market by 
producing food at prices which could compete with those of the Danes and commonwealth 
countries Ireland had a geographical advantage over other exporters because of its 
proximity to Britain and its well established trade routes and business contacts developed 
during the Union Hogan was determined to exploit that advantage
This became the most controversial part of Hogan’s policy his concentration on agricultural 
exports to Britain It reinforced the belief amongst Fianna Fail supporters that Cumann na 
nGaedheal were pro British even though it could be demonstrated that Britain was the most 
lucrative market in Europe and the most convenient for Ireland As early as 1924 the 
opposition were suggesting that ‘an extension of [Ireland’s] trade with Britain would bring 
economic bondage’ though this was not taken seriously by the press who dismissed it as 
‘sheer nonsense’ 4 Fianna Fail could not come to terms with the fact that independence had 
not altered the pattern of trading This led to de Valera questioning whether, as he saw it, 
the ‘strategic object of the Agriculture Department’ ought to be to run the country 
‘simply m order to supply food for the British’ 5 Four years later the Fianna Fail manifesto 
acknowledged the reality that ‘the people of Britain and ourselves are each other’s best 
customer’ and that ‘geographic and other factors’ made ‘it unlikely that this close 
relationship5 would ‘rapidly change’ 6
Economic nationalism, which Fianna Fail embraced, was based on self-sufficiency and had 
its roots m the pre-1916 period It also fitted neatly with new ideas for protecting national 
economies It had a two pronged appeal, one based on simple economic issues, the other 
on its association with the thinking of those who fought for independence in 1916 
This has clouded issues which have not been debated, until recently, without the patriotism 
of those who wished to examine the Cumann na nGaedheal governments’ record 
dispassionately being impugned F S L Lyons makes an important point when he say ‘by 
one of those familiar ironies of Irish history the men who repudiated Griffith’s political 
settlement inherited his economic ideas’ 7 No matter how tenuous this connection may 
have been or how difficult it would have been to sustain in fact, it existed in the minds of 
a sufficient number of electors to make it a useful plank in Fianna Fail’s 1932 manifesto 
and a genuine alternative to what already existed This supports the argument that the 
developments of the 1920s have been overshadowed by the linkage of economics with 
nationalism encouraged by Fianna Fail
There are various interpretations of the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of Hogan’s 
export based agricultural policy Lee suggests that even if his policy had succeeded it 
would not ‘have fulfilled the hopes it inspired’, that is, ‘a healthy and prosperous 
agricultural industry would not automatically have let to a healthy and prosperous 
agricultural community’ 8
Girvin takes a similar line stating that although
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agriculture performed well throughout the 1920s, especially the export sector 
Policy makers outside Industry and Commerce had assumed that development would 
occur spontaneously, with linkages deepemng as a consequence of growth in 
agriculture
However, the profits which were made by farmers were not reinvested in industrial 
development, or in farming but m  increased consumption 9 Girvin regards the ‘cautious 
approach’ of the government to new policies as understandable Their reluctance was, in 
his opinion, caused by the fear that changes could have ‘endangered’ the benefits from the 
agricultural sector 10
Daly is critical of the lack of vision in the 1920s and 1930s, but does not think that there 
was any simple answer available She suggests that ‘there were alternative policies which 
could have been followed, though options were limited in the difficult circumstances of the 
twenties and thirties’ She believes that some types of intervention would have had 
some measure of success
devaluation of the Irish currency against an over-valued sterling would have reduced 
deflation with considerable benefit to agriculture while offering a measure of 
protection to industry However, such a programme would have entailed major 
intervention in banking and financial matters, something that even Fianna Fail 
fought shy of doing u
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This was probably because both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fail were in thrall to 
the existing structures which continued 6 to influence the overall direction of policy choices’ 
They had therefore given priority to solving the existing difficulties which fanners were 
experiencing 12
Daly concludes
given the strong wish for stability it can be argued that the modest and slightly 
confused economic achievements of the twenties and thirties met the dominant needs 
o f Irish society 13
There are several areas which can be examined to see what influenced Hogan’s policy 
decisions, how they were received and what was their lasting effect These are (1) The 
legislation which he introduced, (2) how he worked behind the scenes with his department, 
(3) how he operated m the Dail, (4) how he was rated by his colleagues and opponents, 
and (5) how and for what he is remembered The acts for which he was responsible cover 
almost every aspect of agriculture regulatory, educational, and financial In general they 
were uncontroversial with criticism confined to the particulars of the bills rather than the 
necessity for their introduction They fitted into the overall policy of the government, 
found acceptance within the farming community in general and rarely elicited any 
response from the rest of the community Hogan’s reluctance to intervene except as a last 
resort gives the impression that he was a reactive minister In spite of this the 
legislation which he did introduce brought about a quiet revolution in the quality of
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agricultural exports while measures such the Agricultural Credit Act 1927 demonstrated his 
willingness to intervene actively when conditions demanded
His work with the department shows the effect of an enthusiastic and informed mimster 
who managed to bring to fruition many of the proposals and schemes which the department 
had been discussing and examining over the previous twenty years There appears to have 
been a high degree o f mutual confidence between the minister and his officials which can 
be seen m the smooth way the department was run and the way in which legislation that 
had been in preparation for almost a decade was brought forward and passed The 
departmental files from which these impressions are gamed have some shortcomings, 
however, which make them less effective as sources of information than they might have 
been Notes on discussions with the minister are few and where they exist they are usually 
formal accounts prepared by participants in departmental conferences There appears to 
have been no informal correspondence between the minister and the secretary of the 
department or
senior officials Any contact of this sort was carried on through the medium of his 
private secretary It is very likely that interviews between the mimster and his senior 
officials when they did take place were not seen to require official minutes or aide 
memoirs Neither the minister or his officials thought it necessary to make notes or if  they 
did to put them on the files Another disappointment is the lack of any rough drafts of 
memoranda or letters written by Hogan which would have given an insight into how his 
thinking on particular issues developed or changed as he committed his thoughts to paper
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Department records present a further difficulty While an official of the National Archives 
stated that they had not removed any original documents from the Department of 
Agriculture files it is not true to say that no material has been taken out This writer was 
informed that while the records were being prepared for public access large numbers of 
memoranda and printed material which were sent for the information of the department 
from other government departments were removed It was believed that as they were not 
directly relevant to the business of the department and were still available in the 
departments where they originated they did not need to be kept The decision was 
taken mainly because o f a shortage o f storage space Unfortunately this gives a distorted 
view of the amount of communication there was between departments at that time It could 
be inferred from the files as they now stand that there was almost no attempt made by 
departments to keep each other informed about issues which concerned them indirectly 
This is a problem as it makes it impossible to say to what extent policy was influenced by 
actions and decisions taken in other departments It also makes it look as if the work of 
the department was carried out in a vacuum 14 This was not true Even a cursory glance 
at the flies of other government departments such as Finance, Industry and Commere, Local 
Government and Home Affairs (later Justice) makes this clear There was a considerable 
amount of correspondence and contact between the Department of Agriculture and these 
departments when their business overlapped However, it does not automatically follow 
that this led to them coordinating their policies or adopting similar policy objectives The 
departments seem to have stuck rigidly to their own areas of responsibility and to have 
guarded them jealously For instance queries about legislation governing food and hygiene 
regulations m foreign exporting countries were directed through the Department of External 
Affairs who passed the replies to Agriculture 15
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A very careful and close study of a large number of these files leads to the impression that 
the minister retained some documents and correspondence which never found their way into 
the archives The ‘minister’s file’, a separate set of documents included in the general 
file concerning the establishment of the first sugar factory, indicates that such files existed 
Some but not all of the documents in the minister’s file are duplicated in the general file 
There is, however, nothing m the general file to suggest that relevant correspondence is 
missing If, therefore, it is impossible to infer the existence of the minister’s file from the 
other available material the same is probably true of other files where the minister retained 
copies of his own correspondence and the original letters and telegrams which he received, 
which have now been lost because the relevant ‘ministers files’ have disappeared This is 
a serious deficiency which can give a misleading impression of the direct interest the 
minister took in the affairs of his department Without the minister’s file on the sugar 
negotiations it would not have been clear just how involved he had been at each stage or 
how much weight he gave to their political implications
Another problem is the way that the files are labelled They are not sub-divided under 
headings such as legislation, dairy, livestock or finance, for example It was necessary, 
therefore, to search the complete card index in order to find files which were useful As 
there were thousands of new files opened every year this made the task extremely slow and 
difficult Nor were the descriptions of the contents of the files given in the index always 
accurate or helpful Some of those with the least promising titles proved the most fruitful 
while those which sounded the most interesting turned out to contain only a blank sheet of 
paper bearing the index title It was necessary therefore to decide which areas were the 
most important and look at all the files which made reference to them This meant looking
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at more than five hundred individual files some of which contained hundreds of documents. 
It was very tedious and it took some time before any clear picture began to emerge. 
Eventually it was possible to guess with a high degree of accuracy which files were worth 
ordering. However the niggling thought that something vital might have been overlooked 
was never quite removed.
Apart from these shortcomings the files were well maintained and communications between 
the officials of head office were recorded on the minute sheets and it must be supposed that 
officials in the 1920s would have found the labelling system perfectly adequate. Field staff 
were often asked to report on conditions in their areas which they did with creditable 
alacrity and their accounts of conditions in the country during times o f distress were 
surprisingly objective. They gave considered and informed reports which quite often were 
at variance with the wilder speculations of the press and so far as can be judged were more 
accurate.16
Another useful source for Hogan’s political career are the reports of the proceedings in the 
Dail. However, dipping into debates and reading only the opinions and statements of a few 
of the main speakers can give a false impression. Debates on controversial issues and 
legislation can be entertaining. They give the participants the opportunity to display 
their verbal skill and wit. While these show the deputies’ abilities as debaters they often 
reveal more about their ignorance and prejudice than their competence as legislators. The 
passage of a difficult technical and uncontroversial bill can be a better indicator of the 
efficacy of a government and parliament. The examination of amendments to a regulatory 
bill which is not calculated to receive press attention or produce quotable quotes can,
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therefore, be a more reliable guide to the opinions of deputies than the more spectacular 
pronouncements on constitutional or security issues which are directed at a wider audience 
than the Dail
In Hogan’s case the Dail provided a stage where he could perform the roles both of party 
polemicist and technocratic legislator When he dealt with issues and questions about 
agriculture his expertise was plain and he was confident enough to admit that he did not 
have the answer to every question or needed more time to consider the implications of an 
opposition amendment Throughout his years in the Dail he was involved in some of the 
major contests on law and order, protectionism, and constitutional amendments where he 
was able to display his talent as 6the best platform speaker of his party’ 17 Although he had 
a sharp tongue and an unerring nose for ‘humbug’ his barbs were usually softened by his 
sense of humour and were generally reserved for those who were well able to defend 
themselves It is important to look at the records of the Dail with a degree of scepticism 
m order to separate out the window dressing from the actual intentions of the minister
Hogan was very careful to answer all written Dail questions exactly as they had been 
drafted by his officials and he also stuck very closely to the guidelines which they gave 
when answering supplem entary This is somewhat surprising and at variance with the air 
of spontaneity which his speeches in the Dail had He never appears to have been tempted 
away from this course even in the early days This shows a political maturity which must 
have developed very rapidly That he followed so closely the advice of his department 
should be remembered when attempting to decide how much his policy was influenced by 
his officials
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It is difficult to say how highly Hogan was rated by his colleagues and respected by his 
opponents because there are few written records of their opinions Furthermore, despite his 
close friendship with the abrasive Kevin O’Higgins he apparently made few enemies in the 
government Cosgrave thought enough of him to keep him in his government for ten years 
He also valued his advice In 1923 Cosgrave informed the Dail that when deciding who 
to appoint to the Finance portfolio he
consulted with the other mimsters It was within the period known as the 
Provisional Parliament in the Third Dail, and [I] got the advice and council 
separately of the ministers - I think more than any other that of the Minister for 
Agriculture 18
even though he was not a member of the executive council Hogan and Cosgrave became 
close friends Liam, W T  Cosgrave’s son, spent many happy holidays in Kilrickle and 
Hogan often visited Cosgrave in his home 19
Cosgrave did not, however, move him to any of the more prestigious departments such as 
Finance or Industry and Commerce where other politicians were able to make their names 
Ernest Blythe at the Department of Finance and Hogan’s friend Patrick McGilhgan at 
Industry and Commerce 20 Perhaps Hogan wished to stay at Agriculture because of his 
interest in farming and his belief that it was the most important portfolio All the evidence 
suggests that he was quite content with his position It is unlikely that he was left there 
because of any deficiency in his personality One contemporary of his said that everybody 
loved him, that when he came into a room it was as if somebody had turned on a ligh t21
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This suggests qualities which are rather difficult to discern from photographs These show 
a small slight rather unkempt man and not one whom it is easy to imagine domg verbal 
battle with some of the most venerated names in Irish politics When Hogan was killed in 
a car accident in 1936 his obituaries were fulsome So too were the tributes of members 
of the Fianna Fail government who had been some of his bitterest opponents de Valera 
adjourned the Dail so that deputies could attend his funeral in Kilrickle, which shows the 
high regard in which he was held It was such that in the in the 1930s and in opposition 
he still retained the status of a national figure
Protectionism swept away free trade which had been at the core of his export led policy 
Today Hogan is remembered as a highly efficient Mimster for Agriculture and a 
conservative politician Mention his name to a member of the older generation and they 
may recite ‘One more cow, one more sow, one more acre under the plough’ Those with 
an interest in the land question may recall that he was the Minister for Lands m 1923 when 
the first major piece of land legislation was passed by the Insh government and is credited 
with the suppression of the land issue Few would know that he laid down the foundations 
for the quality control of Irish agricultural produce which halted the sharp decline of the 
export trade which had taken place after the end of the first world war and which led to a 
revival that saw Irish agricultural produce regain its place in the British market This was 
achieved against fierce competition from the continental and commonwealth exporters 
Hogan’s career is, therefore, worthy of serious consideration
14
NOTES
1 M G Valuilius, Portrait of a Revolutionary, General Richard Mulcahy and the 
Founding of the Irish Free State, (Dublin 1992) Seamus O’Buachalla, Education 
Policy in Twentieth Century Ireland (Dublin, 1988)
2 Dermot McAleese, 4 Anglo Irish Economic Interdependence from excessive intimacy 
to a wider embrace’, in Ireland and Britain since 1922 edited by P J Drudy, 
(Cambridge, 1986) p 88 For a detailed account of DATI and the Department of 
Agriculture see Daniel Hoctor, The Department’s Story (Dublin 1971) For a 
contrasting assessment of DATI’s performance in its first years see Trevor West, 
Horace Plunkett Corporation and Politics an Irish Biography (Dublin 1986), 
pp 60-66, 71-82 and Eunan O’Halpin, The Decline of the Union British 
Government in Ireland, 1892-1922 (Dublin 1987), pp 18-21
3 Statement from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Industry and 
Commerce, n d  [September 1930] headed ‘Measures initiated by the Government 
of Saorstat Eireann for the development of Agriculture’, NA, Department of 
Agriculture, AG1\E2563\30
4 The Irish Times, 3 Sept 1924
5 Michael Moymhan, Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917 -1973
(Dublin and New York, 1980), p 157
15
6 ib id , p 189
7 F S L Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (London, 1973), p 610
8 J J Lee Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society (Cambridge 1989), p 115
9 Brian Girvin Between Two Worlds (Dublin, 1985), pp48 and 49
10 ibid, p 48
11 Mary Daly, Industrial Development and Irish National Identity, 1922-1939
(Dublin, 1992), p 173
12 Girvin, Between Two Worlds, p 48
13 Daly, Industrial Development, p 182
14 This information was obtained during an informal discussion with a former member 
of the staff of the National Archives who had been involved in the preparation of 
the files for public use
15 Request for information on regulations regarding the import of animals and animal
products into foregin countries made by the department of Agriculture to the
16
Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 Oct 1929 National Archives (NA), Department 
of Foreign Affairs Files (DFA), DFA32\27
\  16 NA, DA, AG1\E8475\25 and AG1\G927\42
17 Maurice Maiming, The BKueshirts (Dublin, 1971), p 5
18 Brian Farrell, Chairman or Chief (Dublin, 1971) p 19
19 Interview with Liam Cosgrave, 14 Jun 1993
20 Ernest Blythe was TD for Monaghan from 1922 to 1933 when he was defeated in 
the general election He was Minister for Local Government in the first government 
until 1923 when he became Minister for Finance He held that portfolio until the 
Cumann na nGaedheal government was defeated in 1932 Patrick McGilhgan was 
a TD from 1923 to 1965, for the National University of Ireland from 1923 to 1937 
and for various constituncies from 1937 to 1965 He became Minister for Industry 
and Commerce in 1924 when McGrath resigned He was given the External 
Affairs portfilio in 1927 which he handled along with Industry and Commerce until 
1932 Vincent Brown and Michael Farrell, The Magill Book of Irish Politics 
(Dublin, 1981), pp 45-6, 119 R F  Foster, Modern Ireland 1600 - 1972 (London,
1988), ff  p500
17
21 From an interview with the late Mrs Patrick McGilhgan, a close friend of Patrick 
Hogan 15 Jun 1989 Both of the McGilhgans were good friends of his though 
there may have been differences between McGilhgan and Hogan in their cabinet 
relations Patrick McGilhgan told an acquaintance during a conversation that he 
found it very difficult to relate to Hogan during cabinet meetings This, he said, in 
spite of the great respect and affection with which he regarded him Perhaps the 
differences were caused by Hogan’s protective attitude towards agriculture He may 
have regarded Industry and Commerce as a rival ministry which could usurp some 
of the power and prestige of Agriculture
18
C H A P T E R  1
P A T R IC K  H O G A N  A N D  IR IS H  P O L IT IC S . 1891-1936
The singular style and ability of Patrick Hogan would have earned him a prominent position 
in Irish politics under any circumstances His ministerial career is made more interesting, 
however, because it spanned the first decade after independence He, with his fellow 
ministers and deputies, presided over the establishment of one of the most stable political 
systems of the twentieth century Hogan’s part in this is very important because he was 
Minister for Agriculture for the whole period from 1922 to 1932 Therefore, he was closely 
involved with the fluctuating fortunes of Ireland’s most important industry, as well as with 
the potentially explosive question of land reform It is hardly overstating the case to 
suggest that had agriculture collapsed at that time, the other institutions o f the new state 
would have had little hope of survival His policies and those advocated by his department 
were, therefore, of greater relevance than some of the more controversial constitutional 
issues to which so much time and attention has been devoted
After independence the reconstituted Department of Agriculture continued to function 
effectively m spite of the difficulties surrounding the transfer of power and the subsequent 
civil war There is no indication of a loss of momentum in the work of the department 
after 1922 On the contrary, a sense o f urgency, which had been missing in the past, is 
evident m the way that proposals for regulating the quality of agricultural production and 
exports were given a higher priority Under Hogan’s leadership the Department of 
Agriculture retained the confidence of the farming community and became a solid pillar of 
the new state
Patrick Hogan was born in 1891 in County Galway His home, a well proportioned 
comfortable house standing on a large farm on the outskirts of the village of Kilnckle,
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would be more readily associated with the ‘landed gentry’ of East Galway than the home 
of the typical small farmers or ‘congests’ of that county 1 Michael Hogan, Patrick’s father, 
a Clareman, ‘married in’ to the property in Kilnckle where his wife’s family, the Glennons, 
had lived since the turn of the eighteenth century2 However his family tree, which 
contains a significant number of professionals and religious of some standing, suggests that 
Bridget Glennon was not descending the social ladder with such an alliance - quite the 
opposite in fac t3 Patrick and his siblings maintained the high standards of previous 
generations two became solicitors, one a nun, one a professor of history and one an army 
colonel4 The Hogans of Kilrickle could, therefore, fairly be described as a family of 
achievers
Hogan’s middle-class roots were not exceptional in W T  Cosgrave’s government What 
was unusual was his particular suitability for the portfolio of agriculture This was because 
his background as the son of a substantial farmer and senior inspector with the old Land 
Commission, together with his genuine absorption in agricultural matters and his deep 
interest in politics combined to produce a highly professional and energetic minister 
Evidence of his early dedication to the subject and his efforts to keep abreast of the 
technical advances in agriculture and to be informed about what was going on in the world 
of farming can be gleaned from an anecdote in one of his obituaries It tells how he 
occupied himself in Ballykinlar internment camp in 1921 The writer recalled how, instead 
of drilling like the rest of the prisoners, Hogan spent his time reading Department of 
Agriculture and Technical Instruction (DATI) literature, something that most people, 
including farmers, would probably regard as worse than incarceration by the British He 
put this knowledge to good use delivering to the camp Farmers’ Union 4a very instructive
f
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lecture at one of the meetings on the dead meat trade in its relations to Ireland ’ This 
bespoke an unusual degree of commitment to the subject, the more striking since he had 
already embarked on a career in the law 5
Papers in his daughter’s possession reveal that Hogan’s interest in politics pre-dated the 
upheavals of 1916 He was interested enough to collect newspaper cuttings of the general 
election campaigns of 1910 and to paste them into a note book It is an impressive 
collection which includes reports of speeches by the most important British and Irish 
politicians of the time, Liberal, Conservative, Unionist and Nationalist The mam issue of 
that campaign, limiting the power of veto of the House of Lords, was of particular 
significance to Ireland’s hopes of securing Home Rule For the first time it appeared that 
there was a chance of a Home Rule bill once passed by the Commons making its way onto 
the statute book It can be assumed that Hogan’s enthusiastic interest in the outcome of the 
election stemmed from his wish to see Ireland gain some kind of independence He did not 
join Sinn Fein or the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), nor is there any suggestion that 
he became a member of the Gaelic League It is not surprising that he did not become 
involved in the attempts to revive the language as he was critical of the movement In the 
early 1930s he said ‘There are two great rackets in Ireland, one is the Irish language, the 
other is the sweepr  Nothing has come to light on the development of his political ideas 
between 1910 and 1916 In 1917 he joined Sinn Fein after the Easter rebellion had 
destroyed the prospects of the Nationalist party 6
Hogan's participation in politics is not regarded as unusual by his daughter Bridget who 
believes that politics were constantly debated and discussed within the family Hogan also 
had family links with Femamsm, through his mother’s people, the Glennons A story is
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told of one member of the family going to the Umted States to raise funds for the 
movement On the evening of his departure his grandmother appeared at the leave taking 
with her lace apron filled with gold sovereigns valued at two thousand pounds In the late 
nineteenth century this was a very large sum of money to donate to any cause, especially 
one which was proscribed by the Catholic church and was not usually supported by 
comfortable farmers Hogan’s brothers James and Michael became members of the Irish 
Republic Brotherhood and the Irish Volunteers, and they fought in the War of 
Independence This confirms the family’s association with physical force nationalism 7
Despite his lack of fighting record, his local connections made him a particularly good 
candidate m his home constituency of Galway Unlike his brothers who attended 
Clongowes Wood College, Hogan had gone to St Joseph’s College, or ‘Garbally’, in 
Balhnasloe This was undoubtedly an advantage to him in his political life because it 
identified him more closely with the local people and the area he represented in the Dail 
In his case this may have been especially valuable, because the party which he represented 
after the 1922 election gradually became associated in the public mind with a pro-British 
stance While not necessarily true this could have been very damaging m the west of 
Ireland, where Sinn Fem and later Fianna Fail drew strong support from small farm ers8 
John Joe Broderick, a local man who was a constituency worker of Hogan’s and knew him 
very well, recalls him leaning against the wall opposite to the church in Kilnckle after 
mass on a Sunday morning talking to the other men who were likewise employed This 
was seen by the villagers as a sign that in spite of his background, his undoubted talents 
and his early rise to prominence he had not lost the common touch Nor, says Broderick, 
was his attitude regarded as patronising 9
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Hogan’s schooling at Garbally gave him another political advantage It was a diocesan 
college, established partly to educate potential recruits to the priesthood Some boys did 
take holy orders Amongst the remainder were many future Galway lawyers, doctors, 
merchants and large farmers These formed a network of men of influence, who were able 
to help Hogan achieve success at the polls The assistance of his former schoolfellows 
more than made up for the lack of an extended family in the Galway constituency from 
whom he could have expected support his father was a Clareman, while there were few 
cousins on his mother’s side The old school network had added significance given the 
very loose way m which Cumann na nGaedheal was organised m the 1920s and 1930s 
There were no local branches Party meetings were held once or twice a year with little 
attention paid to vote management, fund raising or canvassing Contact between the local 
Cumann na nGaedheal TD and his constituents was maintained through ‘key’ men in each 
parish These would act as go-betweens, relaying requests for assistance to the TD and 
probably advising him or them It was vitally important, therefore, for a TD to have the 
confidence of leading men in the community through whom requests could be channelled 
and who would remind voters at election time where their allegiance should he, especially 
in the absence of a well organised local party machine Hogan’s daughter Bridget Hogan 
O’Higgins only became aware of her father’s support network when she first ran for the 
Dail m 1957 She received unsolicited help from his old school friends, including a number 
of influential local priests As Fine Gael party organisation had not improved much since 
the 1920s, she felt their assistance was crucial to her success Gallagher confirms this view 
quoting Moss
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Sometimes Cosgrave’s opponents did not realize that his party was actively engaged
in campaign work Cosgrave’s party, Cumann na nGaedheal, often carried its
organisation into new areas by merely sending letters to influential men asking their 
aid They went about quietly, often making use of social groups which already 
existed, and then by election time, they had an organisation 10
The lack of a formal organisation which was noted by Moss undoubtedly contributed to 
Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael’s decline in the 1930s and 1940s
It would be very illuminating to know to what extent the face Hogan presented to the local 
community was governed by political considerations or whether it was natural Knowing 
which was the case could shed some light on his political nous, for instance just how 
conscious he was of the need to woo local voters to maintain his seat and to assist other 
members of his party into theirs However, it would have taken someone of considerable 
acting ability to continue to fool the community in which he was bom and raised for the 
twenty years he was active in public life, though he possibly did create a public persona 
with the right balance o f informality and toughness with which to win local popularity 
While there is no direct evidence to confirm either view, he was almost universally praised 
for his honesty and dislike of humbug and cant This suggests that his appeal to all classes
came less as the result of Machiavellian public image making than from his no nonsense
personality and witty turn of phrase 11
His daughter maintains that he would have been well aware of his electoral strength at local 
level She says that he would have known that those in the immediate neighbourhood of
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Kilnckle whom he had helped most, often voted for the opposition They did not find it 
difficult to approach him when they were in trouble but gratitude for his efforts on their 
behalf did not always translate into votes at election time She suggests that it was a way 
for a small farmer to assert his independence and to prove that he was not beholden to the 
Hogans in the big house When she stood for Fine Gael nearly twenty years later the same 
pattern of support still persisted 12
There is one overriding reason why Hogan was a successful politician, apart that is from 
his undoubted personal ability he never broke his links with Kilnckle and east Galway 
He was away for some years at college in Dublin and as an apprentice solicitor in Ennis, 
but they were temporary absences When he qualified as a solicitor he set up his legal 
practice in Ballmasloe, later opemng additional offices in the immediate area He also 
helped to run the farm after his father’s death His continued association with his home 
village was natural and not contrived to curry support from local voters Liam Cosgrave, 
who was a frequent visitor to Kilnckle, remembers the speed with which Hogan changed 
into his working clothes and went out to inspect the farm when he returned from Dublin 
He testifies to his love of country life and his consuming interest in agriculture 13
Hogan’s education after he left Garbally is also relevant to his role as politician and 
minister He studied history at University College Dublin (UCD) for his BA degree He 
was apprenticed to an Ennis solicitor, J B Lynch, a relative of his father, and qualified m 
1914 14 When asked why he had chosen the law as a career rather than farming which he 
loved, his daughter Bridget suggested three reasons Firstly, farming did not offer 
sufficient prospects for a clever young man Secondly, his father had had legal
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qualifications which he used m his work with the Land Commission while still managing 
to work the farm m Kilnckle Thirdly, both the Hogans and the Glennons regarded 
university education as the norm Hogan’s mother and her three sisters had been educated 
m a convent m Belgium and had attended the Sorbonne in Paris Entering a profession was 
not therefore regarded as an unusual step to take On a more practical level Patrick was 
the eldest son and there was a large family to be educated 15
However, it is not easy to say to what extent his education shaped his ideas or, if  it did, 
what affect it had on him as a politician It is tempting to speculate that his interest in 
history gave him a broader perspective on Irish national issues, which would have led him 
to set them in a global context However, it is possible, if not highly likely, that those 
teaching and studying history in the early 1900s would have been most concerned with 
nationalist interpretations of Ireland’s history, and would not, therefore, have been geared 
towards viewing its place in the world other than from the point of view of Ireland’s 
unequal struggle with Britain over seven centuries His pragmatic attitude towards Britain 
and the commonwealth when he was a minister suggests that his brain, ‘packed with ice’ 
in the words of one obituarist, had not been overly influenced by the nationalist analysis 
of Ireland’s p a s t16 He appears to have accepted the realities of Ireland’s close economic 
and political links with Britain after 1922, and wanted Ireland to gain the maximum 
advantage from these in the future
[Hogan] was one of the Irish Free State politicians who never made any secret of
his belief that Ireland’s future lay within the framework of the British
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Commonwealth and all his policies as Minister for Agriculture and as a "political” 
statesman were directed towards that end 17
His personal appraisal of Ireland’s history combined with the received wisdom on 
British/Irish relations may have been instrumental in producing in him a strange dichotomy 
This made his public utterances on dealings with Britain appear neutral and unencumbered 
with anti-British rhetoric while in private his opinions on ‘England’ and the ‘English’ 
conformed more closely to those o f the stereotypical Irish nationalist In early June 1922 
he told his aunt that he was amused at
the general disgust m England over the [election] pact We should have fought each 
other, that was the traditional and conventional thing to do In fact we had no right 
to choose any other course It would have been so nice for the English to come in 
to make peace and whatever else they could ‘make’ out of it
They have great pity for the poor Orangemen Certainly the English are cynical 
hypocrites At the same time we are damn fools or at least some of us are Some 
of our soft headed people thought they could play the fool here forgetting that 
England was simply waiting her opportunity However we will teach the 
Orangemen manners yet They are making frantic efforts to break the treaty 
knowing that if the treaty gets working, they are finished i8
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Nor did his opinion of England alter dramatically over the years In 1931 in another letter 
to his aunt he was sceptical of Gandhi’s chances of victory over the British in India, writing 
that the
English are never really dangerous until they appear to surrender Divide and 
conquer sums up what has happened England is m India m her own (England’s) 
interest but if  she cleared out India would go to bits 19
His more benign public attitude towards Britain may reflect a belief that nationalism based 
only on aspirations and not on reality would produce the sort of results which would not 
lead to economic independence This may account for the dichotomy On the one hand 
he wanted an independent Ireland, on the other he realised that that was impossible without 
the British market for Ireland’s agricultural exports It may also account for his irritation, 
throughout his career, with those who over-emphasised the ‘fighting records’ of Irish 
politicians, regarding them as an irrelevance in political debate However, he was never 
allowed to forget the period in Irish history when such records were established This was 
particularly so after Fianna Fail entered the Dail in 1927 In one bruising encounter 
between Hogan and the opposition, when he was as guilty of resurrecting the past as any 
other deputy, he showed that he had not lost his sense of humour or his disdain for the 
Fianna Fail reverence for ‘records’ When Patrick Little of Fianna Fail appealed to the 
Ceann Comhairle about the Minister for Agriculture going back over what someone had 
done or not done in the struggle against the British, Hogan responded ‘surely I am entitled 
to that occasionally I object to being barred out entirely ’20
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Hogan’s antagonism towards the raking up of what people had or had not done during the 
‘troubles’ probably sprang from his knowledge of how large a part chance could play m the 
events of that time With characteristic candour he contended that he had been arrested 
and interned in Ballykmlar camp in 1921 entirely m error in response to a questioner at 
a meeting who wanted to know what sort of a record he had, Hogan said
‘What’s wrong with this country is we have too many people with records Behold 
a man without a record1 I was arrested by the British but that was a mistake I am 
a man without a record What have you to say to that9’
The British probably intended to arrest one of his brothers, both of whom were actively 
involved in the Anglo-Irish war The fact that he was detained was nevertheless propitious 
for him politically as it gave him a ‘record’ During the same exchange he responded to 
Gerry Boland’s jibe that he had been trying to ‘back a winner in 1921’ with the question 
‘where were you9 [at that time] I think you were the same as myself, fooling around 
Ballykmlar These are the people who talk loudly ’ His efforts to deflate those who paraded 
their heroic pasts by making little of his own efforts cannot have won him many friends 
amongst those who had built their political careers by broadcasting their patriotic exploits 21
Hogan’s ability as a clear, decisive and often witty debater both inside and out of the Dail 
may owe something to his training as a solicitor22 His skill was most apparent during the 
passage of the Land Act, 1923, which was a complicated measure that required a good 
working knowledge o f property law, the procedures of the Dail, and political dexterity to 
get it through the Seanad, which was composed, to a very large extent, of landowners who 
were not naturally predisposed to the compulsory transfer of their land23 His facility m
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debate showed itself throughout his career and was particularly well used when he was 
dealing with agricultural legislation His deep background knowledge of the measures he 
was introducing was obvious and his confidence in his own mastery of his brief expressed 
itself in his willingness to examine the merits of amendments proposed by opposition and 
government deputies alike Hogan’s confidence and competence when dealing with the 
business of his department are easy to assess from even a brief examination of Dail 
proceedings in which he was involved He did not, however, suffer fools gladly Without 
quoting large passages from Dail debates which would need to be set in context, it is 
difficult to give specific instances of his impatience with what he regarded as quibbles But 
his parliamentary style, in the face of what he saw as irrelevant argument, was sharp, 
abrasive and sometimes sarcastic Throughout the following chapters there will be ample 
examples to illustrate what the Irish Independent called his ‘vigorous invective’ 24
Editorial comment in the Irish Statesman in June 1926 shows that his ability as an 
effective speaker was appreciated by his contemporaries Referring to the way that one of 
his speeches m the Dail was reported, it said
Mr Hogan’s speech on the vote for the Department of Lands and Agriculture was 
given a better show m the daily papers than the majority of statements of the kind, 
and this was due in a large degree to the Minister’s masterly and compelling 
presentation of his case If  other members of the Dail could handle agricultural 
questions with the vividness and force of Mr Hogan, the subject would soon 
become more than a peg on which back benchers hang dreary platitudes 25
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Hogan had a rather off-beat sense of humour which seems to have been the product of his 
personality rather than something which he acquired from his education or background 
There was a black tinge to it which is reflected m a letter to his English-based aunt in 
1924 outlining the growing stability of the new state
What did you think of our loan7 Its unqualified success left a lot of our enemies 
here and in England speechless It has about finished the Irregulars I don’t think 
we’ll ever hear of them again The country is, at the moment, painfully quiet - in 
fact dull We are suffering from ‘ennui’ Mr Dooley defines ‘ennui’ as ‘having no 
one m the whole weary world whom you don’t love’ That is the terrible fate that 
has overtaken us We haven’t got even Foot and Mouth Disease as yet - though 
I touch wood when I write this If we are to judge by all the signs the variety 
theatre seems to have been shifted over to your side It is about time We are all 
very much interested here to see what your labour government will do
(The loan which was mentioned was the first national loan raised by the Cumann na 
nGaedheal government m the winter of 1923 It was deemed a great success as it was 
oversubscribed in spite of the fact that the country was regarded as being in ‘a disturbed 
state’ This observation was made by the Governor of the Bank of England during a 
meeting which J J McElhgott, of the Department of Finance, had with the ‘Big Five’ joint 
stock banks in London in May 1923 to discuss the loan On 9th January 1924 Irish 
newspapers reported an article m The Times, under the headline ‘Certainly Remarkable’ 
‘It is certainly a remarkable achievement for the Irish Free State Loan to be raised to within 
a fraction of the price of the British 5 per cent war loan’ R F Foster says that the already
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strong position of the Department of Finance was reinforced by ‘the Department’s 
spectacular success in floating the National Loan in 1923’ 26
When Hogan became Minister for Agriculture in 1922 he was only 31 years of age, and 
had been a TD for less than two years He had been elected in 1921 as a Sinn Fein 
candidate for Galway, the constituency which he served for the following fifteen years He 
had built up a thriving legal practice and had not yet married Unlike some of his 
colleagues he had not been a local government representative, something which would have 
given him an insight into the workings of the bureaucratic mmd Of course he was not 
alone in lacking practical knowledge of politics or of running a government department 
None of the other ministers had held office before 1922 apart from those who had served 
m the largely symbolic Dail ministry from 1919 27 And, while there was a powerful 
tradition of constitutional politics in Ireland which stretched back to Darnel O’Connell, there 
was no tradition of being in government on which to draw Nevertheless, his considerable 
natural talents proved an excellent substitute for prior experience
Given that both he and his party lacked experience, how well did he run his department9 
There can be no direct answer to this question as there is no obvious yardstick against 
which his or any other minister’s career in office can be measured Unfortunately for the 
researcher, there are no contemporary records of what senior civil servants thought of him 
or his methods Nor are there diaries or memoirs written by the minister himself which 
might shed some light on how he perceived his role and how he thought he had filled it 
There is a story that Hogan did keep a personal diary, supposed to have been left in the 
care of the solicitors Arthur Cox & Company, along with other personal documents If
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the diary did exist it has disappeared Liam Cosgrave doubts that he did keep a diary He 
never heard any reference being made to it when he stayed at Kilnckle, nor does he think 
that writing a diary or journal was in keeping with Hogan’s spontaneous personality 28 
However, there are other ways of assessing his years in office which may prove to be more 
objective than the subjective views of his civil servants, his political peers or himself
To attempt to do this the role of a minister has to be examined on several levels First, he 
is a politician and has to be elected This means that he has to please his voters which 
requires him to spend time and effort working for the interest of his constituents This can 
create difficulties, especially if national and constituency interests do not coincide How 
he balances these sometimes irreconcilable interests may determine whether or not he is 
re-elected and by what margin His support at the ballot box may influence the second 
dimension of his role, that is, his position within the party hierarchy Better than average 
support from the voters can enhance his reputation and give him greater clout when dealing 
with other members and ministers Establishing friendships and alliances within the party 
makes his job of promoting the interests and legislation of his department less difficult 
Third, he has to work with his civil servants to achieve the policy objectives to which the 
government is committed Unless he is very able and energetic the enormity of the task of 
running a large department can overwhelm him and he can succumb to the temptation to 
leave it all to his officials The difficulty of interrupting work which has been in progress 
m a department for many years and replacing it with something new should not be 
underestimated, especially when those operating the system regard themselves as the 
experts He needs to be what civil servants describe as "a good minister", that is, able to 
get government support and money in order to achieve his political objectives It is also
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vital that a minster can devote himself wholeheartedly to his ministry O’Buachalla who 
looked at the careers of ministers of education since the foundation of the State points to 
Eom McNeill’s absence from his department attending meetings of the Boundary 
Commission which ‘diminished his direct involvement with educational policy’ Therefore 
Hogan’s dedication and expertise must have put him into the ‘good minister’ category 29
The fourth area concerns public perceptions of his ability and achievements How a 
mimster is seen by the public can affect the preceding three areas Performing well in the 
Dail has repercussions beyond the chamber itself To maintain his prestige in the party a 
minister must be seen to outwit the opposition and present the government’s case in a 
favourable light If  this can be done with humour and flair, so much the better, as 
ministers’ replies and statements often form the bulk of political reportage in the press 
Bearing in mind that it is through such reports that the vast majority of the electorate gain 
V their impressions of politicians, it is easy to see that a mimster who can come up with pithy 
retorts will make the headlines more often than one who is lugubrious and dull 
Therefore, in the Dail a combination of wit and competence is often a winning one Public 
perceptions can also be influenced through contacts with groups interested in the areas 
under his control Meeting with these groups to explain proposed legislation and policy 
changes can often defuse potentially troublesome confrontations and eliminate unnecessary 
public criticism
The reverse is also true A mimster may be a good constituency man, be respected by his 
fellow party members and have good relations with his civil servants, but if his public 
appearances and utterances give the impression of incompetence his image may be
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damaged Without the support of the electorate, which depends to a large extent on how 
he is seen to perform in public and how he is reported in the media, the fruits of his efforts 
to become a force within the government can be seriously damaged
It could be argued that none of the considerations which were to become so important in 
later years were sufficiently established in the 1920s and 1930s to have played a leading 
role in choosing government mimsters in either of the two major parties However there 
was one characteristic common to those who made up the top political elites in 
post-independence governments in Ireland, their activities in either Sinn Fein or the IRA 
during the Anglo-Irish war Therefore, it was this cntenon rather than the more prosaic 
political considerations which grew in importance over the years that followed which at that 
time dominated the selection of the first generation of political leaders Hogan’s association 
with Sinn Fein and his connection with the IRA and IRB through his brothers, would have 
helped his advancement in Irish politics whatever his personal views on their relevance 
were He made his contempt for those who harped on about ‘records’ perfectly clear in 
the Dail He, however, like the rest of his contemporaries could not divorce himself 
completely from the consequences of the previous six years It is very likely that Hogan 
would not have achieved his prominent position in the politics of early independent Ireland 
without the associations which he so often discounted The Irish Bulletin of June 1921 
gave a list of all the republican members of the Dail who were imprisoned
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Of the 130 Republican members
112 had served one term of imprisonment,
78 of these had been imprisoned twice,
41 had been imprisoned three times
1 8 ...................  four times
8  ..................  five times
3 " " " seven times
2 " " " eight times
These figures bear out how important active involvement in the independence movement 
was for a prospective TD 30
II
The unsettled state of the country in 1922 made the success of building up the institutions 
of the state crucial to its survival Therefore the influence of the group of individuals who 
set the tone and ethos of government cannot be overestimated The kind of lucky 
circumstance that had men of administrative ability in charge of the departments o f state 
from the beginning merits consideration This was especially true when the pressures which 
must have existed to reward the minority who had been actively involved in the upheavals 
of the previous six years are taken into account Some of this pressure may, however, have 
been relieved because a good proportion of that minority had cut themselves off from the 
institutions of the state through their support for Sinn Fem and its policy of abstention from 
the Dail The temptation to defuse difficulties during the civil war by being lenient with
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those who committed crimes against the state must have been great since many of the 
perpetrators were old colleagues and comrades in arms O’Higgins in his role as Minister 
for Home Affairs had no difficulty in deciding where his sympathies lay in January 1923
Only a small proportion of it [lawlessness] is due to genuine dissatisfaction with the 
Treaty A good deal of it is due to reaction from the high standards which 
prevailed rather generally during the conflict with the British and to the idea that 
everyone who helped, either militarily or politically in that conflict is entitled to a 
parasitical millennium Leavened with some small amount of idealism and 
fanaticism, there is a great deal of greed and envy and lust and drunkenness and 
irresponsibility We are dealing with anarchy under cover of a political banner 3l
After careful analysis of the situation he summed it up crisply ‘we must kill the active 
Irregular, tackle the passive Irregular, make friends with the rest’ This was to be done 
by putting ‘our thirty thousand armed servants to work on the thing that matters most ’32
Hogan wholeheartedly endorsed O’Higgin’s conclusions and supported the Enforcement of 
Law (Occasional Powers) Act, 1923, and the Public Safety Act, 1923, in the D ail33 As the 
minister responsible for Lands he was faced with compelling evidence of the need to 
counteract lawbreakers in the wake of the civil war thousands of holdings had been 
illegally seized throughout the country The reluctance of the military and of the Minister 
for Defence, Richard Mulcahy to use troops to combat such seizures revived deep divisions 
m the government early in 1923, divisions which never healed and which came to a head 
at the time of the army crisis in 1924 The Special Infantry Corps which was set up in
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March 1923 specifically to deal with the threat which agrarian crime was posing throughout 
the country came about partly at the instigation of Hogan In December 1922 officers at 
the highest level m the army had suggested that the Minister for Agriculture should deal 
with agrarian disputes In January the Special Military Corps for the assistance of the civil 
authorities was suggested by Hogan and provisionally approved In April 1923 he pointed 
to the success they had achieved in Galway which prior to the advent of the "Special 
Columns" as they became known, had been ‘the worst county in Ireland from the point of 
view of agrarian outrage’ He wanted therefore to widen the limit the brief of the Special 
Columns to cover the whole country in order to stamp out agrarian crime before he 
introduced his land bill However, there is some evidence that during the Army Mutiny the 
resolve to enforce the law rigorously, which became the hallmark of Cumann na nGaelheal 
governments, weakened The law was used m an unusually ambivalent way because as 
Hogan put it ‘they [the mutineers] could not be treated as mutineers would be treated in any 
other army’ This was done, bearing in mind the extraordinary circumstances which then 
existed in the army, in an attempt to prevent another outbreak of serious civil unrest34
Hogan’s responsibility for lands led him to support the Enforcement of Law (Occasional 
Powers) Act 1923 which allowed for the seizure of cattle and other property from farmers 
by the sheriff with the assistance of the army in order to discharge debts When critics 
suggested that this would increase tension in areas where there was already instances of 
agrarian crime Hogan remained sanguine He did not anticipate any problems being caused 
by tenants with rent arrears, neither would he consider interfering with decisions made by 
the courts relating to judgement on farmers for unpaid debts
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Ill
One of the earliest crises to test the Cumann na nGaedheal government can also be traced 
to the Anglo-Irish war the so-called ‘army mutiny’ By failing to sanction the actions of 
the IRA during the war the Dail established a precedent which plagued the government until 
it came to a head in 1924 The autonomy enjoyed by some officers and men led them to 
look within their own ranks for solutions to their problems rather than to the D ail35 The 
more immediate cause of the discontent was the massive demobilisation which was taking 
place as an inevitable consequence of the ending of the civil war It is not difficult to 
understand why men who were employed by the army did not relish the prospect of losing 
their jobs when there was little hope of getting any other work once they had been 
dismissed These feelings were heightened, particularly amongst the officers, by increased 
recruitment of men who had served in the British army Their practical skills and 
experience were regarded as necessary to increase the efficiency of the army once the civil 
war had ended in 1923 The mutiny, which was occasioned by this discontent, was serious 
enough to cause the resignation of Joseph McGrath, Mimster for Industry and Commerce 
and force Richard Mulcahy, Minister for Defence, to pre-empt a demand for his resignation 
by resigmng him self36
Hogan was not actively involved m the affair He did, however, make a statement in the 
Dail during the crisis denouncing the actions of those who had taken part His role was 
that of supporter of O’Higgins He was asked, as a result, to appear before the committee 
of inquiry set up to look into the debacle, in order to explain where he had received the 
information on which he based his conclusions 37 Hogan read out an explanation of the
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statement he had made to the Dail in response to this request before the Army Committee 
of Inquiry
His appearance before the inquiry offers a rare opportunity to see him in a public setting 
with his closest friend Kevin O’Higgms and his brother James Hogan, both of whom were 
influential figures in his life Kevin O’Higgins was involved because he was Mimster for 
Home Affairs and therefore concerned because of the law and order implications He was 
also acting for President Cosgrave who was ill at the time James had been asked to give 
evidence because he had been a high ranking officer m the arm y38 He had been aware of 
the decline m morale amongst the officers and men and had been asked by the government 
to suggest ways ‘for the improvement of the army’ and how it could be brought about39
The evidence which Hogan himself gave added little to the inquiry It contained very few 
concrete facts and was based mainly on hearsay, conjecture and impressions 40 When 
questioned about how he knew that the IRB had been revived in the army he said that he 
had ‘sensed’ there were things happening and that ‘the rumours were about for five or six 
months’ When he was criticised by a member of the committee for giving evidence about 
sensing things and talking about persistent rumours he explained that by their nature secret 
societies (the Old IRA and the revived IRB who had participated the crisis in the army) 
were secret Therefore, to give factual evidence about secret societies would be virtually 
impossible However the similarity of the views expressed by Hogan, his brother James 
and O’Higgms is noteworthy O’Higgms and James Hogan put forward carefully argued 
statements and answered questions on the army and its allegiance with the ease which came 
from long and considered analysis of the subject While Hogan was not quite at home in
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this area he was not, however, intimidated by the questioners, and was confident, like the 
others, of where the loyalty of the army should he When counsel for Richard Mulcahy, 
stated that ‘the faction which we call the IRB never attempted mutiny or made any threat 
to disobey the Government’, he replied
reviving the IRB was mutiny Anything that weakens the allegiance that the soldier
bears to the Government is mutiny and all the more serious if done officially 41
The moralistic tone of statements made by Hogan and O’Higgins which were critical of 
those who were involved in the crisis masks another less glorious aspect of the affair 
O’Higgins with Hogan’s help was able through skilful manipulation of the events 
surrounding the crisis to remove Mulcahy from the executive council and discredited him 
temporarily by denouncing him as a bad democrat Mulcahy, one of the heroes of the 
Anglo-Irish war, had a significant national and military following and was consequently a 
threat to whatever hopes O’Higgms might have had of succeeding Cosgrave as president 
Given Hogan’s antipathy to the use of fighting records as a criterion for political 
preferment, it is easy to see why he allied himself with O’Higgms against Mulcahy on this 
occasion42
Hogan’s willingness throughout his ministerial career to consider pragmatic solutions to 
complex problems is mirrored by his brother’s advice to the Inquiry In his evidence to the 
Inquiry James described the difficulties surrounding demobilisation which had precipitated 
the crisis
42
nobody has strictly the right to exploit the country’s indebtedness to them and
equally past services do not give any person a plenary indulgence to behave just as
they like for the rest of their days, but with calm illogicality there are people who 
think they are privileged by reason of past services, and no matter how illogical 
such a frame of mind may be it is one that must be faced 43
Even though he did not agree with the ‘illogicality’ of those concerned he accepted that 
something had to be done to prevent an even more dangerous situation developing His 
suggestion was to give pensions to those who ‘deserved’ them He reasoned that ‘properly 
winnowed the number of pensions could not be so very considerable’,44 but could help 
detach the ‘sensible elements from the Implacable within the Tobm organisation [the Old 
IRA]’45 and so weaken support for the mutiny
Hogan took a similar line when confronted with the clamour for rates relief on agricultural 
land in 1924 He accepted that some form of relief was unavoidable even thought he did
not believe in the efficacy of subsidies of any kind Bowing to the inevitable, like his
brother, he presented a scheme to the government designed to cause the least expense to 
the exchequer while giving assistance to the farmers who were under severe financial 
strain46 The same no-nonsense approach was used Both were flexible in their response 
to difficult and complex problems They discounted their natural reactions in order to 
defuse situations which had the potential to cause long term damage to the stability of the 
state The pragmatism which Hogan exhibited in agreeing to give rates relief and later in 
the decade in allowing limited subsidies on agricultural produce were also important in 
ensuring that no unnecessary risks were taken with the loyalty of the farmers
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The lack of experience of ministers was noted at the time, as was their courage Their 
capacity for making difficult decisions is reflected in qualified praise from their admirers
Members of the Government have proved themselves good men to go tiger-huntmg 
with, but as yet they have few of the parlour tricks of the professional politician, and 
their handling of the Dail has been marked by bad lapses both of tact and 
judgement
This after what could be regarded the most consummate piece of chicanery by O’Higgins 
and his allies, who first condemned, then condoned, then - when Mulcahy and his generals 
had finally crushed it - again condemned the mutiny, though blaming Mulcahy for it 
However, it is worth noting that government efforts to suppress and defuse discontent in 
the army worked even if its policy was not always clear or its members united 47
IV
Hogan’s ministry was unusual He, while holding a very important portfolio, was not a 
member of the cabinet but was an extern minister Extern mimsters were a constitutional 
experiment The original idea behind the innovation was a Dail where there would be no 
rigid parties and a great deal of free voting it was meant to ‘weaken collective 
responsibility, enhance individual responsibility and subdue party’ But once a party system 
along British lines emerged the extern mimsters rapidly became superfluous The 
experiment was virtually abandoned after a constitutional amendment in 1927 and from 
1928 onwards no more were appointed48 The supposed freedom from party constraints and 
direct accountability to the Dail which could vote them out of office was meant, in the case
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of agriculture, to achieve a consensus amongst the farming interests and remove it from the 
arena of party politics To a large extent consensus already existed even though there were 
obvious differences between the concerns of the large, medium and small farmers This 
was evident in the way that legislation relating to the breedmg of livestock, credit for 
farmers and regulations concerning standards for agricultural exports were debated both 
before and after the abstentiomsts took their seats The weakening of the consensus 
towards the end of the 1920s was caused to a very large extent by external economic 
conditions The fall in agricultural prices coupled with increased competition on the 
British market shook the confidence of many farmers Fianna Fail supported the policy of 
protectiomsm, subsidies for cereal growers, increased rates relief on agricultural land, and 
the refusal to continue paying land annuities to Britain These policies won the support of 
a large number of small farmers who did not see their immediate interest lying in the export 
market
The part Hogan played m supporting legislation on law and order and his close alliance 
with Kevin O’Higgms must have reinforced his position within the ruling group of the party 
and so enhanced his ministerial status This would have helped him when he was looking 
for support for his less than dramatic agricultural legislation In the hands of a minister 
with limited ability and determination it could have been demed the time necessary to see 
it through the Oireachtas when there were so many other areas demanding attention 
Because he was a central figure in the government and because of the stress he laid on the 
place of agriculture in the economy of Ireland, it must have been easier for other ministers 
to see these bills as mainstream issues and therefore worthy of being given priority
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Not everybody was convinced that agricultural legislation was given the attention it
deserved An editorial in the Irish Statesman in 1924 put forward the view that
agricultural bills should have ‘precedence over five sixths o f the measures discussed m the
Dail’ It believed that it was vital to deal with agriculture first because all other problems
were fed by the economic trouble which in turn was caused by problems in agriculture
The Irish Statesman almost always gave Hogan a good press However, they were moved /
to call on him to exert his independence as an extern mimster elected by the members of
the Dail, if  the executive council did not give him the finance or facilities which he needed
to implement the recommendations of the commission on agriculture They put their case
strongly
we have waited for a long time for measures absolutely necessary to secure efficient 
agricultural production and marketing One would hardly gather from the legislation 
this year that this was a country entirely dependent upon agricultural enterprise 50
Although there was some criticism of the tardiness of agricultural legislation the measures 
he initiated were, at a time of tension and uncertainty, very positive m nature The land act 
of 1923, usually referred to as the ‘Hogan Act5, was instrumental in completing the 
transfer of land ownership which had begun in the 1880s His work in agriculture was 
equally, if not more, important And, while the legislation which he guided through the 
Oireachtas in this area can be divided into several categories, all were concerned in some 
way with improving the image of Irish agriculture, especially in export markets Marketing, 
a term in common use to-day, was at the heart of his efforts on behalf of the agriculture 
industry He wanted to improve the quality and standard of produce which was sold,
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particularly on the British market Giving purchasers what they wanted was the best way, 
m his opinion, to secure good prices for the farm er51
Hogan’s instincts, as a conservative, were to encourage self-help and to minimise state 
intervention But he was well aware that self-help and voluntary efforts had not been 
effective in the past and that Irish goods were often regarded as sub-standard, especially in 
Britain He made this abundantly clear m  the Dail
failing the efforts of the farmers’ organisations it was necessary for the State to step 
in to do work which the Irish farmers should be doing for themselves 52
He was forced to bring m legislation in key areas of agriculture, much as quality control 
of export produce and regulations to improve the livestock breeding, because it was evident 
that the department’s voluntary schemes had failed
Hogan’s attitude to farming was based on the conviction that it was a business which would 
benefit from investment He condemned the pomt of view of farmers who would not 
improve their farming practices because it meant spending money It was his belief that
the sooner they [got] away from that pomt of view, look[ed] at their business 
rationally as business men, and [thought] of their business along the lines of getting 
a good return for the money spent, the better Deputies who [had] the interest of 
the farmers at heart should [have] endeavourfed] to turn their pomt of view in that 
direction - to show that money well spent and economically spent, after full
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consideration, may be well worth spending and may be far better for their business 
than keeping that money in their pockets 53
He attempted through legislation to give the farmers access to much needed capital in order 
that they could put his policies into practice The Agricultural Credit Act 1927 and 
subsequent amending legislation promoted the idea of farmers borrowing money to better 
their holdings, without the necessity of having to produce security at the level which the 
banks demanded 54 Facilitating credit to farmers was very much in keeping with Hogan’s 
philosophy of self-help Under the scheme farmers borrowed money instead of receiving 
grants which would not necessarily have given them the incentive to increase production 
they got from the need to repay their loans The scheme was, therefore, a way of giving 
farmers the opportunity to work their farms in a business like way
Of indirect assistance, and of no less importance to agriculture as a whole, was his creation 
of faculties of agricultural science in both University College Dublin (UCD) and University 
College Cork (UCC) There were already institutions dealing with agricultural education 
and research such as Albert College in Glasnevin, and the College of Science in Dublin 
However, the creation of separate university faculties attached to their work a status it had 
previously lacked55 Similarly, the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1931, ‘an act to make provision 
for the registration and control of veterinary surgeons’,56 showed that there was a wish to 
bring all branches of agriculture and its ancillary areas under some sort of regulation, 
however much Hogan was devoted to the idea of self-regulation and self-help
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Hogan showed himself capable of understanding and allowing for the difficulties which 
large scale development of agricultural industries could pose He was aware that private 
investors were not going to take risks in areas which had no history of success in Ireland 
In 1925 an act was passed which allowed subsidies to be paid on sugar beet grown in 
Ireland in order to establish a domestic beet sugar industry It was a joint effort at 
ministerial level, the result of an interdepartmental committee set up in September 1925 to 
consider the subject of sugar production in Ireland 57 Blythe, the Minister for Finance, 
introduced the bill, but Hogan was in charge of its progress from the second reading The 
policy of subsidising the development of the new sugar processing industry is interesting 
because it showed that the state had accepted the necessity to supply financial assistance 
to specific industries in special circumstances without any serious debate on the principle 
involved The industry concerned had recently been introduced in Britain and was proving 
successful The special circumstance was the need to attract an industrialist with the 
expertise and experience to build and to operate the first sugar factory because there was 
no body or group in Ireland capable of undertaking the task in 1925 The complexity of 
the venture is shown by the need to involve three departments in the negotiations
Hogan did not see this type of funding and government involvement as an alternative to 
private enterprise Rather, he called it as an experiment, ‘pioneering’ work He did not 
want it to be regarded as a way of increasing employment or tillage, or even a good 
investment 61 want to indicate, if I can, how we hope that this business will become self 
supporting in the long run’ It is clear that he did not want the bill to be thought of as a 
precedent The irony of the free trade party speaking m favour of such a measure was not 
lost on Thomas Johnson, the Labour leader In response to P J Egan’s welcome for the
49
bill, which he compared to the Shannon Scheme, Johnson quipped ‘even though it is a 
further departure from Free Trade9’ 58
Sugar is a classic example of how the state became involved in manufacturing industry and 
has remained so (though the sugar industry was privatised in 1991) It shows the limits of 
the free trade ethic in a country which did not have either the confidence or the tradition 
of investing in high risk or large domestic projects It also illustrates how ministers, no 
matter how wedded to a principle, in Hogan’s case free trade, could not ignore the 
economic realities which existed and had to compromise for practical reasons But it is 
interesting to note that no matter how many compromises Hogan had to make in the years 
which followed, he always tried to give his decisions a free trade complexion and never 
quite let go of his belief in his overall agricultural policy, which put simply meant keeping 
prices and taxation low in order to keep the farmers’ production costs down so that they 
could compete successfully in the export market
Hogan found rates relief difficult to reconcile with his views on agriculture and the 
economy as a whole The necessity for some assistance for farmers was accepted as early 
as 1924, with the Local Government (Rates on Agricultural Land) Act Hogan understood 
that the conditions which prevailed in 1924, that is the immediate rates arrears owed by 
farmers plus the build up of arrears carried forward, were caused to a great extent by the 
Anglo-Irish war and the ‘rebellion of 1922\23’ 59 Throughout the remainder of the decade 
it continued to be a live issue It grew in importance with the deteriorating international 
economic situation in 1929 which put further pressure on farmers’ incomes, until with the
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assistance of the Fianna Fail opposition, it assumed a position at the centre of the political 
stage 60
Hogan’s conversion to the idea of giving the farmers some relief on agricultural rates came 
in 1924, before he was faced with a powerful opposition in the Dail It is an early 
indication that he was not completely doctrinaire and could be flexible within the limits of 
the overall policy of free trade It is unlikely that he was pandering to the farmers when 
he acknowledged their case, as he was never accused even by his fiercest opponents of 
being a man who courted popularity Indeed he was aware that his actions were not always 
politic Donal O’Sullivan, the first clerk of the Seanad, in his book The Irish Free State 
and its Senate, an interesting though highly partisan account of the first decade of 
independent government, says Hogan ‘was a realist, who consistently preached the value 
and necessity of hard work, and disdained to flatter the multitude’, and was, therefore, very 
critical of those who did Into that category he [Hogan] put de Valera and the Fianna Fail 
party, claiming, on the defeat of Cumann na nGaedheal in 1932, that ‘cant has beaten us 
but the people are sound’
Between Fianna Fail and such a man [Hogan] there could be no bridge of 
understanding They put the soul of Ireland first, he held the immediate need was 
to put our people on their feet financially Fianna Fail and Hogan hardly spoke the 
same language 61
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Hogan’s dislike and distrust of de Valera, which he did nothing to conceal, was public 
knowledge In private he referred to him as ‘a criminal lunatic’ 62 When alluding to his role 
in the events which led to the civil war he said
I listened to Deputy de Valera m these debates Not once, but twice and three 
times, he suggested that unless they got their way on these bills trouble would 
ensue Of course he did not say that he was going to bring it about He never does 
and when I compare these statements with another of his on another occasion, 
when I used to hear day after day dinned into my ears "Is your Treaty worth civil 
war9" and other statements which I will not probe now it does make me think 
that there is one thing I am quite sure of anyway, and that is that when it is all over 
again he will be looking at it through a wall of glass 63
Although his contempt for Fianna Fail and its leader was evident he did not cease to 
make clear to them his belief in the democratic process which could put them in power 
After suggesting that the opposition had attempted to impose a dictatorship in 1922 he went 
on to say that ‘the will of the people had been well expressed in the last six or seven years’, 
continuing
there is going to be only one dictatorship in this country, and that is the dictatorship 
of the majority - do not misunderstand me when I use the word ‘dictatorship’, do 
not play on the word, it has been used - and that dictatorship of the majority must 
prevail and there must be no question of whether the majority is made up of people 
who have a national outlook or who have not, or who have this, that, or the other
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There is only one doctrine that must apply to those people, and that is that they be 
Irish people 64
And, even more directly, he said
but supposing you do get a majority, I am absolutely satisfied You are then the 
majority party It means that you are then the masters of this country You will find 
nobody on your flank I will be a good looker-on 65
It is ironic that these and other ringing declarations of support for the institutions of 
democracy were made during a series of debates which related to controversial 
amendments to the constitution which the opposition denounced as an attack on ‘the great 
safeguard which minorities have under this constitution’ It is pertinent to ask to what
extent those who were strongly supporting democracy on both sides of the Dail m 1928
*
were committed to all its ramifications Hogan at least took a practical line when he said 
that ‘you have only one safeguard in this country and that is the character of the people, 
and the character of the Deputies’, while Fianna Fail who had strongly defended the 
articles which were being amended made no attempt to restore ‘the great safeguard’ of 
minorities when they had the opportunity after the election of 1932 The Round Table 
remarked wickedly that
all this pother comes from allowing our constitution to be drafted by a committee 
of doctrinaire lawyers and professors who seem to have searched the world for all
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the latest democratic stunts quite regardless of whether they were suitable for the 
peculiar genius of our people 66
Hogan’s active participation in the democratic process waned when he was no longer a 
minister His appearances in the Dail became rare although he was still able to command 
an attentive house when he spoke on the issues with which he was most closely associated 
agriculture and land His frequent absences from the Dail may have been partly because 
he was a solicitor in a large practice in the west of Ireland, but also because he was ‘sick 
at heart and thoroughly disillusioned’ 67 It is, furthermore, likely that the role of an 
opposition TD, even on the front bench, was not challenging enough for someone who 
had been so energetically engaged at such a high level for a decade68
V
One area of Hogan’s life which invites investigation is his attitude to the church and more 
particularly to the catholic hierarchy His private beliefs would not have been relevant but 
his public acquiescence with the church in matters of morality could have been important 
In a government ‘which was willing to use the power of the State to protect Catholic moral 
values’ it would be useful to know where Hogan stood in relation to other members of the 
government, like Cosgrave and O’Higgins, whom Whyte says were known as ‘fervent 
catholics’ 69 There does not appear to be any public record of Hogan criticising the 
hierarchy This is hardly surprising, even for someone as outspoken as Hogan, if  he 
wanted to remain in the mainstream of politics in Ireland where ‘by the late twenties, in 
the opinion of some observers, there was a revival of this influence [the Catholic 
church]’ 68 There is a hint in a letter to his aunt that he is less than enamoured with church 
leaders.
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I’ll begin to lose all respect for the Church if the Pope is condemning boxing I 
wonder if  he condemned bull-fighting which is a cruel, decadent, form of sport 
Boxing is a fine masculine harmless sport People are never really hurt at boxing 
I know because I have seen a great many first-class fights
The bishops here issued a pastoral recently they are very concerned about short 
skirts, they don’t seem nearly so concerned about perjury or murder, but there you 
are
I think the Pope was quite right to condemn the Actione [sic] Française That was 
an attempt by a minority to bring about a revolution by violent means I have 
always been taught that that is immoral Moreover, I believe that it will increase the 
influence of the Catholic church in France The church has never lost influence by 
taking a defimte line, on the contrary they have lost influence by attempting to be 
on both sides of everything 70
This letter is quite revealing in several ways The first is the open way he criticises the 
Irish bishops and to a lesser extent the Pope in a letter to his aunt, a nun This suggests 
that he took for granted a degree of broad-mindedness on the part of his aunt which is 
rather surprising given her age - she was in her late fifties - and her calling Perhaps this 
gives a clue how he developed his independent and highly individual personality which 
gave his career its distinctive style It may also show why he had such a strong dislike of 
cant and humbug His openness with Mere Wilfreda suggests that he came from a 
background where there were few restriction on what was discussed and with whom 71 The
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letter also suggests his disenchantment with the church was not something which had 
happened recently
Hogan’s criticism of the bishops was not unconnected with the general election which had 
recently taken place He would have wanted the church to come out strongly in favour of 
Cumann na Gaedheal, or at least to condemn Fianna Fail His comment about the church 
needing to take a definite line rather than attempting to remain neutral seems to confirm 
Whyte’s contention that
with the end of the Civil War, and the adoption of constitutional politics by most 
of the defeated republicans, it became possible for the hierarchy to take an attitude 
of neutrality between the two mam parties m the state, and the government could 
no longer count so confidently on the bishops’ good will And as the decade went 
on, it [the government] needed support increasingly from whatever quarter it came 72
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Hogan’s criticisms were based more on political rather than theological considerations and 
as a result say very little about his personal faith which is, of course, not relevant to this 
thesis But it would be interesting to know if they were widely shared withm the 
government and if other members voiced them as frankly as Hogan when speaking to close 
colleagues
There is one issue on which he took a line which was different from the majority of his 
government and opposition colleagues that was censorship of publications Michael Adams 
in his work on Irish censorship says the view taken by proponents of censorship* ‘The
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Vigilance Association and other persons and groups represented a large body of opinion 
within the country’ The campaign for a bill was accelerated by the intervention of the 
Catholic bishops O’Higgins gave their suggestions a sympathetic hearing and a 
"Committee on Evil Literature" was set up in 1925 to examine the matter The Bill which 
resulted was 4 a fair reflection of its report’ By the time it was produced, deputies on both 
sides of the house accepted the principle of the bill but were concerned about the way it 
was to be implemented However, by this time the adamantyne O’Higgins had been 
succeeded as Minister for Justice by the less assured James Fitzgerald Kennedy Significant 
changes were made Despite his reservations the section which proposed setting up local 
associations to vet periodicals was dropped and it was left to individuals to complain if they 
thought the law had been broken73
During the second reading of the Censorship of Publications Bill, 1928, Hogan criticised 
some of its provisions However his lack of support was not necessarily based on a belief 
that there should be no censorship but rather on the belief that it would be impossible to 
implement He cites three reasons one, that censorship would lead to a ‘double circulation 
of these books in this country’, two, ‘our proximity to a neighbouring country’, and three, 
the hklihood that he would ebe extremely difficult to get anyone m this country fit to censor
i
books’ 74
The debate also gave him a 
indulged in double standards 
said
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chance to lash out at those on all sides of the Dail who 
Referring to public morality other than sexual morality he
1
I listened to the debate very carefully We were all very virtuous and anxious to 
make the other fellow virtuous, and I presume having fimshed the debate, having 
made honest men of ourselves so to speak, we will revert and begin to discuss nice 
little subtleties whether commandeering is a proper word for robbery or theft, and 
I suppose the next time we are taking the oath we will push the Bible two feet 
away, and the next time under certain conditions it may be the proper course under 
certain conditions to embezzle the money lent All these are questions of public 
morality and as the Bill stands at present all these come within the scope of the 
Bill
He continued
I am quite clear that Thomas or Pat Murphy, who live anywhere between Donegal 
and Cork, is not likely to read either Balzac or Aristophanes even in translation, but 
unfortunately he is likely to read the publications where moralities I have mentioned 
are expounded, and unfortunately he understands them and all the suggestions and 
innuendoes I am anxious to limit this Bill as much as possible, for this reason only, 
that I think the Censorship Bill should be limited as much as possible The more 
it is limited the better I want to say that it is my settled opinion that there has been 
more harm done during the last four or five years by the sort of moral poison I have 
mentioned than would be done by all the pornographic literature that would come 
from France or England within a hundred years 75
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While his position on censorship contains some ambiguities he did not adopt the usual 
stance of Irish politicians on sexual morality on this occasion Nor does he appear to 
have had any fears about expressing his misgivings m public It was described at the time 
as ‘the most caustic and sensational speech5 which was made by Hogan who ‘rated the 
Pecksmffs m no uncertain manner and indicated that he at least had doubts about the Bill’ 
He was courageous to do so in a parliament where there was almost complete unanimity 
between both the government and the opposition on the issue The only discordant note 
from the opposition was struck by Sean Lemass who was critical of the government 
because they ‘ha[d] been too slow and too cautious in introducing a measure of this kind 576
Hogan’s stand on censorship may have been instrumental in convincing the Minister for 
Justice reluctantly to take on board several changes to the bill His position on censorship 
brings out another facet of his personality, his independence in matters of conscience The 
proposed bill on censorship had been initiated by O’Higgins However, this did not deter 
Hogan from speaking out and voting against it, even though he continued to revere his 
m em ory77
The easy and open way he corresponded with his aunt and lack of reference to anything of 
a religious nature in his letters indicates a religious man who could not be regarded as 
pious His laconic account of his life in internment camp contrasts sharply with the most 
devotional tones of another detainee, who recalled how the men
had Mass every morning and the Blessed Sacrament always in the Camp The
Rosary was said in the huts every night, and many of the huts - perhaps all of them
- were m time formally consecrated to the Sacred Heart 7g
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Allied to his stand on censorship the evidence suggests that he could not be numbered 
amongst Cumann na nGaedheal’s ‘fervent catholics’
Hogan died tragically m a motor car accident in July 1936 when his car struck a bridge in 
Aughrim, Co Galway, late at night when he was returning home He was forty-five years 
of age He was mourned by his widow, four young daughters and a step-son He left a 
prosperous law firm with branches in Ballmasloe, Ballygar, Athenry and Gort His death 
also left a serious gap in the leadership of Cumann na nGaedheal Cosgrave said on 
hearing of his death ‘our best man is gone’ It was a loss which the party could ill afford 
m 1936 His death was greeted with regret even by the Fianna Fail party De Valera, his 
most ‘implacable opponent’, paid him what the Irish Independent called 4a graceful tribute 
in the DaiP
Many of us differed profoundly from Deputy Hogan on matters of public policy, but 
I am sure that there is no member of the Dail who did not admire his courage and 
frankness m stating his views, his energy as an administrator, and his rare 
effectiveness m debate His death is a loss, not merely to his party but to the house 
and to Irish public life 79
It is a measure of the esteem in which he was held that the government saw fit to adjourn 
the Dail because of the large number of deputies who wished to attend his funeral It is, 
therefore, armed with the knowledge of how he was respected by his contemporaries, 
‘though he never was exactly popular, even in his own party’,80 and regarded as a national 
figure by the press at the time of his death that we shall look more closely at the policies
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which caused Walter Elliott, the British minister for Agriculture from 1932 to 1936, to call 
him the greatest minister for Agriculture in the world He was regarded by his friends as
a delightful and entertaining friend who in his private relations was just as 
outspoken and as free from cant as he was in his public capacity
The late Ann McGilhgan referred to him in sincerely affectionate terms She described him 
as ‘cynical’ but at the same time ‘lovely’ and ‘full of fun’ and was delighted that he was 
at last getting the attention which she believed he deserved 81
61
NOTES
1 "Congests" was a term used to describe small farmers who lived on uneconomic 
holdings in areas designated congested districts, these were situated mainly west of 
the Shannon and in the north and south west of Ireland The congested districts 
were defined by Section 46 of the Land Act, 1909 as ‘Counties Donegal, Sligo, 
Leitrim, Roscommon, Mayo, Galway, Kerry and the six rural districts of 
Bally vaughan, Enmstymon, Kilrush, Scariff, Tulla, Kildysart, in the County of Clare 
and the four rural districts of Bantry, Castletown, Schull and Skibbereen, in the 
County of Cork ’ Report of the Irish Land Commission for the period from 1st. 
April, 1923 to 31st March, 1928, and for the prior period ended 31st. March, 
1923 p 4
2 In the report of Hogan’s death he was referred to as ‘son and nephew of popular
Claremen’ The Clare Champion 25 Jul 1936 Interview with Bridget Hogan 
O’Higgins in the family home at Kilnckle, 18 Mar 1993 ^
3 John Joe Broderick, a publican in the village of Kilnckle, who knew Hogan very 
well, said that the Glennons had been comfortable publican-farmers Monica 
Duffy, Hogan’s eldest daughter, believes that the Glennons may have been 
protestants at one time, which she thinks may account for their being comparatively 
wealthy Interview with John Joe Broderick in Kilnckle, 12 Oct 1989 Interview 
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Public administration in Ireland before independence can be characterised as inefficient and 
complex The day to day business of running the country devolved to the under secretary 
in Dublin Castle who ‘had [his] hands full with the routine business of exacting an 
acceptable minimum of efficiency from the creaking machinery of Irish government 
Fortunately for Hogan and his fellow mimsters the administrative system which they 
inherited in 1922 had been completely reorganised It consisted of over twenty thousand 
personnel from heads of departments to typists, and unskilled labour One of the most 
important changes which occurred was in the way public officials were selected, that is 
candidates were chosen and promoted on merit rather than through personal influence and 
patronage The reforms instituted in 1920 were continued and strengthened in the early 
years of the State with the establishment of a Civil Service Commission in 1923 and the 
Local Appointments Commission in 1926 1
In order to understand Hogan’s work as Minister for Agriculture, it is important to examine 
the administrative legacy left by the British in 1922 The Department of Agriculture and 
Technical Training was sui generis It had been set up by act of parliament in 1899 to 
oversee all facets of agriculture in Ireland Its first ministerial head was Sir Horace Plunkett, 
promoter o f the co-operative movement and founder of the Irish Agriculture Organization 
Society, who had been instrumental in its creation
The purpose of the Agriculture and Technical Instruction (Ireland) Act, 1899, was defined 
m DATI’s first annual report as being
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to establish an Irish department of state so constituted as to be representative at once 
of the crown, the recently created local government bodies of the country, and those 
classes of the people with whom its work is chiefly concerned, and to give this 
authority the function of aiding, improving and developing the agriculture, fisheries 
and other industries of Ireland in so far as may be proper to such a department, and 
in such manner as to stimulate and strengthen the self-reliance of the people 2
DATI was similar in many respects to any department of state in Great Britain Sir Horace 
Plunkett, who was the first vice president o f the department, lost his parliamentary seat a 
year after it was set up However, he remained vice president of DATI for a further seven 
years which meant m effect that DATI was not directly represented in parliament by its 
senior mimster Plunkett’s absence from the Commons did not lessen his commitment to 
DATI and his enthusiasm contributed to it developing a strong character of its own T W 
Russell, MP, succeeded Plunkett in 1907 Paradoxically, the restoration of parliamentary 
accountability and the disappearance of Plunkett, detested by unionist and nationalist 
politicians alike for his idiosyncratic views, took DATI out of the political firing line The 
department’s standing and activities never became controversial again, although Russell was 
himself out of the Commons between 1910 and 1911 when a safe seat was found for h im 3
DATI’s junior executive and clerical staff were graded and remunerated in much the same 
way as their counterparts in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) in Whitehall 
Differences between DATI and MAF did not come from the its internal structure but from 
its constitution Its most characteristic feature was its representative advisory council and 
boards The Council of Agriculture consisted of one hundred and four members and was
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made up of appointees from county councils and representatives of agricultural and 
industrial organisations in the provinces. Its meetings were held in public and one of its 
central functions was to discuss matters of public interest in connection with any of the 
purposes of the Act. It also elected members to the Agricultural Board and representatives 
to the Board of Technical Instruction.4
The function of the Agricultural Board was to give advice to the department whenever it 
was requested. Their agreement was required for the expenditure of funds allotted to the 
department under part one of the Act. There was, therefore, an attempt made to have some 
element of local input in policy and decision making through these layers of public 
representation. It is true that those who represented the rural and farming interests on the 
Council and Board were not directly elected to their positions, but they were drawn from 
groups which would have had support within their communities and/or industries. This may 
account for the wide acceptance which the department gained in a comparatively short time.
By 1922 the department’s structure and pattern of operations were firmly established and 
there is little to suggest that they were radically changed when the British departed except 
for the disappearance of the Council of Agriculture. The channels of communication 
between its various branches had been set up so that information flowed easily from the 
agricultural instructors, agricultural overseers and the other field workers throughout the 
country to the central office in Merrion Street. Through files, on which minute sheets were 
kept, details of work in progress was passed to those who were involved or who needed 
to be kept informed. The minute sheets were a record of how different issues were 
handled, containing, as they did, the remarks and initials of those through whose hands
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they passed. It was a simple and efficient way of keeping track of a sequence of events 
and its eventual outcome. The files were ultimately kept in the registry department which 
looked after the documents and produced them on request. This system was still being used 
when Hogan left office in 1932.
When Hogan became minister he did not have to build up his department from the ground 
unlike some of his colleagues. The personnel who made up DATI remained unchanged and 
the transition from British to Irish control went remarkably smoothly. Issues which had 
been given priority and schemes which were administered by the central office bear 
surprisingly few signs of the great political upheaval which had taken place. There was 
evidently no hostility specifically directed towards the department or its officials during the 
Anglo-Irish war. In a memorandum on the collection of agricultural statistics for the 
1920, 1921 and 1922 period, it was stated that ‘it was not found practicable to obtain 
particulars of either crops or livestock on all farms in Ireland’. The Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC) were the census takers, which amply explains this. Nevertheless it goes 
on to say that the department had been able to produce reliable estimates due to the 
generous response of a very large number of farmers in each district who posted signed 
returns to the department. This rather phlegmatic description or more correctly lack of 
description of conditions at that time reinforces the impression that it was exempt from the 
attacks which were being made on other departments of state. At a time of serious civil 
unrest and lack of co-operation with the administration this suggests that it was regarded 
more as an Irish institution than an arm of the British government. A simple explanation 
for this phenomenon may be that it had succeeded in winning the confidence of the farming 
community. Sir Horace Plunkett’s early involvement with its foundation and ‘his
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enthusiasm and naivety’ may also have played a part in its acceptance Therefore, when the 
department was taken over after independence the retention of pre-independence staff and 
practices never became an issue This is quite significant in DATI’s case because so many 
of its employees were m close contact with the farming public and could therefore have 
been targets for resentment and complaints when the new government was in place ‘The 
best proof of its value [was] that almost alone among administrative bodies it did not go 
to wrack and rum m the chaos of the Anglo-Irish conflict ’5
The very success of DATI could have been a problem for whoever was appointed Mimster 
for Agriculture in 1922 Given that department officials had worked well together and that 
they had been used to a fair degree of autonomy because they were at a remove from the 
control of Westminster, there was no reason to suppose that they would have welcomed a 
minister who would be closer both to them and the centre of government Hogan’s 
appointment at that juncture was fortuitous Because of his genuine interest in agriculture 
and practical involvement in farming at his home in Kilrickle he did not come to the 
department as an innocent and therefore was not at a disadvantage when discussing the 
basic issues of farming He was a countryman, well able to distinguish a heifer from a bull 
and to tell the difference between oats and barley without briefings from his civil servants 
As a prominent member of the Farmers Union he must have had dealings with DATI and 
have been acquainted with the workings of some of their schemes With this background 
he was free to concentrate on the administrative side of the department and to tackle much 
needed legislation In a department where technical knowledge was vitally important and 
an understanding of the every-day problems facing farming essential, Hogan’s knowledge 
and enthusiasm for the subject must have been received with some relief
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Hogan had no experience of running a large organisation Like the rest of his ministerial 
colleagues he had never held high political office He had not been a local government 
representative, and had no first hand knowledge of the bureaucratic mind However, he and 
with many of his peers proved themselves remarkably talented administrators in taking over 
what ‘was essentially an old country setting up for itself a new state’ Despite its unsettle 
condition, they prevented it from sliding into administrative and political anarchy 6 His 
experienced senior civil servants were able to provide the background and experience which 
he lacked If Ireland was fortunate to have had such a talented group of young men in its 
first government the government were equally fortunate in having civil servants who 
handled the transition to independence with great skill
One of the key officials Hogan inherited was Dr J H Hinchcliffe, an exceptionally efficient 
and imaginative man In 1925, while chief mspector, he served on the inter-departmental 
committee on the sugar beet industry as the representative for the Department of 
Agriculture With R C Ferguson from the Department of Industry and Commerce he 
visited industrialists in Europe interested in the possibility of setting up a sugar beet factory 
in Ireland The enthusiasm with which he approached his task was evident He kept the 
minister and his department well briefed about his contacts abroad The accounts which 
he gave about the technical and business capabilities of the industrialists he visited were of 
a high quality Therefore, the information which he sent and his contribution to the 
discussions of the committee must have made the task of choosing the right group to start 
the industry relatively easy
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It is clear from the correspondence between Hogan and Hmchchffe that they had confidence 
in one another Hmchchffe made sure to forewarn Hogan of any difficulties which might 
occur, he advised him to have the good test results on beet grown in trials double checked 
by the ‘Chief State Chemist or analysed by Lippens in Belgium’ so that there would be no 
doubt about them 7 When the site for the factory was being considered he advised Hogan 
to allow Lippens to make the final decision, shrewd counsel as numerous towns were vieing 
with each other for the prize o f the first sugar factory If  Hogan had decided the matter he 
would have been applauded by the town and area which had succeeded but damned by 
those who were disappointed 8 Hmchchffe was not above suggesting a little subterfuge 
In order to prevent stalemate m a dispute between the Beet Growers Association (BGA) and 
the Irish Sugar Manufacturing Co Ltd , (ISMCL), he asked Hogan to wire him to the effect 
that he and Lippens had agreed not to insist on ‘this year’s growers’, towards whom the 
BGA were hostile, being represented at the first meeting of the conference to resolve the 
dispute This he believed would make the Irish directors less likely to push for their 
inclusion Hogan and Lippens had made no such agreement However, Hogan took his 
advice and the ploy proved successful9
There was a degree of informality between Hmchchffe and Hogan In September 1925, 
when Hogan was at home m Kilrickle, he was kept abreast of developments by him in 
considerable detail Hmchchffe took M Lippens to see O’Higgms in Hogan’s absence and 
arranged to entertain him O’Higgins and Fitzgerald were to join the party along with 
Blythe when he returned from Cork that evening They were all to meet that night, 
Hmchchffe added cryptically ‘I need not say where1’ While Hogan was at Kilrickle 
during the Christmas recess he kept him well briefed about topics such as the provision of
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a level crossing for the ISMC in Carlow and the appointment of Irish directors to the board 
of the ISMC. These were areas with the potential to cause him political embarrassment if 
they were not handled sensitively. Hinchliffe concluded one letter with
all good wishes for the New Year and hoping that you may, next New Year’s Eve,
be using Irish grown and manufactured sugar in your - well, shall I say coffee.10
Hinchcliffe was a notable civil servant. His rapport with Hogan was good and Hogan 
certainly depended upon him and used his talents extensively. His hand and style can be 
detected in many of Hogan’s letters and memoranda. However it is not always possible to 
know for certain whether Hogan’s correspondence, particularly with Lippens, was drafted 
by him, because of there are so few first drafts in the files. However, while Hinchcliffe 
was an unusually gifted man and dedicated to his work he was not alone in his dedication. 
The interest which many of the field staff, both at agricultural instructor level in Ireland and 
those involved in the inspection of exports and market intelligence in Britain displayed was 
quite impressive. The result of this dedication by field staff and those employed in Merrion 
Street was a vast amount of information flowing in and being recorded and analysed. It is 
of course debatable whether the information was used by senior officials and government 
to the best advantage.
It is worth recording that the staff of the department treated the farming community in a 
way which could be represented as helpful and unpatronising. This opinion is 
impressionistic rather than scientific and is gained from reading many hundreds of 
departmental documents. The best way of describing the atmosphere is to say that all the
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important issues were treated by both field and head office staff in a serious and thorough 
manner There was great awareness of the difficulties facing Ireland’s many small farmers 
and the lack of available resources with which to cure them This was expressed in the 
patient way that continuous infractions of the rules and disregard for regulations were 
.handled Tolerance of this sort may be regarded as weakness However, the department 
was created to deal with the special difficulties of Ireland’s agriculture and the failure to 
deal with them by the previous regime By 1922 the department had gamed the confidence 
of the farmers and began after independence under the leadership of Hogan to implement 
in a gradual way the changes which they had known were needed
Hogan may have been an inexperienced politician but he managed to promote a positive 
image of himself which led to his being regarded internationally as an excellent minister 
for agriculture 11 Whether he deserved such an accolade depends to a large extent on the 
qualities of the other mimsters for agriculture with whom he was being compared1 
However, circumstances did not help him to earn such respect and he faced serious 
difficulties from the moment he took office in 1922 Agriculture was in the grip of a 
recession which appeared all the worse because it followed a period of relative prosperity 
During and immediately after the first world war the price of agricultural products was high 
and demand was good, for example exports of poultry produce rose from £4 4m in 1914 
to £ 18m in 1919 However from 1920 on prices began to fall due to increased competition 
from imports into Britain from the continent and other countries of the Empire 6 in 1919 
co-operative members were realizing a shilling a gallon for their milk - some were getting 
as high as 14d a gallon In 1921 they were back to 7d or 8d ’12 Farmers had borrowed 
heavily during the buoyant conditions caused by the first world war and were in 1922
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feeling the burden of high interest rates and falling prices The civil war itself which had 
been preceded by six years of civil disruption of varying intensity, compounded the 
problems which he faced It would not appear, therefore, to have been a suitable time to 
impose new regulations on the industry
Regulative legislation had been discussed and investigated by the department from its 
inception The Agricultural Produce (Ireland) Bill, 1920, which had been prepared by the 
department, was intended to improve the quality of livestock, dairy produce and all other 
agricultural exports It was conceived in an effort to end the complaints of British 
importers It was hoped that the autumn session would probably offer a good opportunity 
for endeavouring to get through a short measure giving the department ‘full powers to 
inspect and grade all agricultural produce whether intended for export or for sale m 
Ireland5 However, it did not become law, and the problems with which it had hoped to 
deal had not been addressed Reporting on the condition of Irish eggs bemg sold m Britain 
in 1920, one of the department’s inspectors said ‘on the whole it is one continual grumble 
m every town I call and I trust the matter is receiving the attention it deserves’ 13 In 1922 
the same British food importers who had complained in the past were still clamouring for 
something to be done, otherwise, they threatened they would switch to produce from 
Denmark, Holland, Canada, Argentina, New Zealand and Australia, which would have made 
an already serious situation worse The attitude of British importers is encapsulated in a 
letter written by an irate London dealer
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To me, who looks upon business as something more than a means of livelihood it 
is tragic that the finest article of its kind in the world - the Irish egg - should be 
rendered a by word for filth and manure - as you know it is - merely because of 
carelessness, unscrupulousness and dishonesty on the part of shippers and crass 
negligence and apathy of the carrying companies,
concluding that through complaints from customers he had been ‘victimised enough th[e] 
last year for the rest of [his] life’ At the same time a similar situation existed in the butter 
export market In a letter to MAF about adulterated butter from Ireland being sold in his 
area, the Town Clerk of Ramsgate Borough Council asked if the government could take 
steps either to stop such butter coming into England or take proceedings against Irish firms 
who exported i t 14
Apart from the need for legislation to improve export performance there existed another 
major problem which required technical expertise There were serious deficiencies in the 
quality of the animals in the national herd which were obvious to those who were involved 
in the livestock business Cattle, sheep, and pig breeding had to be improved even to regain 
Ireland’s share of the British market, let alone increase it Dairying in Hogan’s opinion was 
the foundation stone of Irish agriculture, so improving the quality of breeding stock would 
have a two-fold effect, it would increase milk yields and produce store cattle which would 
achieve good prices in the markets in Britain The elimination o f the so called ‘scrub bull’ 
was the first task if a government sponsored breeding scheme was going to be a success 
This huge undertaking could easily have brought the department into conflict with farmers 
who did not wish to enter the scheme or who wanted to keep their unlicensed bulls to
service their own cows and those of their neighbours. They might have seen such 
legislation as interference with their traditional farming practices. In the following chapter 
we will see how Hogan piloted the Live Stock Breeding Act through the Oireachtas to 
tackle this problem.
A similar situation existed in the potato industry: poor quality produce was being exported 
and was damaging the market for Irish potatoes in Britain. The Seeds Act, 1920, had 
attempted to deal with sale and distribution of seed potatoes in Britain and Ireland. 
However, potatoes continued being sold and transported from one area to another regardless 
of the damage this caused through the spread of infection. DATI had tried in 1921 to get 
the British authorities to stamp out this practice by banning all imports of potatoes from 
Ireland into England except from exporters who were licensed by the department. They 
hoped that it would stop the movement of potatoes with black scab and encourage growers 
to plant varieties which were disease resistant. The problem of disease was common to 
both countries but its effects were more serious in Ireland where potatoes were an important 
crop. Both agricultural departments made efforts to improve the situation: in 1923 the 
British drafted an order which prevented the planting of any potatoes grown in Ireland 
unless they had a certificate showing they came from disease free stock, and in 1924 there 
was an attempt at a joint approach. It was not, however, until 1931 that a comprehensive 
act was passed, the Agricultural Produce (Potatoes) Act, 1931.
The obstacles to legislation were as much social as technical. Small farmers, especially 
in the old Congested Districts, relied on the potato as a source of food for their families and 
livestock and in many cases it provided them with a cash crop. Any legislation, therefore,
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which introduced restrictions on the movements of the crop could have been seen as an 
attack on the poorest members of the farming community Consequently it had to be 
introduced gradually and with sensitivity During pre-independence years members of the 
department’s staff and county committees of agriculture (CCAs) had been trying to educate 
the growers about the need to plant disease resistant varieties and to use better methods of 
cultivation so that by the time the act was passed much of the ground work had been 
completed 15
There are contrasts and similarities in the way in which livestock and potatoes were treated 
in the early 1920s Both were in obvious need of attention but priority was given to 
livestock because it was Ireland’s largest single export Legislation was put on the statute 
book three years after Hogan took office It was clear that the necessity for an act had been 
appreciated by the majority of fanners and farming associations in the case of livestock 
Therefore, resistance to its implementation was not strong or organised, whereas in the case 
of potatoes although the need for action was known it took almost ten years to bring it 
about However, a quotation from the guide to the Livestock Breeding Act shows that a 
gradual approach was also used in its early stages This demonstrates that the same realistic 
approach was used in both cases, avoiding a sudden raismg of standards which would have 
been impossible for the farmers to achieve and for officials to police
While the standard will not be unduly high when the Act is first put into operation
it is intended to aim at a progressively higher standard in the future 16
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This policy was a success Registration of bulls increased steadily in spite of worries, 
expressed at the time, about the suitability of some of the breeds prescribed by the scheme 
to produce dual purpose animals which would increase milk yields and produce good 
quality beef cattle However, the figures speak for themselves, in 1922 one in forty bulls 
was registered, in 1925 one in twenty five and in 1928 one in nine 17
The introduction of separate legislation for the dairy and poultry industries in the early 
years of Hogan’s ministry reveals movement in areas which had long been under 
consideration by the department Initially the minister wanted to deal with both in the one 
b il l18 However, it is quite clear from the length and complexity of both the Agricultural 
Produce (Eggs) Act, 1924 and the Dairy Produce Act, 1924 that it would have been almost 
impossible to steer these measures through the Oireachtas if  they had been part of a single 
bill similar to the Agriculture Produce (Ireland) Bill, 1920 The 1920 Bill not only sought 
to cover eggs and dairy produce but almost everything else which the farmer produced for 
sale both at home and abroad Such an unwieldy bill could have had little hope of 
becoming law especially as it had to pass through the House of Commons where the time 
available was limited and the enthusiasm of MPs was hardly likely to be aroused by a 
measure which was only of indirect interest to them The fact that the only Irish MPs to 
take their seats at Westminster after the 1918 election were Umomsts and the Irish 
Parliamentary Party made the situation even worse Because of lack of support at 
Westminster it is probable that DATI officials thought they had more chance of getting one 
single bill which covered everything through parliament rather than a series of separate bills 
which would have needed more parliamentary time
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While the breaking up of the 1920 bill and the introduction of separate legislation for eggs 
and butter by Hogan may not seem to be of great political importance it shows more 
clearly than any nationalist rhetoric the value to Ireland of having its own parliament whose 
prime concern was the self-interest of Ireland, and in this case, Ireland’s farmers. DATI, 
which had been set up by the British government to deal with the specific problems of 
Ireland’s agriculture which differed from those of the rest of the United Kingdom, had only 
managed to get one act relating to Ireland’s special needs passed in the twenty two years 
before independence, the Bee Pest Prevention (Ireland) Act, 1909.19 It also shows the 
limits on the power of department officials to bring their work to a successful conclusion 
when the political will and means to carry it through was denied to them.
The legislation on dairy produce and eggs was based largely on the findings o f the interim 
report of the commission on agriculture.20 The commission was set up by Hogan in 
November 1922 to examine conditions in the industry so that decisions could be taken and 
policy made with the help of up to date information. An interim report was produced in 
1923 and was signed by all members of the commission. It covered tobacco growing, the 
marketing and transit of eggs and dairy produce, licensing of bulls, and agricultural credit. 
With the exception of tobacco, all these areas had been dealt with by 1927.21 The final 
report, which was issued in 1924, was not unanimous. The majority report reflected the 
views of the Cumann na nGaedheal government by stressing the importance of self help 
and voluntary efforts to stimulate the industry. Emphasis was also placed on education and 
it was suggested that agriculture might be taught as a subject in secondary schools, 
something which never attracted widespread support.22 One of the findings on education 
which was implemented was the creation of university faculties of agriculture. However,
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its major concern was the livestock industry, which was hardly surprising, since this 
produced, between beef and dairy produce, the largest volume of exports Suggestions 
about increasing the acreage under tillage were regarded with a degree of pessimism and 
were, therefore, in line with Hogan’s view and the view of the department The minority 
report was signed by the two Labour members With its ideas for expanding tillage 
through some form of compulsion or subsidies and encouraging industries based on 
agriculture it was in line with their agricultural policy It also fore-shadowed policies which 
began to grow in popularity towards the middle of the 1920s They were adopted by 
Fianna Fail and became the policy of their government after they won power in 1932 The 
hope was that more tillage would increase employment on the land and that state 
intervention would do the same in the agri-industries 23
In his book on the Economic History of Live Stock in Ireland, which was published in 
1940 long after the commission had reported and the policy of protection had been 
introduced by Fianna Fail, John O’Donovan defended the majority report He reached this 
conclusion because the ‘predominance of small holdings’ tended ‘to support the existing 
system’ in which livestock played the most important role He also pointed out that 
Ireland’s climate ‘made the pasture lands particularly productive’ and that an integrated 
system based on livestock had developed which was in the interest not only of the large 
ranchers but the small farmers who ‘carry on supplementary occupations’, and therefore 
kept ‘on their small farms, a cow or two’ and ‘the calves until’ they were ‘twelve months 
old’ O’Donovan’s thesis was that these farmers could not benefit from increased tillage 
and that large increases in tillage could remove the market for their year old calves In
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other words the traditional structure of farming based largely on the raising of livestock, 
dictated from the beginning the way that decisions had to be taken 24
The commission on agriculture heard evidence from those who were most closely 
concerned with the agriculture industry Apart from describing conditions, many of those 
giving their views put forward schemes and proposals on how they thought new legislation 
should be framed For instance the Irish Dairy Producers & Shippers Association and the
i
Irish Creamery Manager’s Association (ICMA) both made detailed submissions for a bill 
on the dairy industry The department put forward their own proposals which were along 
broadly similar lines The differences of emphasis between those putting their cases reflect 
their special interests and shows how useful this exercise was as a method of gathering all 
shades of opinion, before actual decisions were taken The ICMA was critical of the plan 
put forward by the department’s man, Poole Wilson, the chief inspector of dairying, which 
they regarded as a defence of the dairy policy which the department had pursued in the past 
and which they believed had fallen short of what the industry needed 25 In a document 
published by the central council of the ICMA, they listed as their priorities a national 
brand for butter with strict controls and examination at the ports They dismissed as 
‘having little material effect on quality’ compulsory inspections of creameries They 
wanted all the assistance which was given to butter making directed towards improving it 
at the source of production 26 The ICMA were, not unreasonably, stressing the areas with 
which they were primarily concerned The department, on the other hand, which would 
have responsibility for implementing any legislation, pointed out that it would require more 
money to employ the extra instructors and inspectors who would be needed to make the 
legislation work 27
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The department had been working on proposals to regulate the dairy industry since before 
the first world war, and a butter bill had been drafted in 1912 However, it had been 
dropped Strong objections came from the butter factory owners and the IAOS, who were 
afraid of its effects, contributed to its demise The minister wanted to know why the bill 
had run into such difficulties The department responded that the factories’ mam objection 
had been to the term "creamery butter" being reserved for the produce of a creamery They 
believed, however, that the IAOS, who had opposed the 1912 bill, were unlikely to object 
to the 1924 bill Their objections m 1912 had been based more on the difficulties which 
they had experienced with the vice president of the department, who had been instrumental 
in discontinuing the society’s grant, than on any deeply held conviction about the 
classification of factory butter The problems which they had with DATI at the time did 
not dispose them to co-operate with its proposals 28 Another unsuccessful attempt at 
regulation had since been made under the Agricultural Produce (Ireland) Bill, 1920 This 
indicates that the department was already well versed in the arguments for and against its 
proposals when Hogan’s bill was drafted The department had also looked at the controls 
used by other countries who were exporting agricultural produce to Britain and was thus 
m a very sound position to advise the commission on agriculture on the shape of the dairy 
b ill29 A pleased assistant secretary wrote to the secretary
The recommendations of the Commission follow closely those advocated by the 
department This is all to the good as it gives those who would be engaged in the 
administration of any new work that full confidence which is so helpful in 




Given that the commission and the department were in agreement on the measures to be 
taken for the dairy industry, it would have been difficult for the minister to make substantial 
changes in the bill, even if he thought them desirable Hogan did, however, keep himself 
well informed about how the officials m his department were handling the bill His private 
secretary sought information from the secretary about areas which might prove to be 
I contentious, such as inspection and grading at the ports, objections from factory owners
i
• and the IAOS, how much butter was exported in the various categories which were being
examined and the expected cost o f administering the scheme 31 It is probable that these were 
I topics on which the mimster anticipated being questioned in the D ail32 Hogan knew,
! however, that when he introduced the bill he would not face any serious opposition
i During a debate on the report stage of the bill, he expressed mock surprise at what he
regarded as Deputy Milroy’s suggestion that ‘this was simply interference by the state for 
the pleasure of interference’ and countered the allegation by pointing out that he had been 
asked by deputies from every party m the Dail when the bill would be introduced and what
i
were the reasons for its delay He also pointed out that it was not just in the Dail that
i
( agitation for a bill had taken place ‘for the last four years practically every organisation
connected with the industry had been asking for a bill9 33 This was because, in the early
t
1920s, of the major farming areas, the dairying districts probably improved on balance the
i
least Irish butter experienced more acute competition on the British market through the
i
; appearance of its Danish rival34 Therefore, they needed government assistance to help to
fight off their better organised competitors and recover from the post-war recession
In one specific area the department went further than the changes recommended by the 
commission, which dealt mainly with the conditions for a national brand, general powers
i  9 4
Ii
of inspection and the enforcing of regulations on cleanliness They had come to the 
conclusion that more could be gained from the elimination of low class butter from the 
export market than by any other measure This would mean exporting only butter which 
met a set standard and so would reduce the risk of second class Irish butter being sold in 
the shops m Britain with consequential damage to the reputation of first class butter The 
department sought the minister’s approval for this measure They advised him to meet the 
various interests who would be affected by the bill Prior to meeting them he had a 
conference with those who were concerned with its preparation and was briefed on the 
technical reasons for the greater complexity of the new proposals 35
They convinced the minister of the validity of their case Removing second class butter 
from the export market would give the department complete control of the quality o f Irish 
butter The proposed changes did not go unnoticed On 2 April 1924, the minister for 
Finance, Ernest Blythe, wrote to Hogan questiomng him about the bill He was concerned 
about the degree of state intervention which was involved and asked if  they, the Department 
of Lands and Agriculture, were going to control the whole export business Hogan 
replied that the bill was directed towards the improvement of the whole Irish butter trade 
in Great Britain He said that the establishment of a national brand was not sufficient and 
that there was more to be gamed from the elimination of the export of low class butter than 
by branding the best He cited the case of New Zealand whose regulations prohibited the 
export of any butter unless branded The minister set out the department’s case and made 
it his own Undoubtedly it was a good case and deserved his backing The Department 
of Finance agreed with the points in his analysis and thereafter raised no substantial 
objections36 That they sought reassurance from one of the staunchest proponents of laissez-
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faire economics shows the suspicion with which any measures which smacked of state 
intervention was viewed by other departments, particularly Finance, and the degree of 
commitment the government had to free trade and to preventing their policy being gradually 
eroded.
Hogan introduced the bill in the Dail on 6 June 1924. His opening statement contains what 
might be called his credo:
Dairying is the foundation of Irish agriculture. Any weakness in dairying is 
immediately reflected in every aspect of agriculture, and if by any mischance the 
dairy farmer should go out of business the wheels of industry would immediately 
stop short. 37
In the 1920s when so many people depended on dairy and livestock exports for their living 
either directly or indirectly this could hardly be called empty rhetoric, and it probably 
accounts for his readiness to accept state regulation. However he insisted on the industry 
paying some of the costs of inspection.38 He did not see why measures which would 
benefit the dairy industry should be paid for by the general public especially as he believed 
it was the failure of ‘the efforts o f farmers’ organisations’ which made it ‘necessary for the 
State to step in to do the work which the farmers should’ have done ‘for themselves’.39 
Acceptance of what was in effect the department’s bill was not confined to the minister or 
the Cumann na nGaedheal government. The opposition, in the form of the Labour Party 
and the Farmers’ Party, raised only minor technical objections. Denis Gorey, TD, leader of 
the Farmers’ Party welcomed it at its second reading saying ‘this is the Bill we have been
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agitating for for years’ 40 The only contentious areas were whether butter should be graded 
at the ports or the creameries, and who should pay the costs of administering the scheme, 
the industry or the exchequer Neither o f these issues were, however, a real threat to the 
passage of the bill through the Oireachtas
In a review of the working the Dairy Produce Act m 1928 The Round Table was very 
optimistic It said that it had achieved its aim of delivering ‘clean milk to first class 
creameries making first class butter’ It was also impressed by the administrative costs, 
£17,000, which it regarded as 6a small price to pay for the saving of a trade worth at 
present £5,000,000’ It went on to highlight the success o f the scheme and the part that 
Hogan had played in it
butter and cream exports have increased by £1,500,000 and at the same time we 
have reduced our winter imports of butter from £687,000 to £333,000 Very wisely 
Mr Hogan refused to permit the introduction of the national mark on Irish butter 
until the quality was defimtely high Already Mr Hogan states that seventy per 
cent of the Irish creameries would qualify so much have things improved since the 
Act was passed 4J
Hogan’s dislike of compulsory regulation had previously been shown during the second 
reading of the Agricultural Products (Eggs) Bill He said
This particular [bill] is, if I might use the expression, a sort of voluntary 
compulsion, and the point I wish to stress is that there would be no need for a bill
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like this if both sides of the trade, that is, both the producers and exporters, were 
properly organised for the purposes of their own business 42
The department would have agreed with Hogan on this point The previous four years had 
seen determined efforts on their part to improve the egg trade They were conscious o f the 
areas which needed attention testing, cleanliness, packing and transport However, there 
was no way to prevent dirty and bad eggs reaching the British markets so whatever 
progress they made was being brought to nothing by a considerable number o f producers 
and shippers who ignored their advice and persisted m exporting shoddy goods43 In 
common with the dairy produce bill, the Agricultural Products (Eggs) Bill corresponded 
closely to the findings of the interim report of the commission on agriculture, which in turn 
followed the line which the department had adopted The problems had been discussed 
by the department with various interested parties and voluntary methods to reform the 
offenders tried Discussions had been held with representatives of the Irish egg merchants 
at the department’s offices as early as June 1919 in an effort to improve m atters44
However, reports continued to come in from both Irish and British shippers and merchants 
about the poor quality of some of the produce which was being exported45 Some producers 
and shippers found the temptation to hold back eggs in times of shortage, m order to get 
higher prices, impossible to resist especially when the department had no sanctions to use 
against them The egg trade does not appear to have had confidence in their own ability 
to regulate themselves and pressed DATI to do something about it The department were 
well aware of the trade’s misgivings The vice president recorded them in a memorandum
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during the last three months Irish egg merchants have been requesting the 
department to obtain powers to enable them to licence each egg exporter The 
conditions to be imposed before a shipper would qualify to be licensed would 
probably be a matter for discussion between the department and the trade The 
marketing section are in entire sympathy with this request as they feel that it will 
require something more than voluntary effort to effect a change which is necessary 
at once in view of the fact that foreign competition is making every effort to 
capture the trade of the British market 46
Both bills, which proceeded through the Dail almost simultaneously, are interesting from 
the pomt of view of policy making because they were passed in the early years of the new 
state47 In 1922 the Cumann na nGaedheal government were as close to a fresh start as it 
was possible to be With no Irish antecedents with whom they could be compared, they 
were apparently in a position to decide their priorities and set the policy agenda The 
preceding description of how the legislation on the dairy and the egg export industries gives 
some inkling of how a policy can gradually become accepted and entrenched without any 
conscious decision being taken by the governing party or administration It suggests that 
this happened because they were under the same constraints as the previous administration 
They were therefore forced to adopt the same policies In both of these industries a 
situation had developed which caused and which would have continued to cause huge 
losses in export revenues both to the country and to the individuals concerned in these 
busmesses Something had to be done DATI had tried to eradicate the bad practices by 
education and through suggesting and promoting voluntary schemes These worked m some 
cases, but in many others they did not Therefore, the image of Irish
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agricultural produce in the United Kingdom continued to suffer Failure to improve the 
quality of goods allied to the decline in their share of the British market forced all parties 
to the conclusion that compulsory regulations would have to be tried
To Hogan state intervention and regulation of industry was anathema He believed in the 
self-regulation of industry and commerce and in the individual working hard and looking 
after himself Free trade was fundamental to his economic outlook However, when 
confronted with the deteriorating situation in the export market in 1922-23, there was very 
little which he could do except go along with the bills which his department drafted The 
calls for legislation were loud and clear from all who were concerned in the export sections 
of these industries The commission on agriculture set up by Hogan m November 1922 
heard evidence from all the interested parties and came to the same conclusion as the 
department One of the mam considerations which spurred the department must have been 
the legislation which was being implemented in other countries who exported to Britain 
In 1920 when they were drafting the Agricultural Produce Bill DATI had examined 
measures taken by Canada, Denmark, Holland and Argentina48 Ireland, after the Treaty 
was signed, was no longer an integral part of the Umted Kingdom Therefore it was even 
more important to improve and maintain high standards Although a member of the British 
Commonwealth it did not enjoy the same trading position which had existed before the 
Treaty was enacted even though this had not immediately brought about new restrictions 
on Irish agricultural imports
In 1923 the Irish Independent contrasted Ireland’s declining position in the British butter 
market with Denmark’s ascendency and wondered if Ireland could ‘survive competition
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from the Danes’, whose eggs and butter were date stamped, guaranteed and graded It 
asked why Denmark, a smaller country then Ireland, was able to supply Britain with larger 
quantities of agricultural produce The inroads which Denmark, along with other 
continental and commonwealth countries, were making into traditional Irish markets were 
due to several factors Chief amongst these was a major export drive by other countries to 
mcrease their share of the lucrative British market using quality control as an important part 
of their export strategy This was very serious since Irish produce was at a grave 
disadvantage in the post war period because of the damage done to its reputation during the 
w ar49 It was unfortunate from the point of view of food exporters that at this critical time 
Ireland’s position vis a vis Britain had changed to that of a foreign country albeit one which 
still occupied a special position In response to a request for clarification on the legal 
position of warranties given in respect of butter from Ireland exported to Britain the 
department noted the opimon of the attorney general that ‘Ireland’ was ‘not now regarded 
in legal measures as part of the United Kingdom’ These were external pressures which 
could not be ignored, as the butter and egg trades were just too valuable There had to be 
some way of assuring British customers, both at the wholesale and retail levels, of quality 
and a fair deal which would do away with the necessity of their seeking redress in the Irish 
courts if something went wrong Because ‘many merchants had given up dealing in Irish 
butter if they could possibly avoid it’ the chief inspector for dairying believed that ‘our 
guarantee should be made good’ Therefore, voluntary regulation, which was Hogan’s 
preferred solution, would not have been sufficient to repair the damage done during the 
war years or quieten the fears of importers about the legal position Ultimately it was the 
British „consumer who decided how Ireland’s export policy for butter and eggs would be 
framed They were the real arbiters of the quality and dependability of Irish food produce 50
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It was ironic, m view of the stress put on branding and marketing, that in 1929 when Irish 
eggs were marked, it initially led to a drop in price Reports from the Commission for 
Trade in London gave as one cause the practice of selling unmarked Irish egg as new laid 
English eggs for which the sellers could get a higher price Another factor was increased 
continental supplies and the cotton strike which was ‘beyond the control of the trade’ 
However it was the inferior quality of the eggs which was a major factor in the differential 
in prices between Irish and Danish eggs The report went on
it is stated by traders and it is also the experience of this office that about this time
of the year [August] the quality of our eggs tends to fall off
The reporter did not think it was a coincidence that when the price of eggs rose the quality 
dropped He questioned whether they were being held up by importers rather than shippers 
He gave an example of this happening in Glasgow Branding, therefore, could cause 
difficulties if  the quality control was not enforced It meant that the poor quality branded 
product could be more easily identified with the producer51 There is an interesting contrast 
here between the success of the dairy legislation and legislation on eggs The two 
industries were structured in different ways The dairy industry was largely controlled by 
the co-operative creameries whose produce bore their names It was easily identifiable 
Therefore offenders against the act could be traced and penalised The egg industry was 
made up of many small licensed exporters who were in turn were supplied by thousands 
of small scale producers who did not have a large stake m the industry and were as a result 
more difficult to police
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Once the bills were drafted Hogan pressed both the Attorney General and the Department 
of Finance to allow them to be brought in as soon as possible He got his way His 
performance in the Dail was of a high quality both m his mastery of the technical details 
! and in his ability to see off those who wished to obstruct with minor quibbles Given thei
I enormous amount of legislation which was before the Oireachtas that year,52 Hogan must
have had the support of the executive council in order to have priority given to these
11 bills His task was made easier, of course, because the department had been examining
I
, both problems for many years and therefore had a huge amount of information with which
| to brief him It was not difficult, therefore, to persuade the executive council that there was
j a broad consensus in favour of government action The agreement between the minister
t
[ and the department on the methods to be adopted must therefore have been mutually
I
advantageous With Hogan pressing for the early introduction of the bills the department’s 
representations were given extra weight and vice versa Early m 1923 in a memorandum 
marked ‘pressing’ to the acting secretary of the executive council, F J Meyrick, secretary 
! of the department, informed him that the British wanted imported goods marked ‘imported’
He gave the department’s opinion that compulsory marking in the case of eggs would 
stimulate an improvement m the quality of Irish produce and ultimately prove an 
1 advertisement for the goods of the Free State Meyrick saw fit to keep the executive council
j up to date with developments which affected Irish agricultural exports to Britain and so
prepared the way for early actionS4 It is noteworthy that department officials were always 
confident that they could manage to operate new regulatory legislation successfully even 
I though they had not had experience of enforcing large scale compulsory schemes
Introducing and steering these acts to a successful conclusion cannot have damaged 
Hogan’s reputation either nationally or m his own constituency There can be little doubt 
from contemporary sources that both laws were almost universally welcomed Approval 
of his policies was given by the Galway electorate in August 1923 when he received 7,563 
votes from a valid poll of 48,375, with twenty four candidates standing and mne seats at 
stake, an increase in his personal vote 56 In subsequent elections his vote fell However 
although he was closely associated with free trade policies which had become very 
unpopular he did not lose his seat
Neither of the 1924 regulatory acts created any difficulties for Hogan in his Galway 
constituency Unlike legislation on potatoes which would have involved the small farmers 
throughout the country those who were most affected by the new regulations farmed mainly 
in the dairying areas of Munster and Leinster where the land was more suitable and the 
farms were larger The organization of the egg trade meant that there were thousands of 
egg producers who sold their eggs to dealers The majority of egg producers were farmers’ 
wives who kept a small number of hens to earn some cash Therefore, the effect o f the 
legislation on these small scale producers was marginal as it was the shippers, who 
exported the eggs, who were being scrutinised by inspectors from the department There 
was, however, a political bonus from this legislation, it managed to satisfy almost all the 
interested parties and made Hogan look like an efficient and decisive mimster while 
farmers in his own electoral territory were hardly touched by the inevitable, if  slight, 
disruption which the changes did cause
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This was in contrast to the crisis which developed because of mounting rates arrears which 
affected farmers throughout the country It was to be one of the most intractable problems 
of Hogan’s period in office Throughout the decade there were calls from every interest 
connected with farming, varying in intensity with the economic situation, for the relief of 
rates on agricultural land
In 1924, Hogan described the genesis of the problem thus
The fact is that the problem which this state of affairs presents is an abnormal 
problem from every point of view, (1) it commenced with the dislocation caused 
by the Dail local government decrees of 1919\20 Even though the policy of the 
Dail, while fighting the English Local Government Board, was to have rates paid, 
it could not be expected that the processes which took place during these years 
would not result in a certain amount of disintegration of that particular service (2) 
The Anglo-Irish war of 1920\21 and the rebellion of 1922\23, re-acted on the 
economic position of the farmers and on the efficiency of the machinery for 
collection of rates by local authorities Some local authorities, and some rate 
collectors, deliberately encouraged the non-payment of rates (3) The rate for 
1923\24 was an entirely extravagant rate Extravagant, not only for the reasons set 
out in Nos 1 and 2, but also because Local Bodies elected at the last Election not 
for purposes of administering local government economically and efficiently, but 
for other reasons connected with the circumstances of the times, could not be 
expected to attend to their proper business (4) Moreover, the 75% of the ratepayers 
who are farmers have gone through far the worst times they have experienced within
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living memory, and there is no sign of these times getting any better While farming 
has been collapsing the rates which farmers are bemg asked to pay are mounting 
These are some of the reasons which make the present rating problem an entirely 
abnormal problem The total rate for 1913\14 was £1,617,000 There were 
practically no arrears, and in that year farming was prosperous 57
The mimster played a leading role in persuading the executive council of the need for rates 
relief on agricultural land In a series of memoranda he set out a strong case in its favour 
His main proposal was that the banks would lend the local authorities two million pounds 
which they could repay over a four year period in order to remove the extra burden which 
arrears were causing to ratepayers A committee was set up by the executive council to 
examine his proposition, made up of officials from the departments of Finance, Agriculture 
and Local Government However, they were unable to present a unanimous report58 
Hogan addressed his response to the conclusions which Joseph Brennan, the powerful and 
abrasive secretary of the Department of Finance had reached He obviously regarded 
Brennan as the most important member of the committee He went through Brennan’s 
memorandum and answered all the salient points which Brennan had raised and did so with 
a degree of aggressiveness which bordered on contempt
To Brennan’s assertion that there was no revenue from which to increase the agricultural 
grant he said
That present recurrent expenditure absorbs not only the whole of but more than 
present revenue was, of course, known to every member of the Executive Council
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when the scheme containing, amongst other items, a proposal to increase the 
Agricultural Grant, was referred to the Committee 59
He went on to agree with Brennan "that the pressure of taxation is already so severe as to 
be of serious prejudice to the economic welfare of the country" but suggested that an 
inquiry into the tax system would be necessary and that
such an enquiry raise[d] questions of fiscal and economic policy which could not 
be decided by the Ministry of Finance alone, and which obviously require[d] the co­
operation of the Ministries of Industry and Commerce, Local Government and 
Agriculture, and [was] long overdue 60
He conceded nothing to Brennan and systematically demolished his argument that "that in 
fact the balance of evidence appear[s] in favour of the opimon that the farmers are 
distinctly the privileged class in this respect [rates and taxes]" by demonstrating that 
through the rates on land farmers paid for services from which they did not benefit He 
also reminded Brennan of the most important element of the argument which was that ‘the 
problem comprised not only rates that’ would ‘be current in 1924, but arrears amounting 
to £2,200,000, practically all owed by farmers’ On income tax he was equally clear that 
the farmers were not getting "preferential treatment" It did not follow that, because 
‘farmers’ produce ‘something less than 75 per cent of the National wealth’, they should 
pay an equivalent amount of income tax On the contrary he made the point that ‘income 
tax is a tax on profits’ and as farmers had not made profits because o f the economic
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conditions in the previous three years there was nothing on which to levy a tax He 
maintained, therefore, that
to point out as evidence of the privileged position of the farmer that he pays no
income tax, [was] about as relevant as to point out that he pays no super tax 61
There appears to have been some antagonism between Brennan and the Department of 
Agriculture In the correspondence on increasing the agricultural grant to relieve rates 
Hogan addressed Brennan in a very sharp manner Brennan likewise took a critical attitude 
towards the department and Hogan when they failed to reply to queries he had make about 
requests to finance the deficit of the IAOS Brennan did not wish to finance the deficit 
in full and seems to have been annoyed that Hogan had given a commitment to the IAOS 
about the matter without consulting the Mimster for Finance Blythe on the other hand had 
no hesitation in granting the money Brennan questioned if any state aid should be given 
to the IAOS Again he criticised Hogan for not replying to his minute requesting 
information about his proposals for the future of the IAOS Instead, Hogan had nominated 
six representatives to serve on the committee of the society Brennan was clearly irritated 
by Hogan’s handling of the affair He wanted Blythe to make a response to his minute of 
15 August 1924, ‘an indispensable condition o f  his ‘considering a provision in the 
Estimates of 1925-26’ for the IAOS grant Brennan had asked for information on the re­
organisation of the society throughout the autumn of 1924 without success His continuous 
requests for information finally elicited a very curt response from Meynck of Agriculture 
who told him that the society reorganisation had not been completed and that when it was 
he would let him know The tone of the exchanges between Brennan and the department
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do not suggest that an amicable relationship existed It is also worth noting that on the 
issue of the agricultural grant, the financing of the IAOS and later on financing credit 
societies Blythe did not take his secretary’s advice This tallies with other evidence of the 
strained relationship between Brennan and Blythe, which ultimately led to Brennan’s 
resignation m 1928 62
Having disposed of all Brennan’s objections to special assistance for the farmers Hogan 
came back to his own position which will be quoted in full
agriculture is in a critical and urgent condition how much can we afford to borrow 
to relieve it so that the inflation caused thereby will not be a greater danger than 
allowing agriculture, our mam industry, to go bankrupt9 The proposal - there will 
be others - is that two millions be borrowed It is stated that the resort to borrowing 
for the purpose of giving effect to this proposal "is immediately and necessarily 
inflationary in its effect" It is, but it would be about as inflationary in its effects as 
pouring a bucket of water into the North Sea 63
Although Hogan defended the farmers and fought for assistance for them he did so without 
discarding all his free trade principles His plan was to allow the local authorities to 
borrow money to reduce the burden of rates In the long run the rate payers would have 
to repay i t 64 However, in the meantime the impossible position in which both the 
government and the local authorities found themselves would be alleviated It was a mce 
solution to what was a very serious problem on the one hand it avoided giving direct 
handouts to one section of the community and on the other it made the job of collecting
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rates a manageable enterprise once again The immediate relief felt by the farmers would 
redound to Hogan’s credit, although they would hardly think it sufficient He won a victory 
over the all powerful Department of Finance From the tone of his memorandum it is clear 
that he did not feel over-awed by them In fact the opposite seems true There was great 
assurance in the way he put his case which points to his confidence in the scheme and his 
ability to implement it Instead of adopting a defensive approach, he attacked Finance and 
w on65 In the event it was decided to increase the amount of the Agricultural Grant
The Minister for Finance realised by 1925 that doubling the Agricultural Grant in order to 
relieve some of the rates burden on farmers was likely to become a permanent policy He 
asked Brennan to find out what had been done in the North of Ireland and Great Britain66 
Brennan contacted the Department of Finance m Belfast which told him that although the 
agricultural grant had been doubled and was likely to be doubled in the following year there 
was no legislation on the statute book which made it permanent This correspondence gives 
an mteresting insight into a meeting of minds amongst Finance officials on both sides of 
the border The Belfast official gave what can only be described as an analysis based on 
wishful thinking in his reply which was for Brennan’s ‘private information’
I may say that m official circles it was considered that far better use would have 
been made of the money if it had been expended on schemes for the development 
of the agricultural industry, but the Farmers’ Umon took an opposite view and they 
got their way They have, however, recently asked for some extension of our 
agricultural schemes, and in doing so have suggested that the cost might be deducted
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from this temporary grant which would seem to indicate that they are coming 
around to our Agricultural Department’s point of view 67
The application of the Agricultural Grant to cover arrears and annuities exacerbated the 
situation In a minute to the Department of Local Government Brennan stated that the 
system which had been designed for the relief of and rates had not envisaged the abnormal 
situation which existed in the early 1920s This, however, was not completely true as 
George Wyndham, chief secretary for Ireland from 1900 to 1905, had written that the 
reason why the agricultural grant was connected to repayment of annuities was to ‘provide 
against a combined refusal to pay’ They had not envisaged a large number of farmers in 
arrears with both rates and annuities and a native government in charge What had been 
designed as a punitive measure by the British administration became unworkable in 
independent Ireland The pressure which was exerted by all the farming interests on 
politicians made it impossible to continue to withhold the grant They had to double it and 
make it de facto a permanent arrangement It was a far from equitable solution to the 
problem The net result of the policy was to give greater relief, in monetary terms, to the 
larger farmers who had bigger rates bills There was some logic, therefore, behind the 
Northern Ireland finance department’s wish to see the money spent on improving 
agriculture practices rather than alleviating short term difficulties, even if it was just a pious 
hope 68
Hogan’s stand on rates relief and the way m which he conducted his campaign is in marked 
contrast to his handling of the agricultural produce bills They had taken many years to 
develop They grew and were improved and extended as circumstances changed until
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eventually there was a consensus which ultimately became law. The bulk of the work was 
carried out by the department who had been monitoring the situation for years. It was left 
to Hogan to put the bills before the Dail and make sure they got through with as little 
amendment as possible. He accomplished his task very successfully. The Local 
Government (Rates on Agricultural Land) Bill was different. It came in response to a crisis 
and the opposition which it generated came from within the government, that is, the 
Department of Finance, rather than from political opponents. Hogan dealt personally with 
the emergency, possibly because of the political implications of failure. They would have 
been immediate for himself and his party if he had not found an acceptable solution. 
Delaying his regulatory legislation, however necessary it was, would not have had the same 
political impact. It may have been because rates and rates relief were outside the normal 
competence of the Department of Agriculture that they had no established departmental 
view on the subject. This was a problem more naturally associated with the departments 
of Local Government and Finance. Rates, always a contentious area, would have 
caused particular difficulty in Hogan’s own constituency where the vast majority of 
ratepayers were small farmers. He would therefore have been well informed about the 
hardship that rates and rates arrears collection were causing and presumably was anxious 
to do something about it. In this case he was in a position to take the lead and make his 
own decisions based on his analysis of the situation rather than on the well rehearsed 
opinions of his departmental officials. He took that opportunity.
In three areas we see the minister operating decisively. Firstly he was determined to protect 
the interests of his farmer constituents and farmers in general. With this in mind he drew 
up his proposals in a memorandum of February, 1924. Secondly he proved himself well
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able to deal with the Department of Finance He rejected their assessment of the situation 
and persuaded his government colleagues to adopt his more sympathetic line In this he 
was undoubtedly aided by the popularity of the cause amongst the farming community 
Thirdly, he pushed the bill swiftly through the Oireachtas to have it on the statute book two 
months after it was introduced in the Dail In the introduction to this dissertation it is 
suggested that Hogan may have been a reactive rather than a creative mimster However 
the rates relief legislation shows him in both modes, that is reacting to a crisis and coming 
up with a creative solution which did not offend his conservative ideals
This review of Hogan’s early years in office shows him as a capable and responsive 
mimster carrying out policies under the limits set by the overall government policy of free 
trade There is no evidence that he disagreed with the general policy or that he 
contemplated acting in any other way, in fact the opposite was true However, there is no 
reason to suppose that there was any inevitability about the economic policies which the 
first government of Ireland would pursue Griffith, who was elected president of the Dail 
in January 1922, was the originator of the Sinn Fein doctrine of a self-sufficient Ireland 
It was he who appointed Hogan Minister for Agriculture, he was also Mimster for 
Agriculture in the provisional government, yet there is no hint that Hogan held the same 
views as Griffith or intended to instigate a self-sufficiency policy in agriculture ‘Griffith 
with that power and incisive leadership which came so naturally to him’ failed to make any 
impression on the policies of his protege, Hogan69
The speed with which the Cumann na nGaedheal government developed a coherent and 
consistent economic policy is interesting Perhaps the lack of any detailed economic plan
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on the part of Sinn Fein deputies who were elected m 1918, 1921 and 1922, and the 
concentration on the fight for independence, created a vacuum which allowed Ireland’s 
bureaucracy to set the agenda McAleese says
The economic arguments in favour of political independence were regarded as of 
subsidiary importance in the build up of national sentiment They were not 
therefore very well articulated and were not subject to much debate m the period 
immediately preceding independence 70
Hogan’s experience at Agriculture seems to lend credence to this view, he took over the 
department and immediately began to tackle the problems which had been high on their list 
of priorities Yet on the issue of rates Hogan acted in a very decisive and independent way 
which suggests that he would not have been pushed into actions with which he 
fundamentally disagreed, especially if there were alternatives available However the take 
over of power went so smoothly, considering the unsettled state of the country, that it raises 
questions about the cleavage in Irish politics which, it is generally accepted, was caused 
by the disagreement over the Treaty The cohesion and agreement amongst the group which 
formed the elite of Cumann na nGaedheal and the government on economic policy cannot 
be attributed solely to the so called split It is possible to accept that they would have 
remained united during the civil war but it is not clear why they did not disintegrate when 
the immediate threat to the state was over in mid-1923, unless, that is, they agreed on areas 
other than the constitution
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It would have been a remarkable coincidence if the deputies who supported or opposed the 
Treaty held views on the economic future of Ireland which divided convemently along pro- 
and anti-Treaty lines However Hogan’s ten year period in office shows few signs of major 
disagreements over government policies and reinforces the idea that pro Treaty deputies had 
more in common than their wish to end the conflict with Britain There was one notable 
exception to this rule, J J Walsh, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, who took a 
completely different line than his government colleagues on the issue of protection for 
industry and agriculture He, however, was a hybrid Pro-treaty and pro-protection he did 
not fit comfortably into either of the mam political parties During his time as minister he 
earned the scorn of the Farmers’ Union over his stance on increasing tillage He was told 
to mind his own business before he commenced ‘to plough his neighbour’s plot’ He was 
categorised by its paper The Irish Farm er as a ‘strong protectionist’ when farmers were 
not certain that it would do them any good, ‘in fact’, it said, ‘they [were] diametrically 
opposed to tariffs’ 71 Walsh fell from favour and took little part in electioneering for 
Cumann na nGaedheal in the run up to the second general election of 1927 In fact, he was 
out of the country The Irish Statesman makes it clear that this was not surprising 
because for a long time it was obvious that Walsh was a protectiomst of the extreme kind 
and that the policy of the Government m this respect was too moderate for h im 72 He did 
not stand m the September 1927 election There was speculation at the time that he would 
join Fianna Fail It is unlikely that he would have been well received in that party either 
as the only area where they would have agreed was the need for protection The Irish 
Statesm an encapsulated his political philosophy thus
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we believe the basic fact in the consciousness of Mr J J Walsh is his conviction of 
the necessity of high protection - that and nothing else 73
In his memoirs Walsh blamed the failure of Cumann na nGaedheal to fight off the 
challenge from Fianna Fail on the abandonment of protection for native industries and 
castigated the Farmers’ Party
Then a small party of alleged farmers in the Dail, in reality ranchers never lost an 
opportunity of denouncing industrial development 74
In undisguised bitterness towards his former party he maintained that ‘its complete eclipse 
would long since have been a national gain’ 75
Walsh certainly seems to have been a man who swam against the tide of public opimon 
During the Second World War he came under the scrutiny of military intelligence They 
became aware of him because of his ‘rather blatant pro-German sympathies’ and his 
‘attempts surreptitiously to gam favour with certain Germans by passing to them 
information of a military nature concerning Northern Ireland’ Walsh seems to have taken 
to the German cause as obsessively as he had adopted the mantle of protectiomst He 
supported the Germans to such an extent that he was ‘regarded in British circles as one of 
four potential Quislings m Ireland’ 76 He remained what he had been in government until 
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The years 1922 to 1925 covered some of the most difficult times for Ireland and Irish 
farming The post-war international economic situation improved only gradually and Irish 
farmers were at an additional disadvantage because civil unrest had flared up in 1919 just 
when the war in Europe had ended ‘First tram for three months reaches Maam Cross’ was 
the headline in The Irish Times m September 1922 and in January 1923, Kevin O ’Higgins 
presided at a conference to ‘discuss the most effective means of dealing with the 
lawlessness prevailing throughout the country 1 Despite these unsettled conditions, 
however, Hogan had begun ‘what was thought to be almost revolutionary at the time’, his 
regulatory legislation2 Throughout the next two years he continued to make progress 
starting another minor revolution, in livestock breeding, and playing a large part in the 
introduction of the beet sugar industry into Ireland
Hogan’s legislation heightened amongst farmers the awareness that individual efforts to 
improve their industry, however laudable, were insufficient They looked on Denmark 
which had a population of comparable size and a dependence on agriculture which was 
similar to Ireland’s The Danes were regarded and still are, as the epitome of efficient 
agricultural production and marketing In October 1925 The Irish Times produced an 
agricultural supplement It marked a visit organised by the County Cork Association of the 
Irish Farmers’ Union (IFU) to Denmark The purpose of the visit was to find out how the 
Danes had managed to become one of the most efficient and prosperous agricultural 
countries in the world The majority of the delegates were IFU members from Cork with 
some representatives from Dublin and an official of the Department of Agriculture The 
visitors and the journalists who accompanied them were impressed by what they saw They
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were wholehearted in their praise not only of the courtesy and civility of the people but of 
their evident prosperity and the way it had been achieved 3
Throughout the supplement several themes recurred The most constant was the education 
system on which it was believed the whole success story of Denmark had been built 
Danish schools gave a high priority to agriculture because it was the most important 
industry in the country Practical skills were taught at all levels and it was not unusual for 
farm labourers to attend agricultural schools in order to make them more proficient in the 
work which they carried out for their employers This was in marked contrast to Ireland, 
where agricultural education was regarded as separate from primary and secondary 
schooling Another theme was the way in which the Danes had organised themselves into 
co-operatives to buy supplies and to market their goods Cleanliness with its consequential 
good effect on the quality of farm produce was referred to throughout the supplement with 
evident envy The inference was that Irish farmers and creameries did not share the Danish 
devotion to hygiene However, the overriding impression given by all the writers and 
commentators was of a country where the people were independent and had organised 
themselves into co-operative groups not because of ‘overhead propaganda’ which the 
assistant secretary of the I AOS believed was the case in Ireland ‘Danish co-operation’, he 
said ‘springs from beneath - from the very soil itself, one might say - from the soul of the 
nation ’
Legislation was not the first tool the Danes reached for when they wanted to improve and 
regulate their industry, whereas one writer complained that in Ireland ‘we have put all our 
money on the efficacy of this method of social salvation More important to the Danes is
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the creation of an "economic man" by education and training’ 4 However, the department’s 
experience with self regulation for agriculture had been a failure since it was established 
Voluntary schemes had been tried but with little success Hogan was forced against his 
instincts to introduce regulation but with the support of all farming interest groups
Hogan would have agreed with the sentiments expressed in the supplement His dislike of 
legislation as a means of controlling farm production was well known The Danish 
experience was living proof that it was not always necessary for the state to intervene to 
make an industry profitable Denmark believed, as he did, in free access to world markets 
and so did not give direct subsidies to farmers or exporters They had to take their chances 
against foreign competitors both on the world and the home market Therefore, they had 
to give good quality and value for money Otherwise they would not have been able to 
retain their customers at home or abroad However the reason the Danes were so strongly 
in favour of the philosophy of free trade may have been the knowledge that their exporters 
were equal to any competition from any source and did not need the protection of tariffs 
or subsidies The Irish experience was different The independent spirit and the well 
established education system geared towards agriculture which the Danes had established 
m the less competitive days of the nineteenth century did not exist in Ireland The endemic 
poverty particularly in the congested areas of the west coast had created conditions where 
self-help at the level at which it took place in Denmark was a pious hope and difficult to 
make a reality The co-operative movement in Ireland flourished in areas which were 
already comparatively prosperous, namely in the counties where dairying was well 
developed This suggests that there was a correlation between the economic conditions of 
the farmers and the degree of co-operation which took place 5
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Educating the farming community was one of the original objectives of DATI and it 
remained part of the department’s brief after 1922 However, their brief did not cover 
primary or secondary schools It covered agricultural colleges which took school leavers 
and ran full time courses It also provided part-time instruction and assistance at local level 
through a network of agricultural instructors and their assistants at county level Specialist 
instructors were also employed in areas such as poultry rearing and butter making This 
system remained virtually unchanged throughout the 1920s and 1930s During the winter 
months series of lectures were organised by the field staff, which local farmers were invited 
to attend These contacts allowed department policy on the various aspects of animal 
husbandry, tillage and marketing to be disseminated, helped by official publications giving 
advice and general information Most of the instructors and inspectors were well qualified 
in agricultural science To their number were added more inspectors to police the 
agricultural acts and report to the department on their progress6
Unlike Denmark, however, agriculture was not integrated into the curriculum in primary 
and post primary schools The low priority given to the study of subjects concerned with 
farming m Irish schools was due almost certainly to the influence of the British educational 
system which did not have a vocational bias However it was not inevitable that after 
independence agriculture should continue to be regarded as a specialist subject That it 
remained outside the mainstream of primary and post primary education cannot be blamed 
altogether on the educational traditions of the previous century Hogan and the department 
are at least partially to blame for not tackling the reform of agricultural education It was 
a missed opportunity, especially at primary level, to educate the future generation of farmers 
and increase their knowledge of the importance of fundamentals such as hygiemc
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production methods and simple accounting This neglect caused Irish exporters financial 
loss and allowed other more customer conscious countries to establish themselves in what 
had been part of Ireland’s home market, Britain The secretary of the department reinforced 
the traditional line on agricultural education In his submission to the committee on 
technical education, he suggested that a sound general elementary education would develop 
a taste for informative reading He thought that entry to agricultural classes might be 
deferred until a student was twenty years old In other words he believed that agricultural 
education should be a thing apart and confined to those who would make their careers on 
the land Given that the majority of the population were involved in agriculture and that 
only a tmy minority went on to secondary school, it seems an odd recommendation He 
must have known better than anybody that farmers and farm labourers who had left school 
at the age of fourteen were unlikely to return to formal classes on farming when they were 
tw enty7
Consequently it is hardly surprising that it was not until 1926 that an act establishing 
faculties of agriculture and dairy science was passed Agricultural education had been 
spread over a large number of institutions throughout the country such as the College of 
Science and Albert College m Glasnevin8 This cannot have been an adequate way to 
support agriculture, and would not have compared favourably with practices in other mainly 
agricultural countries There may have been historical and administrative reasons for the 
unco-ordmated appearance of the third level and vocational tier of agricultural education
The educational ethos which prevailed in the British Isles did not give priority to vocational 
education It was unlikely, also, that those who admimstered the system at local level in
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Ireland, the boards and the clergy, would have relinquished their responsibility or have been 
dictated to by DATI before 1922 After independence the Department of Education does 
not appear to have made any attempt to include agriculture m the curriculum for students 
of all ages
The attitude of government departments and of Irish people in general towards agricultural 
education may have been influenced by their attitudes towards agriculture In an article 
in 1925 on Irish education policy Eom McNeill, Mimster for Education, summed up this 
point of view
It is a curious fact an effect partly of former conditions o f land tenure but partly also 
of education, that Irish people m general do not like agriculture Their desire for 
possession of land is sometimes a fierce passion, but the love is not for the land but 
for the possession of it
McNeill did not however convert his concern to promote interest in agriculture into 
practical measures for the improvement of agricultural education, eschewing any idea of 
vocational teaching which he regarded as ‘simply slave education, an insult to human nature 
and a menace to society5 9 This was hardly surprising since small farms were usually
i
equated with poverty and a struggle to make a living Consequently the families of those 
who wished to better themselves and who had access to education wanted it directed 
towards professions such as the law, teaching and medicine 10 Education and agriculture 
were not regarded as necessary to one another Hogan was a prime example of this 
attitude education was for most farmers’ sons and daughters a way of escaping from the
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drudgery of farm life This situation gave rise to an interesting paradox Irish agriculture 
was regarded by almost every farmer in Ireland as well as the vast majority of the non- 
farmmg community as Ireland’s most important industry However it had a very low status 
compared with other industry, commerce and the professions The reason is simple 
collectively farming was a formidable industry, but its component parts were small and not 
always efficient or economically viable The statistics said that almost all Ireland’s foreign 
income came from agriculture, that is the earnings which allowed Ireland to trade with the 
rest o f the world At local level, however, it must have been difficult to realise that the 
economy of the whole country depended on the production of so many small and 
uneconomic holdings
Hogan’s defence of Ballyhaise agricultural school m County Cavan gives an insight into 
the department’s attitude towards some of their own educational institutions, and it also 
shows that he sometimes went against official advice In a memorandum to the secretary 
a senior official was harshly critical of Ballyhaise agricultural station He regarded its 
educational output as ‘trifling’ and suggested the best course would be to ‘get rid of it’ 16 
Hogan visited the school in September 1924 and came to radically different conclusions 
He looked at Ballyhaise from a completely different angle He regarded the poor results 
of experiments as a consequence not of a badly run institution but of the kind of conditions 
with which farmers on the difficult lands of Cavan and Leitrim were confronted daily He 
was not of the opinion that Ballyhaise had no useful future On the contrary, he said that 
there were
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enough farms where with first class land, by buying the best stock and feeding and 
manuring regardless o f expense, we can inevitably produce, say 800 gallons per 
cow, per lactation period 17
While he understood that such experiments were necessary and useful, he thought that their 
results should be checked against the results of corresponding experiments in places like 
Ballyhaise,
where conditions, such as climate and soil etc , cannot be changed, are not ideal, but 
at the same time are typical of a large area of the country ,8
He concluded that Ballyhaise should be run with a view to solving, as far as possible, the 
special problems of Cavan and Leitrim and could provide short courses for farmers from 
the area
The department snapped into action after the mimster had intervened A report was 
produced which went into the points which he had raised, in great detail 19 Hogan analysed 
the problem from the stand point of a farmer who was interested in the practical 
application of research carried out by agriculturalists The department had lost sight of the 
purpose for which such agricultural stations/schools had been set up, that is, not just to 
produce high returns per se but the best possible results given the local conditions Hogan, 
by his intervention, caused a radical re-thmk This led to a departmental conference where 
a number of imaginative suggestions and recommendations on how to improve the
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performance of Ballyhaise were made 20 Ballyhaise agricultural station remained, thanks
t
to Hogan’s decisive intervention, and is now Ballyhaise College
Apart from Hogan’s interest m the application of agricultural experiments under local 
conditions there may have been a degree o f political interest involved He wrote to P F 
Baxter, a Cavan TD, in October 1924, telling him that he had no intention of closing 
Ballyhaise but had given instructions for the development of work in certain directions 21 
It is not possible to say if  it was at the prompting of Baxter that he began to take an interest 
in the future of Ballyhaise, or if Baxter became worried about its closure because of the 
sudden interest of Hogan and the department It would seem out of character for Hogan 
to expend so much time and energy on a cause with which he did not agree, especially as 
closure would have saved state funds However, Hogan was a politician, and so was not 
averse to passing on good news and associating himself with it whenever possible
This was just a small incident in the administration o f the Department o f Agriculture 
However, it illustrates how a minister can impose his will, particularly in an area with 
which he is familiar The official’s statement that the station should close down was 
unequivocal and he gave good reasons for this assessment The minister’s analysis was 
quite different and destroyed the case for closure The department did not argue with the 
line which the minister took and quickly got down to producing a plan for Ballyhaise based 
on Hogan’s suggestions for the farm Perhaps they took this attitude because this was an 
issue which could not be fudged, and because the mimster had shown that he had a 
complete grasp of the situation The incident is interesting as it shows the extent of a 
minister’s power once he is convinced that what he wants is correct and has the energy to
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pursue it It also shows that one action does not automatically lead to a re-think of overall 
policy Ballyhaise was an isolated incident which did not disturb the settled ideas on which 
the system was based or lead to a review of the relevance of the work carried out by the 
department’s educational institutions It may, however, have affected future judgements 
which were made when the work of similar institutions was being evaluated 22
There was a strong belief amongst commentators in the farming press that agricultural 
education was being neglected They had no compunction about airmg their views on the 
need for more agricultural education at all levels in the schools A good flavour of 
contemporary opinion can be gamed from an editorial in the Irish  Homestead in 1922 
The Farmers5 Union had raised the need for the teaching of agricultural science in primary 
schools The Freem an’s Jo urnal expressed fears o f the ‘undue preponderance of 
agricultural education5 if such a policy were adopted This idea was firmly put m its place 
by the Irish  Homestead
the Southern towns live on the farmers, and that being so, it is unreasonable to talk 
about undue preponderance of agricultural interest in a programme for the primary 
schools where there is no mention of agriculture at all, and where rural science is 
an optional subject n
Throughout the decade the Irish  Homestead, The Irish  Statesm an, and The Irish  Farm er
covered the topic of agricultural education The Irish  Statesman was outspoken on many 
occasions about the need for a change in the education system which it believed would 
lead to greater efficiency in farming It referred to a speech by Hogan which been critical
138
of the lack of progress made by farmers. Praising him for his directness, it asked why 
twenty-five years after the organisation of agriculture had begun was it necessary for him 
to air home-truths which should have been the indisputable commonplace of rural thought:
It is, we think, because education in the rural districts in the past had but little 
bearing on rural life. Our farmers read but little ... we doubt if more than five per 
cent of Irish farmers subscribe to any agricultural journal ... we are being driven 
out of markets we depend on. We cannot say that we blame farmers so much as the 
regime which left them half illiterate. 12
This theme was discussed and developed throughout the following years. The stand which 
papers like The Irish Statesman took seems to have had very little influence on the way 
that primary and secondary education developed. Hogan was aware of the necessity for 
education as a way of improving farming methods. He tartly remarked that some people 
believed that it would be possible to devise a system under which the Irish farmer could 
be educated ‘without the necessity of having to think.’ The speech, according to The Irish 
Statesman, was widely reported but it pointed out that it was ‘characteristic that sub­
editorial blue pencils were wielded on the sections in which the Minister expounded his 
policy in regard to rural education’. 13 The paper was aware that it was not a topic which 
was regarded as newsworthy. Hogan believed in educating the farmer but he did not 
attempt to change the thinking of the Department of Education or those of his colleagues 
in government. He never suggested any radical changes which would have brought 
agricultural education to the fore and put Ireland’s schools on a par with those of the 
Danes. The praise which was lavished on the Danish system of education in the farming
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and national press brought no practical results in Ireland. The status quo remained secure. 
There was no upsurge of public opinion demanding a similar system of high quality 
vocational education.14
The Irish education system was well established and very much in the control of the 
Catholic church by 1922. The church would probably not have been in favour o f a system 
like the Danish Folk Schools because they encouraged a spirit of individualism and self- 
reliance, which was at variance with the tradition in Ireland. However, it does not appear 
that they were ever seriously challenged on the issue, debate on the subject being confined 
to a few farming journals. It is more likely that a sense of pessimism about the prospects 
for farming prevented any consensus on the need for change developing. The lack of 
confidence in the future of rural Ireland led to what The Irish Homestead called the 
‘cream-separator’ effect
which separated the cream of the intelligence of Ireland and manufactured it for 
export, or for urban consumption, while the skin milk of the intelligence was 
returned to the rural areas. 15
Nothing was done to encourage the education system to give a higher priority to agriculture 
and agricultural science, even though Hogan remained quite definite in his opinion that the 
prosperity of Ireland would be based on agriculture for the foreseeable future. It is all the 
more surprising, therefore, that he did not pay attention to the way in which the rural 
community were being educated. The department files which relate to all types of 
agricultural produce are filled with references to the damage being done to the export trade
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not because the basic produce was inferior but because of poor handling This included 
packaging, hygiene and the conditions under which livestock were transported In chapter 
two reference was made to legislation to improve the quality control o f poultry and dairy 
produce, due m no small way to the criticism and complaints from British wholesalers and 
retailers Livestock exports were also coming under pressure from commonwealth and 
South American competitors This focused attention on the quality and presentation of 
animals which were being sold to British buyers
Like the dairy and poultry trade the livestock industry was being made aware that what had 
previously been regarded as the ‘common and inseparable interests’ of Britain and Ireland 
had altered as a result of the Treaty and also as a result of growing export penetration from 
other countries of the Empire In an attempt to prevent disease restrictions against Irish 
cattle being made permanent, the secretary suggested to the Colonial Office that the 
disadvantages which Ireland would suffer under new cattle regulations would be used as 
an argument in favour of a republic 4 it will be said that it could not be worse than a 
republic Ireland might indeed to treated with more respect’ However, a not 
unsympathetic official at the Colonial Office pointed out to him
I fear it is inevitable that Ireland will find that autonomy of any kind is inseparable
from certain disadvantages You may rest assured that we here shall do
everything in our power to minimise these difficulties But Irish autonomy will
inevitably mean British autonomy in matters which previously were treated as 
common and inseparable interests
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My deepest regret is that the provisions establishing permanent free trade were 
struck out of the Treaty We shall always now be faced by the possibility that the 
agricultural interest here will use their power to obtain protection against the most 
formidable competitors 24
This was an early indication of what could reasonably be expected in the future But while 
the market for Irish cattle might be eroded by new competitors, Ireland had been for many 
years a major and convement supplier who was unlikely to be abandoned without good 
cause It was important, therefore, not to increase the threat through careless marketing, 
something which was within the control of the trade 24
The mimster, his department and the industry feared the consequences o f Ireland being 
treated as a foreign country for the purposes of the cattle trade They were not alone in 
their fear The Department of Agriculture m Northern Ireland was similarly preoccupied 
There was a continuing community of mterersts between the Agriculture departments north 
and south which transcended politics It may be that such amiable relations were possible 
precisely because they were maintained bu "semi-official" correspondence and contacts 
between civil servants, many of whom would have worked together before independence 
No evidence has come to light of contacts at ministerial level which would obviously have 
raised political difficulties However, Hogan was kept informed of the lobbying efforts of 
both the northern and southern representatives in London In May 1922 he wrote to the 
British Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries saying that the Provisional government was 
going to improve the quality of livestock He made a case against the admission of 
Canadian cattle giving the risk of disease and unstable supply as reasons for maintaining
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an embargo against them 25 He was obviously fearful o f the inroads which they could 
make into Ireland’s traditional market
It is not easy to say to what extent the new trading position was appreciated by the 
government or the country at large In a press release Hogan gave the background to their 
attempts to maintain the easy access which livestock had had to the British market in the 
past He had asked to be represented at the discussions between Britain and Canada but 
his request was turned down on the grounds that they were not dealing with Irish cattle 
In November 1922 he was informed that whatever regulations applied to Canadian cattle 
would also apply to Insh He concluded bluntly
the moral of the story is plain and is, number one - that business is business and that 
m business matters England will do what suits her because the Irish economy was 
‘exceptionally dependent on foreign trade’ 26
This episode must have been worrying for Hogan for it showed how vulnerable Ireland’s 
largest industry was to decisions made in Britain A mimster less dedicated to free trade 
might have been tempted to intervene with promises of support for the cattle trade His 
response, however, was to implement measures to improve the product so that it could 
withstand the increased competition and achieve consistently high prices However, fears 
about competition from Canadian cattle proved unfounded
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It was soon found that store cattle from Canada could not compete seriously on the 
British market with store cattle from Ireland and this trade in live cattle contmued 
to be quite prosperous27
Hogan remained concerned about disease restrictions The livestock export trade could be 
brought to a halt during foot and mouth epidemics Exporting dead meat was a way of 
overcoming the regulations He called for the department’s observations on how the trade 
was progressing The department looked at two centres where efforts to start a dead meat 
industry had been made before independence Drogheda and Wexford Neither had been 
a success In Wexford heavy freight charges were the main cause of the failure to fulfil 
‘the success it at one time gave promise o f  The Louth factory was hit hard by the war 
when ‘conditions hampered the transport of carcases’ and the price of cattle was high 
There was one other obstacle to the trade which could not be ignored, competition from 
countries like Argentina and New Zealand who were already strong players in that m arket28
The difficulty of securing adequate and regular supplies of livestock hampered not only the 
dead meat trade Developmg alternative markets to lessen dependence on the British trade 
was subject to the same problem The establishment of trade with continental countries 
would require a steady supply of animals to make the investment in suitable sea transport 
worthwhile for the carriers In 1922 Ireland’s trade representative in Brussels saw exporting 
to Belgium as a ‘most promising outlet for surplus Irish cattle’ He wanted to have the 
transport costs defrayed in order to give the trade a chance to become established 29 An 
Irish trading corporation which wanted to become involved in exporting to Belgium asked 
if the government would guarantee them against loss and grant whatever facilities and
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assistance might be necessary But even this corporation in their submission to the 
department did not hide the fact that the ‘English’ trade in spite of its ‘slackness’ at the 
time still produced considerable profits 30 The departments of Agriculture and of Industry 
and Commerce examined the proposition A year later Industry and Commerce were 
quoting a Belgian importer who wanted two hundred head straight away and was ‘anxious 
to be the first in the field’ 31 Later that year Hogan came up with his proposal for 
exporting to Belgium He ignored the requests for subsidies and guarantees and suggested 
instead a propaganda campaign in the Belgian press to alert importers to ‘the fact that we 
can supply’ 31
This was, perhaps, as shortsighted a policy as the lack of urgency in promoting the dead 
meat trade The difficulties associated with encouraging growth m either area should not, 
however, be underestimated It would have been difficult to divert exports from the still 
profitable British market which was taking 743,000 head compared with a estimated 
requirement of 20,000 for the Belgian market which was untried and would pay in a 
currency which was likely to fluctuate in value 33 Criticism of the minister and the 
livestock exporters for their tendency to concentrate on the British market and ignore the 
alternatives should be tempered with the knowledge that they were choosing to sell where 
they got the best price They would have been open to far greater criticism if they had not 
availed themselves of a convenient market which every livestock exporting country in the 
world was doing its best to penetrate
Hogan’s disinclination to intervene in the cattle trade by subsidising innovation did not 
extend to his ideas on improving the national breeding stock34 The act which he was
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instrumental in framing reversed the emphasis of the schemes which had been m operation 
under the supervision of D ATI since the turn of the century They had concentrated on the 
payment of premiums for registered cows and grants to cow testing associations which 
momtored the milk yields and general performance of the animals Farmers who 
participated received a small fee for keeping records The Treasury had suggested to DATI 
in a note in 1919 that it would be better if grants were given to bull societies 35 However, 
DATI disagreed, believing that more staff to supervise cow testing and registration would 
lead to the kind of progress which they had been trying to achieve 36
A more realistic assessment of why the scheme had not succeeded was given by an official 
o f a cow testing association in County Cork In his opimon the reason he could not get 
farmers to join, even though he was local secretary of the Farmers’ Umon, was because 
they regarded the work involved as too troublesome and therefore not worth the effo rt37 
It was also true that because the DATI schemes were voluntary there was a considerable 
element of self selection in the composition of groups who took part This meant that those 
who were most likely to undertake the work involved in cow testing and registration were 
the same farmers who would be interested in breeding good stock A report of an 
inspection of Kerry cattle in 1914 bears this out
the want of success is due to the fact that the scheme has m practice proved 
unsuitable to the conditions which obtain in the districts where Kerries are bred 
The holdings are, almost without exception, small and the farmers are not in good 
circumstances They see no immediate prospect of deriving any immediate benefit 
from the registration scheme, they think it offers no inducement, or no hope of
ultimate profit to repay them for in the first place retaining their most saleable 
animals and secondly for the trouble involved in the keeping of records - a matter 
which appears to them burdensome 38
This was the attitude which Hogan had to overcome
The policy to eliminate the so-called ‘scrub bull’ for which the 1925 Act was implemented 
seems to have been a more direct and less complicated way of raising the quality of the 
national dairy and beef herds It may appear difficult, with the benefit of hindsight, to 
understand why this simple solution had not been adopted in the first place ‘Cow-testing’, 
says Hoctor, ‘was encouraged and by 1929 the membership of cow-testing associations was 
three times what it was in 1923 even then only 6 8 per cent of the total cow population 
was under test’ Ending a practice which had existed for generations, that is keeping a 
bull to service the farm’s cattle, was not easy either for the farmers or the department 
Deteriorating export markets gave the introduction of the scheme a better chance of success 
Like all changes in agriculture it had to be demonstrated that it would give the farmer a 
greater return for his investment and labour However, the failure of the efforts of the 
previous twenty years must have made the introduction of compulsory registration and 
licencing of bulls easier to present to those farmers who had reservations, especially since 
the evidence of that failure had grown over the preceding years39 Whatever farmers may 
have thought on an individual basis, Hogan was convinced that it would meet with general 
approval During the second reading he said
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the principle of this Bill is approved by the agriculture commission by, I think, all 
the county committees of agriculture, and by, I think, every organisation or 
association o f farmers throughout the country 40
Nor was any opposition to the principle offered in the Dail It was welcomed by Dems 
Gorey on behalf of the Farmers’ Party and accepted as a necessity by his colleague Michael 
Heffeman41
In the years immediately following the introduction of the act there were questions in the 
Dail about the numbers of animals rejected by inspectors enforcing the act Hogan, m an 
answer to a question on the subject in 1927, said that ‘on average about 45 per cent were 
rejected’ 42 It is interesting to note that officials of the department suggested when 
preparing the answer to this question that
figures for each inspection are supplied but it may be better not to give them, as 
the point might be raised that rejections at the latest inspection were proportionately 
high This is due of course to the raising of the standard 43
He took their advice, as he invariably did when answering Dail questions, and did not 
break down the figures What makes this worth noting is the attitude which the department 
had adopted when enforcing the newly introduced regulatory legislation (referred to in 
chapter two) which was gradually raising the standard of the animals to be registered It 
shows a commendable flexibility which is not often associated with the civil service and 
a degree of pragmatism which may be attributable to the influence of the minister Not
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everybody agreed with the way the department were handling the act one deputy said his 
complaint was not with the inspectors or the act but the way the department were trying 
to advance too quickly This was, in his opinion, the cause of protests against the number 
of animals being rejected44
At a Derry Rotary Club meeting in 1927 members of the Chamber of Commerce blamed 
the Northern Ireland and Irish governments for the depressed state of the Irish cattle trade 
Both governments had adopted similar restrictions on licencing and registration of bulls A 
local shipping agent protested that small farmers would not pay high fees to have their 
animals serviced and this was leading to a shortage of young cattle He used export figures 
to back his argument more than one million head exported in 1924, down to 781,000 in 
1925, and to 721,000 in 1926, with worse figures projected for 1927 It seems to have 
escaped his notice that the numbers exported had begun to decline before the act had begun 
to take effect, making it unlikely that the Live Stock Breeding Act and its Northern Ireland 
equivalent could have been the mam cause The decline was the result of conditions already 
described, greater competition and the British demand for good quality beef at a reasonable 
price45
Hogan alluded to the cause of the drop in exports in his answer to a question from another 
TD in the Dail He said that the cattle trade was facing ‘serious opposition’ which made 
it essential to upgrade livestock to meet the opposition successfully 46 The competitiveness, 
particularly of Canadian livestock, forced those concerned with the trade to look at areas 
which had been ignored because of Ireland’s hitherto privileged position in the British 
market Now that those privileges were being eroded existing flaws were being uncovered,
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which it was accepted were contributing to the drop in prices for Irish cattle One such 
problem was the ill-treatment of animals at fairs and during transit The result of such 
treatment was not just the suffering of the animals Bruising caused by careless droving 
when loading and unloading reduced the value of carcasses A deputation to the department 
told the mimster that the price of Irish cattle was ten to twelve shillings per cwt less than 
for Canadian cattle and blamed the conditions under which Irish livestock were being 
transported Hogan accepted the contention that animals were ill-treated but suggested that 
there was exaggeration in the press He also suggested that there were other reasons why 
Canadian cattle were achieving higher prices, the mam one being that their cattle were 
better finished It was noted at the time that it was the drop in prices which had brought 
about the public concern for the welfare of cattle for export
So long as it was the immortal soul of the drover that was in danger because of its 
cruelty there was no particular stir, but when it was proved that the cattle 
deteriorated in value by from twopence to fourpence per lb because of the bad 
treatment they received on their way to market and that yearly losses to Ireland ran 
into millions, business woke up 47
Hogan in his time at agriculture was not easily seduced by simplistic arguments, such as 
the connection between falling cattle prices and ill-treatment He realised that when 
demand for Irish cattle had been strong and competition weak, considerations about the 
treatment of animals m transit had been ignored by British customers Therefore he would 
not allow himself to be associated with the notion that if ill-treatment was stopped the 
trade would instantly improve48
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There had undoubtedly been considerable disquiet about the treatment of live animals for 
export, if newspaper reports are used as an indicator of public opimon The press 
connected the cruelty issue with the drop in Irish cattle exports Mr Ganley of the 
Salesmasters’ Association summed up the feeling of the deputation of representatives from 
all branches of the cattle trade which met the minister when he said ‘the animals suffer 
from first to last’ 50 Hogan, however, pointed out during the course of discussions at the 
meeting the difficulties which would be involved in eliminating hardship for cattle from the 
system It was not just a matter of one body or of one set of facilities being regulated 
There was the treatment by the farmers who brought their cattle to markets, the provision 
of suitable fair greens, co-ordinating railway time-tables with those of the shipping 
companies, improving the accommodation on trains and vessels and preventing gratuitous 
violence by drovers and others handling the animals Most of these elements fell outside
i
the ambit of the department and were the concern of Local Government, Justice and 
Industry and Commerce He told the deputation that ‘the matter is not so simple as it may 
appear’ 51 He did, however, agree to a committee of enquiry into the marketing of livestock 
‘to find out where the trouble’ took ‘place and how it’ was ‘to be removed as far as 
possible’ 52 This was made up of representatives of those directly concerned with the 
transportation and marketing of livestock, members of animal welfare associations and 
officials of the department53
The committee drew up a report which covered many of the mam areas of contention 
Some of their recommendations such as the speeding up of rail transport and the reduction 
of overcrowding on cattle ships would have been costly for private interests to implement, 





would have had to provide suitable fair greens, enforcement inspectors, and all night street 
lighting around markets where cattle arrived the evening before a sale There were other 
issues which might be called humanitarian, such as dehorning cattle, providing adequate 
food and water for animals in transit and the licencing of drovers However, the committee 
responsible for the report do not appear to have followed up many of its recommendations 
with action Implementing them completely would have meant a co-ordinated effort by 
all the interests represented on the committee in co-operation with government departments 
Predictably a decline in public pressure, and the indifference of farmers, meant that action 
was lim ited54
I
The department issued the Animals (Transit & Exportation) Order in the hope that this 
would improve the conditions for Irish livestock The order did not make any immediate
i
difference Glasgow importers still complained about the bruised state in which1 cattle 
arrived55 Port inspectors in Britain blamed drovers for the bruising which they observed 
had become less frequent However, they did admit that injuries were not always visible 
until after the animals were slaughtered 56 The department was conscious of public 
disquiet about the issue Newspaper cuttings of major articles ‘deploring’ the ‘ill-usage of 
Irish cattle’ and connecting this with the downturn in the cattle trade were collected and 
kept in the department’s files The department seems to have taken a rather sanguine view 
of the complaints from Britain and in the Irish press, preferring to accept the reports of their 
inspectors who said that ‘damage’ was ‘rare’ 57 The ill-treatment of animals in transit may 
have decreased, or at least the more obvious abuses became less apparent as by the end of 
1926 it was no longer a major cause for concern in the press It is certainly not true to say 
that it had stopped Campaigns to improve the lot of livestock exports or to ban them
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completely have continued to the present day However, as far as the department and 
Hogan were concerned they had dealt with the matter The mterest which they had taken, 
encouraged by a campaign in the press and the suggestion that it was contributing to the
depressed state of the cattle trade, seems to have wrought sufficient changes, short of
*
legislation, to defuse public concern and increase awareness of the problem among those
i
who handled animals for export58
Concern about the ill-treatment of cattle was replaced in 1926 by worries about the numbers 
of cattle being rejected as unfit for export because they appeared to be suffering from
i
bovine tuberculosis (TB) The British authorities introduced a Bovine Tuberculosis order 
in 1925 to enable them to screen cattle imports Irish officials began to inspect animals duef
for shipment in an attempt to stop those with obvious signs of disease being carried to ports 
where they would either have to be slaughtered and sold at a loss or returned at the expense 
of the owner Deputies were concerned that veterinary inspectors ‘on the other side of the
i
water5 were not always correct in their diagnosis and believed they were far too strict when
(
interpreting the rules for entry There was a very real conflict of interest between Irish 
farmers, their representatives and the British government One TD put the British side of 
the argument in the D ail59 In response to Michael Heffeman's assertion that farmers would 
not pay £2 2 0 to have their cows undergo a test for TB acceptable to both the Irish and 
British authorities, he said
I know it is expensive, but the British Government put some value on the health ofi
their people, and I do not think it would be in the least influenced by the question 
of saving the Irish owner two pounds 60
It may be significant that the speaker was a medical practitioner
I
Hogan took a practical stand on the issue in the Dail He demed the implication that Irish
t
cattle were being singled out for special attention He pointed out that they were being 
treated no differently than cows in England, that is any cow which appeared to be suffering 
from TB of the udder had to be reported without delay The problem in the Irish case was 
that animals so adjudged would have to be returned at the expense of the owners Although
there had been considerable tightening up as a result of representations from the British
\there had been constant complaints that Irish veterinarians had been allowing diseased 
animals through Hogan said that the British ministry appeared to be saying
we are tired writing you letters to say that you must stop any animal that has a 
tubercular udder, that appears to have a tubercular udder, or that has an indurated 
udder, and if you do not stop them promptly we are going to send back all such 
animals in the future 61
Hogan was right The lemency which the Irish government had shown had not succeeded 
The industry had not used the time to adapt themselves to the new situation brought, about 
by the restrictions 62 In July 1927 the British Diseases of Animals Act received the royal 
assent When the bill was first introduced it caused the agriculture departments on both
j
sides of the border to confer on the approach they should take to the proposed legislation 
(As has already been seen, relations between the two departments were quite close) Both 
were anxious that Ireland should not even appear to lag behind Great Britain in the 
eradication of disease and ‘for this reason the conference agreed to recommend legislation
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J
for the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland on the same lines’, that is, it was to follow theilead on penalties given in the British act The difficulty arose from section three o f the bill
iwhich would allow veterinary officers at the importing ports to slaughter animals which did
i
not pass their inspection for TB The experience of exporters since 1925 did not fill them
i
with confidence that their cattle would be treated fairly However there was little they 
could do to prevent the legislation going through The Ministry of Agriculture in Northern 
Ireland accepted by the end of March that MAF would not agree to any amendments which 
would permit payment of compensation for animals slaughtered under section three They 
regarded it as a waste of time pressing for protection for the owners of the animals 
slaughtered which proved to be healthy Without the support of the Northern ministry it 
was useless for the department to try to lobby the British parliament for special treatm ent63
f
The difficulties which were anticipated became apparent very quickly The mam sufferers 
were exporters of cows because TB was detectable by induration of the udder Hogan used 
occasions and issues such as these to remind the Dail and the general public of the change 
in the position of the country since independence ‘This is a hardship to the cow trade’, 
he said, ‘but it is an example of one of the English markets being closed to us The 
English have a right to close their markets to us if they wish’ But he admitted to Deputy 
French that the situation had changed British inspectors were more strict ‘and there’ was 
‘quite a serious situation as a result’ 64
Irish cattle exporters were vulnerable to British legislation and had no say in Britain when 
it came to disease control and inspection of livestock exports This was a particular 
problem as there was a huge onslaught from other beef producing countries on Ireland’s
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i
established and only export market However, it is important not to underestimate the 
strength of the Irish cattle trade with Britain There had been a long and fruitful association 
between the two countries which was capable of absorbing the changes which twentieth 
century legislation brought about65 The confidence of the trade in its right of entry to that 
market is underlined by the shock which was expressed when a very small number of cows, 
a tiny proportion of annual exports, were slaughtered m Britain under the 1927 Act The 
C o rk  Evening Echo headlmed the slaughter of twelve m-calf cows at Birkenhead on 31 
October 1927 The Irish  Independent referred to this again under strongly worded 
headlines on 22 November 1927 That the slaughter of twelve animals should cause such 
controversy in the press suggests that it was not a very common occurrence It is quite 
clear that those involved in the trade had no intention of allowing the practice to become 
widespread because they watched developments very keenly and raised the question with 
the minister if  they thought it was becoming a serious problem The damage which was 
expected did not materialise This was probably due to the increased vigilance of the 
department’s veterinary inspectors, to the hard line taken by those of the ministry in Britain, 
and to a growing acceptance of the view expressed by the minister that the British had the 
right to close their markets if they wished In the end the only practical response was to 
improve standards66
The early years of the state were not easy for the producers of beef, the country’s largest 
export There were some fundamental problems, starting with the quality of the animals 
being produced The need for the Live Stock Act and the other measures which had been 
taken to improve the national herd by the CCAs and the department’s instructors bears 
testimony to the perceived need for improvement However, it appears that the drop in
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livestock exports from 1924 was not caused solely by either the quality of the product or 
the changed position of the Ireland vis a vis Great Britain It was probably due to 
economic conditions in Britain and the assault on the British livestock market by other 
foreign suppliers The worries expressed by those who drew attention to the ill-treatment 
of cattle in transit and those who feared the strict enforcement of disease regulations about 
how these issues would affect sales to the British market were not confirmed by events 
Where, in the case of dry cows, regulations did bite, the effect was only marginal The 
producers managed to deal with this problem by persuading the mimster to introduce a bill 
which would give financial compensation to those whose animals had been slaughtered m 
Britain Hogan originally took the view that he should not be involved in this arrangement 
as he believed that it was an ordinary trade risk ‘which should be met by mutual or 
ordinary insurance5 arranged by the trade This was also the view of the department, who 
were ‘fearful that if such a scheme were set up the department would be asked to expand 
or set up a similar scheme to cover other risks’ They suggested that if the livestock trade 
really wanted a scheme they ought to promote a bill by private legislation However, 
pressure grew for government action 67
The bill which Hogan eventually introduced was in effect a compromise The legislation 
sanctioned a compulsory levy on cattle exports, to be administered by a board of trustees 
In that way administration of the scheme could be kept at arms length from the department 
Although Hogan did not concede all that the trade wished, he and the department did 
change their minds and persuaded the executive council to give the legislation priority 68 
This testifies to the strength of the livestock lobby They are shown here having a 
significant effect on the department’s policy on an issue on which they were united
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Accepting that neither ill-treatment of animals nor disease control measures, which were 
mitigated by the compensation scheme, had a substantial effect on livestock exports it 
follows that it was the international trading situation at the time that had the greatest 
impact on cattle sales Therefore, once Hogan had brought in his act to improve the quality 
of livestock, his ability to influence the situation was limited
Hogan’s reluctance to commit state aid to the well established livestock industry can be 
contrasted with his wholehearted involvement with the setting up of the beet sugar industry 
in Ireland The former was well supplied with champions in the form of the farming 
organisations and the cattle dealers and shippers The latter did not exist in Ireland, north 
or south, and therefore had no formal representation In Britain and continental Europe 
beet sugar was in its infancy It is reasonable, therefore, to ask why a government 
dedicated to free trade, at least in theory, should become so attached to the idea of 
subsidising such an untried industry Unlike the cattle trade, beet sugar could hardly be 
classified as essential to the economic health of the state Nor could it have been equated 
with the Shannon hydroelectric scheme which was to become an important part o f the 
national infra structure to provide services which had to be supplied from within the 
country 69
Patrick McGilligan, the Minister for Industry and Commerce from 1924 to 1932, in an 
interview in 1976 called the ‘Carlow sugar beet factory a child of the Shannon scheme’ 
He maintained that Hogan had experienced difficulty in persuading his officials, who were 
‘not sweet on the introduction of sugar beet’, that it was a new crop which would be 
additional to the ordinary rotation However, if there had been resistance to the introduction
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of beet sugar it was short lived Hogan, who was, according to McGilligan, convinced of 
its potential must have put a very strong case to his department When the 
interdepartmental committee on sugar was set up in September 1924 to examine the 
potential of a sugar beet initiative, the members from Agriculture and Industry and 
Commerce must have become immediate converts, as there is no hint m the reports o f any 
serious doubts about the basic principal of growing beet and refimng sugar in Ireland 70
The idea of growing and refimng beet sugar m Ireland was not new In 1851 an factory 
was built in Mountmelhck and went into production The experiment proved that beet sugar 
could be produced in Ireland even if it did fail though a combination of difficulties 
including beet procurement The belief that sugar could be grown and refined locally did 
not disappear completely According to one writer, ‘it was Sinn Fein in Leabhair na 
hEireann in 1908 which helped fan the first sparks’ Trials were carried out from 1911 but 
the results were not followed up However it was probably the growth of the sugar beet 
refining industry in Britain which gave the greatest impetus towards setting up an industry 
in Ireland This combined with support for sugar beet in the interim report of the 
commission on agriculture soon gamed it acceptance within the department71
This acceptance by Hogan and the government of the need for state assistance to the beet 
sugar industry was assisted by the experience of other countries In fact Ireland would 
have been the exception if it had not helped in its foundation with some capital investment 
or financial incentives The report of the interdepartmental committee on the beet sugar 
industry said ‘most, if not all, European countries have found it necessary to assist the 
beet sugar industry in its early stages’ The committee came down on the side of a subsidy
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and pointed out that some British factories had been unable to get enough roots because the 
price paid to farmers was not high enough ‘until excise duty on home-grown, home 
manufactured sugar was remitted, whilst customs duty on imported sugar was maintained 
at the rate of 25\8d per cwt 572 Even the Umted States had to offer some help to the beet 
sugar industry in the form of import duties on foreign sugar and farmers and producers 
made local arrangements to facilitate each other so that the industry could establish itself73
The need to subsidise the beet sugar industry may have been well documented, but why 
did Ireland need a sugar industry when there were sufficient supplies of refined sugar 
readily available9 During the second reading of the Beet Sugar (Subsidy) Bill, Hogan 
made a clear statement which covered both issues
The important thing is to prove that Ireland can grow these beets - that the farmer 
can grow them of the required amounts and quality After the factory has been 
operating for some years we will be fair judges of whether or not the game is worth 
the candle, or whether there is anything in this, whether we ought to subsidise seven 
or eight factones and what chances there are of those factories ultimately paying 
for themselves We cannot do that without the experience gamed from this factory 
Then we shall have increased tillage and increased employment In this scheme, 
so far as the factory is concerned, we do not claim any merit on the grounds that 
it is a good investment, that it will increase employment or bring increased tillage 
We only hope it will be the beginning of a scheme that will have these possibilities, 
and, in addition, provide a lucrative crop to the farmer 74
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In essence he was saying that this was an industry which provided a basic commodity that 
would always be in demand It would also have the merit of increasmg tillage which in 
turn would increase employment Increasmg tillage in order to give employment to farm 
labourers had always been mooted by politicians and trade unionists Suggestions that 
tillage schemes be made compulsory had always caused divisions amongst the political 
parties In a debate in 1922 the Farmer deputies wanted to know how the extra crops 
grown could be disposed of when they were already making a loss of two pounds an acre 
on barley and oa ts75 Sugar beet had one great advantage It would not affect the market 
for crops which were already being grown and cause prices to drop It had two additional 
attractions it would provide industrial employment in rural areas where the beet was grown, 
and reduce sugar imports
The antagonism of Hogan and his Cumann na nGaedheal colleagues towards government 
subsidies was lessened in the case of sugar beet because it was envisaged as a temporary 
arrangement By paying the subsidy to the factory they had some control over the amount 
of sugar beet grown, as the factory would contract with local farmers to grow specific 
amounts A subsidy on sugar beet was not like a subsidy on barley, wheat or other cereals 
which would have mvolved almost the whole farming community without necessarily 
producing the required result of expanding employment in rural areas A cereal subsidy 
would have been very difficult to administer, even if the government were inclined to 
introduce one, and would have spread the available funds very thinly over the whole 
country Beet growing, on the other hand, would be concentrated in areas convenient to 
the factory and the factory itself would provide both permanent and seasonal employment 
for a large number of workers in its catchment area
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A locally based sugar industry seemed to answer a number of problems the most important 
of which was rural unemployment However, the enthusiasm which Hogan and his fellow 
mimsters showed for its creation seems rather out of character with the way in which other 
decisions and policies were pursued where fears were expressed that if  they were to assist 
m one area they would create a precedent which would be used as an argument for further 
help in others76 In the case of sugar they seem to have ignored these considerations 
Nevertheless, Hogan must have been pleased when R C  Ferguson, the Industry and 
Commerce member of the interdepartmental committee on the sugar beet industry, reported 
to a colleague at Agriculture on his negotiations in Europe
I might say that my visit here has absolutely convinced me of the security of 
making a start on beet - it is risky financially at all times apparently but it is the 
basis of agriculture here and might mean a big thing for us in other ways than 
securing dividends 77
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Hogan and the other ministers involved were 
influenced by what was happening in other countries which had similar economic policies 
rather than by domestic pressure to establish the industry Inevitably, once they had let it 
be known that they were contemplating setting up a beet sugar industry there was an 
immediate and enthusiastic response Once the interdepartmental committee had set their 
investigations in motion the interest generated would have made it impossible to abandon 
the idea without causing serious political damage to the government and the mimsters who 
were most involved
The political implications of the attempt to introduce the industry were quickly realised by 
those who wished to have the factory sited m their area North Cork Industrial 
Development Committee (NCIDC) sent a deputation to J J Walsh, Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs, telling him that they had asked 4 a big financial house to investigate the 
possibilities of beet sugar manufacture in the area’ and requesting the government to 
facilitate them in every possible w ay78 A Mallow solicitor wrote to Kevin O’Higgins, 
indicating the support which the government party would receive at a local by-election if 
they backed the NCIDC schemes Conversely the 'Republicans’, he believed, would gain 
electoral advantage if the government did not ‘counteract’ their ‘propaganda’ that the 
NCIDC scheme would collapse ‘by reason of departmental ineptitude’ 79 Hinchcliffe, 
Agriculture’s representative on the interdepartmental committee, advised Hogan that 
assistance should be granted to one factory as an experiment which, if successful, would 
lead to more factories being built and more beet being grown He also suggested in a 
minute to Hogan that the best course to take is to allow selection of the factory site to the 
group whose terms are accepted, in order to avoid the kind of situation which the Mallow 
solicitor Sullivan had foreshadowed 80
Hinchchffe’s advice was followed The Belgian group Lippens, headed by the a one-time 
Governor of the Belgian Congo and Belgian cabinet minister, Sir Maurice Lippens, was 
chosen to set up a factory and to decide where it was to be located They also won the 
concession that no other sugar company could build and operate a factory withm a wide 
radius of the site which they chose By allowing the ‘experts’ to decide where the factory 
would be located the government disposed of a potentially thorny problem However, even 
though it was Lippens who selected Carlow as the site, the Carlow Urban District Council
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(UDC) telegraphed the minister thanking him for the beet sugar factory 81 There is nothing 
in the records to indicate that the minister replied to the UDC reminding them that it was 
Lippens who had made the decision Even for so severe a critic of campaign promises as 
Hogan, politics was still politics
Poor to the announcement of the location of the factory, local business people mounted a 
campaign to promote Carlow as a possible site for the factory A committee was set up to 
coordinate local efforts when it became clear that other areas such as Kildare, Laois, 
Kilkenny, Wexford and Cork were being considered There was disappointment in the 
centres which were unsuccessful, particularly in Athy which had been confident, so much 
so that there were bonfires ready in anticipation of the good news 82
Hogan was actively concerned with all aspects of the negotiations He was involved from 
the initial stages when there were several firms bidding for the right, with government 
assistance, to set up a factory and organise the growers His efforts were ably supported by 
Hinchchffe who, with Ferguson from Industry and Commerce, visited the various applicants 
on the continent They kept the minister fully informed of their discussions and researches 
and it was on their recommendation, as part of the interdepartmental committee on beet 
sugar, that the Lippens group was selected Both were very well briefed in their own areas, 
agriculture and industry and commerce, and appear to have had a good understanding of 
the sugar industry They do not seem to have had any difficulty in presenting Ireland as a 
suitable country m which to invest in a sugar factory In fact their difficulty was not a 
lack of applicants For instance M Maurice Goor, a Belgian diplomat who had asked to 
be posted to ‘the new Free State’, saw the potential for investment in agriculture in Ireland
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‘He knew what Belgium could do Discreetly he interested the influential Lippens family 
in Ireland’ The chief difficulty which faced the government was choosing the contender 
who would be the most efficient and the most financially sound and therefore likely to 
make a success of the venture Their dealings were probably made easier, because they had 
the advantage of the British experience on which to draw 83
An interesting difference of approach appears to have existed between the secretary o f the 
Department of Industry and Commerce, Gordon Campbell, and members o f the 
interdepartmental committee Campbell believed that the matter was being looked at in the 
wrong way and proposed a bolder approach He suggested that the government should set 
out its conditions and then advertise them widely In that way they could attract bids from 
many companies He was afraid that secret negotiations would lead to corruption Nor did 
he believe that setting up ‘one small factory in one place only m the whole Free State [was 
an] adequate test at all’ In a memorandum on discussions about his objections which took 
place between Hogan, Campbell, Ferguson and Hinchcliffe, it was made clear that the 
government were open to offers for the establishment of a beet sugar industry from anyone 
who wished to put one forward And, in the opimon of the inter-departmental committee 
Lippens had put forward the best proposal Hogan made it plain that he was in favour of 
one factory and believed that Campbell was under a misapprehension about the capacity of 
the factory which would be considerable 84
Campbell’s suggestion would have meant greater state involvement in the industry It 
would have put the onus on the government to step in to deal with the problems of the 
industry on a regular basis and to undertake a greater degree of investment By contrast,
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the less ambitious plan which was adopted was more in keeping with the government’s 
minimalist attitude towards state intervention The way the system actually worked kept 
the government away from the day to day running of the factory and left the majority of 
decisions to the management This of course did not stop political pressure being brought 
to bear on the government who in turn brought pressure on the company It did, however, 
minimise the areas in which they, the government, could interfere They were in effect 
confined to the issue of the price of beet and the amount of subsidy to be paid each year 
of the ten year subsidy period
Campbell remamed interested m the fate of the sugar industry despite his early misgivings 
McGilhgan said that Campbell had been fearful of the idea in the beginning but later 
became ‘very, very enthusiastic’ about it This is borne out in the way he assisted Hogan 
in negotiations to resolve the dispute over sugar prices in April 1929 He describes in a 
rather whimsical way how he wielded a ‘white wash brush’ m order to preserve the 
Department of Agriculture’s reputation for impartiality He was prepared to act as arbiter 
again saying that ‘Hinchchffe looked saintly in white wash’ and expressing his amusement 
at being treated as a ‘senior person by two of the Irish directors, Col Gibbon and J 
McCann’ 85
Campbell may have been worried initially because he believed that negotiations were being 
rushed Ferguson wrote to Campbell in November, 1924 saying that there was no 
possibility of a crop in 1925 and suggesting that ministers should not raise hopes It 
appears that there was growing pressure to have the factory established m the following 
year Late in 1924 this would have precluded the type of action which Campbell had
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suggested His intervention may have been a caveat entered to cover his department m the 
event o f criticism had the venture failed, an attempt to slow down the momentum which 
had developed towards choosing the group, or a genuine call for a broader and more 
ambitious approach to state promotion of a new industry 86
Hogan and his colleagues were optimistic about the introduction of the sugar industry into 
Ireland They had accepted, as already noted, that the factory which they sanctioned was 
experimental in nature However, it is clear from the confident way they proceeded that 
they believed it would not fail Failure and its consequences were never directly alluded 
to in any of the correspondence The belief was that once the right industrialist was chosen 
it would have every chance of success Their optimism must have been reinforced by the 
number of large scale European industrial groups who asked to be considered for the 
enterprise 87
Mr J L Lynd of Finance wrote to the three departments agreeing with their report88 In a 
report from the interdepartmental committee dated October 1924, the terms which were to 
be offered to the industry were discussed They used the British terms as a yardstick and 
concluded that they would have to offer bigger inducements, for reasons including (1) Not 
enough data on yields in Ireland, (2) technical facilities for the repair of factory machinery 
were not as good as in Britain, (3) a higher proportion of foreign technical staff would be 
needed, (4) coal prices were higher, and (5) it would be difficult to attract capital to the 
beet sugar industry as the British had already discovered
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In March 1925 the committee representatives of Agriculture and Industry and Commerce 
reported:
(1) that the terms [of the Lippens group] are, in our opinion, on the whole more 
advantageous to the government than those submitted by any other group of 
standing and also guarantee a price for beet which should secure an ample 
supply of roots for a factory:
(2) the standing of this particular group is such as to give us confidence that 
they will leave nothing undone to secure the success of the enterprise. 89
Hogan’s long-held and much-trumpeted conviction that subsidies were ineffective and 
wasteful seem hardly to have entered the equation when it came to sugar. The arguments 
which he and other government ministers used when fending off calls for assistance for 
various interest groups were not made in this debate. However, to say that there had been 
a debate on the principle of state assistance for the beet sugar industry would be misleading. 
It was only on matters of detail that there were any questions raised during the passage of 
the subsidy bill through the Dail. Hogan was questioned regarding the siting of the factory 
and the criteria which would have to be met. He responded that it would depend on the 
‘results o f a year or two’s working of the initial factory at Carlow’. However, behind the 
scenes the department maintained its opinion that the siting of further factories must be left 
to the discretion of those who invested in the industry. Deputies from many constituencies 
lobbied and questioned the minister in the hope of securing the establishment of a sugar 
factory in their area. The need for an industry which would employ a considerable number
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of people silenced many TDs who otherwise would have been critical of government 
intervention and it would be safe to say that no member of the Oireachteas would have 
turned down the opportunity of having a sugar factory in their area90
When asked by Heffeman what government policy was regarding allocation o f sites and 
areas for factories and what circumstances would be taken into consideration in that regard, 
Hogan said that the general policy on sugar beet factories was that which had been 
announced in the budget statement of 22 April 1925, when he said ‘that consideration of 
that question must pend the results of a year or two’s working of the initial factory at 
Carlow’ In a note for the minister’s private information the policy that the site and district 
for a further factory must be left largely to the discretion of those who invested capital in 
buildings and equipment, was reiterated Inquiries about further factories came from Deputy 
Frank Carney, who asked the minister if a sugar factory could be established with a view 
to increasing employment in Donegal, Mallow UDC wrote to the mimster requestmg a 
meeting to discuss suitable sites for a sugar factory, and North Cork Development 
Association passed a resolution about the establishment of a sugar factory91
The problems which Hogan had predicted when refusing subsidies to other sectors of 
agriculture manifested themselves in the sugar industry in a very short time After its initial 
success, the owners of the Carlow factory began to experience resistance to the prices 
which they offered the growers, and complaints were made about the amounts of beet 
which were to be grown each year The Irish Sugar Beet Growers Association (BGA) with 
whom the factory negotiated contracts quickly established themselves as a powerful group 
They were determined to maintain the high prices which had been paid when the factory
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was opened Hogan, because of his initial involvement in the industry, was drawn into the 
disputes and was asked to act as an arbitrator He was caught between the BGA and the 
factory owners In 1931 he was forced to enter into very detailed negotiations with Lippens 
in Belgium to try to get them to improve their price offer92 He was working against a 
background of militant action BGA members refused to plant beet until their terms were 
accepted Garda reports from 1931 tell of incidents of beet and turnip crops being damaged 
and intimidation used against growers who did not support the association’s tactics93 At 
least one farmer received a threatening letter
Take notice if you thrash for any person that has beet soad [sic] you will mark the
consequences You may be preparing for 6’ x 3’ 94
There was no evidence that the BGA was directly involved, but it can be assumed that the 
incidents were carried out by its members who were refusing to plant sugar beet until they 
got the price they demanded This was not the first time that the sugar factory had been 
under threat from the growers Lippens were particularly annoyed since they had given the 
BGA every encouragement, they built an office for them at their factory and collected 
their membership contributions from the beet growers free of charge They regarded the 
BGA’s attitude as less than appreciative In 1929 the BGA had been involved m a poster 
campaign which referred to the company as ‘Foreign Blood Suckers’, and called on 
growers to ‘Starve the Factory Out’, and which promised their supporters that ‘after the 
sugar kings would come the malsters, the bacon curers and the rest of the crew’ Lippens 
asked
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what other firm would tolerate their premises to be made the head-quarters of an 
organisation from which to direct flying squads of motor cars bent on a campaign 
of the most violent intimidation 95
The difficulties which the sugar industry experienced in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
were not unconnected with the deteriorating international economic situation If Ireland had 
not been a producer the benefits of the collapse of sugar prices would have been felt by 
Irish consumers Instead, the growers were pressing for higher prices, protection and for 
all the sugar consumed in the country to be grown 4at home’ 96 When Hogan’s government 
was defeated at the 1932 election the problems of the sugar industry had not been resolved 
It is probably one area of agriculture which he was glad to hand over to somebody else 
His experiences with sugar subsidies can have done little to convince him that his 
convictions about subsidies in general were wrong Hogan, for once, had willingly 
promoted the practice It must, therefore, have left him with a mixture of feelmgs about the 
experiment On the one hand his instincts about direct intervention in the economy had 
been proved correct On the other he saw an area which had great potential both for 
agriculture and industry failing to achieve it under his guidance
The years which followed the 1925 subsidy act saw increasing pressure for tariff protection 
and agricultural subsidies Fianna Fail took their seats in 1927 and brought the debate into 
the Dail This turned the predictable slide towards international protectiomsm into a party 
political issue in Ireland Accepting its inevitability must have been difficult if not 
, humiliating for Hogan He had to concede that Ireland’s agriculture had to follow the lead 
of every other country and put up trade barriers He did not give in gracefully
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NOTES
1 Irish  Tim es 18 Oct 1922 Memorandum to the executive council from Kevin 
O’Higgins, Jan 1923 (UCD) Mulcahy Papers, P7b/96(7)
2 Meenan, The Irish  Econom y p 95
3 Hoctor, The Departm ent’s Story p 7, says that Denmark had begun to reorganise 
farming after 1869
4 These were views expressed by writers who visited Denmark with a group organised 
by the County Cork I F U in the autumn of 1925 and published in ‘Agriculture’ - 
a supplement to The Irish  Tim es 13 Oct 1925
5 For a full discussion on the Irish co-operative movement see Patrick Bolger, The
Irish  Co-operative Movement and Its Development (Dublin, 1977))
6 In a reply to a question about the technical qualifications of the advisory and college 
staffs, asked by James Ryan, TD, the minister said that of the general technical staff 
of the department, five agricultural inspectors and two junior agricultural inspectors 
did not possess a degree or diploma in agricultural science All itinerant instructors 
in agriculture and all those engaged in the teaching of general agriculture possessed 
diplomas or degrees In a note for the minister’s information it was added that there 
were persons employed under the various acts and in connection with flax growing
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in the Congested Districts for which these qualifications had never been considered 
necessary DD Vol 33, cols 1247 - 1248, 5 Mar 1930 NA, DA, AG1\G715\25
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173
9 The Irish Statesman 31 Oct 1925
10 Eoin McNeill in an article in The Irish  Statesman 24 Nov 1924
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19 Report on the progress of special schemes being carried out at Ballyhaise 
Agriculture Station, 18 Feb 1925 ibid
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21 Hogan to Baxter, 22 Oct 1924 ibid
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ibid
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Act to make provision for the regulation and improvement of Bulls and other Live 
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35 Treasury to DATI, 28 Jan 1919, confirming the allocation of monies for cow 
testmg schemes NA, DA, AG1\A11338\22
36 Memorandum, 11 Nov 1919, of a meeting held at DATI offices on 30 Oct 1919, 
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the Minister, ND, Mar 1927
43 Advice which was given to the mimster during the course of the preparation of the
answer to the above question ibid
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NA, DA, AG1\L939\27
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the Port and Docks Board, the Railways and the Salesmasters’ Association, which 
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AG1\E5356\25
51 From the minutes of the meeting with the deputation ibid The secretary to Kevin
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Nineteen twenty seven was a watershed in Hogan’s political life His best friend and 
cabinet colleague, O’Higgms, in whose home he lived while in Dublin, was assassinated 
on 10 July Hogan’s reaction when he heard the shots fired - ‘he ran from the house, 
revolver in hand, in the direction of the shooting’ - bears witness to the still unsettled 
condition of the country, as well as to his physical courage The remtroduction of fierce 
emergency legislation outlawing the IRA and the requirement that candidates declare that 
they would take their seats if  elected, caused by assassination, ‘accelerated Fianna Fail’s 
entry into the Dail’ 1 De Valera and his party took the oath and provided, for the first time 
in the Dail, an opposition which was determined to remove the government and take its 
place
The loss of O’Higgms at this juncture was a serious blow to Cumann na nGaedheal He 
was a man of ‘great intelligence, great courage, great self-control, and powers of work 
which staggered his contemporaries’ and therefore difficult to replace2 Hogan
was convinced that Kevin O’Higgms was the greatest man Ireland had ever 
produced and that in him lay the national salvation From the moment he turned a 
white-faced tragic figure from the death bed of his great friend he was a changed 
man Up to that date he had devoted himself almost entirely to his own Department, 
Agriculture, now he entered the arena of politics, and with fierce vehemence and 
energy he strove to fulfil the role Kevin O’Higgms might have played 3
Cornelius O’Leary cites as one of the reasons for Fine Gael’s failure to make the pendulum 
swing back m their favour during the first six controversial years of Fianna Fail rule the
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decline in the quality of the party elite through the premature death or defeat at the polls 
of its most dynamic leaders ‘Kevin O’Higgins assassinated in 1927, Patrick Hogan, 
the brilliant Minister for Agriculture Killed in a car accident in 1936, Ernest Blythe and 
Desmond Fitzgerald who lost their seats in 1933-7’ 4
Hogan had been involved in areas other than agriculture in the early years of the state He 
had strongly supported legislation to put an end to widespread disorder and agrarian 
violence caused by the civil war and the years of disruption which preceded it He had 
spoken out during the ‘army crisis’ and appeared before the army inquiry as a resu lt5 His 
interest in law and order was caused not just by his friendship with O’Higgins, who was 
Minister for Home Affairs and later Minister for Justice, but because conditions in rural 
areas affected the implementation of his land legislation He made this clear m a 
memorandum to the President in 1923
all the information and evidence which I have at my disposal make it clear that as 
things stand in the country at present it would be quite impossible to pass anything 
approaching an equitable Land Bill which could be put into operation at present 6
In January 1923 he informed the President that in his ‘opinion two months more like the 
last months’ would ‘see the end of us and the end of the Free State He was ‘in a 
position to get authentic information as to the trend of things and all the information which’ 
he had led him ‘to the conclusions’ he had ‘set out’ 6
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It is likely that his statement on the 1924 army crisis and his support for O’Higgin’s special 
powers bills were influenced to some extent by their friendship He must have greatly 
missed his friend’s confidence, advice and support Though they agreed on important 
issues of government policy they had very different personalities Hogan was very 
amusing, O’Higgins was more thoughtful and religious They were opposites m matters 
of dress Kevin O’Higgins was always smartly turned out while Hogan was distinctly 
scruffy Liam Cosgrave tells of a remark which was overheard at a conference in London 
One British official commented to another on the dreadful state of Hogan’s clothes The 
response of the other man was ‘wait till you see his legal adviser’ He was Arthur Cox, 
a notoriously dishevelled figure8 Una O’Higgins O’Malley tells a story which highlights 
Hogan’s lack of regard for the way he dressed Hogan was due to attend the Spring Show 
in his official capacity He happened to go into the kitchen of O’Higgms’ house m 
Blackrock and saw O’Higgins’ recently pressed suit hanging up in readiness for its owner 
Hogan looked at his own crumpled clothes and decided Kevin O’Higgins’ suit would be 
perfect for his visit to the show He did not worry that O’Higgins was taller and larger 
than himself On O’Higgms’ return he found that the suit was missing The garda who 
was on sentry duty was asked if he knew where it was on what had happened to it He 
sheepishly replied that he had seen the Mimster for Agriculture leaving the house wearing 
a suit which was obviously not his own O’Higgms was hopping mad He knew m what 
condition his good suit would be when Hogan returned it Personal appearance was low 
down on Hogan’s list of priorities 9
The two men obviously discussed the work of their departments O’Higgms in Hogan’s 
view knew the 1923 land bill so well that he could always deputise for him in the Dail
which he did 10 Their analyses of the law and order situation in 1923 were strikingly 
similar, for example their assertion that those who were involved in irregularism had a 
vested interest in chaos
[Hogan] the irregular war has defimtely taken the form of a war by different 
sections, different interests and different individuals, with no common bond except 
this - that all have a vested interest in chaos ,,
[O’Higgms] A great deal of the support that Irregulars are receiving comes from 
people who have vested interests in chaotic conditions 12
During the army inquiry hearing, Hogan referred to a detailed discussion which he had with 
O’Higgins about an army incident which had particularly sensitive implications 13 J J Lee 
maintains that O’Higgms, Hogan and Blythe made up one of three factions within the 
government ‘O’Higgins’, he says, ‘strongly supported by Patrick Hogan , and Ernest 
Blythe, mimster for Finance, represented vigorous social reaction All three came from 
comfortable rural backgrounds’ 14
While this is undoubtedly true, it is unlikely that their ‘comfortable rural backgrounds’ were 
the only things which they had in common Little had changed in the economy of Ireland 
or in its position in the international economic community with which it traded in the early 
years of the 1920s Hogan believed that the export trade in agricultural produce remained 
just as important as it had been up to 1922 For him, therefore, it was vital to see that 
peaceful conditions were restored in order to maintain the agricultural production which
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supplied the export market Radical policies were not contemplated When he did express 
his reservations about the consequences for Ireland’s economic and social development of 
continuing the land policy, introduced by the British, it was a momentary lapse He 
accepted the situation and did his utmost to complete the task efficiently
Blythe, as Mimster for Finance, knew that to obtain foreign and domestic loans with which 
to fund the running of the country, Ireland would have to be seen as a stable and 
dependable place to invest money It would have been impossible to achieve Hogan’s or 
Blythe’s goals without O’Higgins’ commitment to the restoration of law and order 
throughout the country Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that it was their sense of 
realism and their belief in the need for stability as much as their backgrounds which bound 
them together on matters of policy, unless it could be argued that realism was a virtue 
attributable only to those with comfortable rural backgrounds The evidence of agreement 
between Blythe and Hogan on general economic policy is based mainly on the absence of 
any real conflict between the two departments on financial matters Joseph Brennan’s 
attempts to reduce spending on the IAOS was overruled by Blythe and ignored by Hogan 
Again when it came to rates relief Hogan was able to circumvent Brennan’s objections and 
achieve an outcome which was favourable to the farmers Nor does it appear that Hogan 
had prepared new programmes which were subsequently rejected by Blythe for financial 
reasons This could mean that the two ministers were as one on how state funds were 
dispersed or that Blythe and the Department of Finance set a limit on spending with which 
Hogan was not prepared to argue The former is probably true Where disputes arose they 
were, as m the cases of the IAOS and rates relief, with Department of Finance officials 
rather than the minister himself
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I f  H ogan  and his allies w ith in  the governm ent party w ere realists, how  did  the entry  o f  
F ianna Fail to  the D ail affect their attitude to contentious issues w hich  until 1927 they  had 
been able to  get th rough the O ireachtas w ith  com parative ease9 B ecause o f  the 
abstentiom st po licy  o f  Sm n Fein  after 1922, those TD s w ho sat in the D ail and w ere 
opposed to governm ent m easures knew  that they could not use the final sanction  o f  
bring ing  dow n the governm ent w ith  a vote o f  no confidence Even i f  they had, there w as 
little chance tha t the L abour Party , the F arm ers’ Party or independent deputies w ould  have 
been in a position  to form  a governm ent to take advantage o f  the situation  H ogan knew  
th is and spelt it ou t in a  m em orandum  to the President in  A pril 1923
the fa rm ers’s party  in the D ail, how ever, are no t too eager to beat a  L and  B ill 
in troduced  by us i f  they  can avoid it They know  it w ill sim ply start them  in a 
com petition  against the L abour Party for the B olshevists’ vote They w ant a  B ill 
w hich  w ill be so good that it w ill satisfy the tenants even in  their p resent m ood  and 
at the sam e tim e give them  a case strong enough to fight the B olshevists on  I f  they 
cannot get that they w ill sim ply m ake an alliance w ith  the Bolshevists, though it is 
the last th ing som e o f  them  w ant The farm ers’ party  in the D ail know  that i f  they 
oppose a  B ill w hich I introduce there w ill be no half-w ay-house fo r them , they w ill 
have to go definitely  as far as the m ost extrem e section o f  the L abour Party  or lose 
their political future and they are not likely to oppose any B ill w hich the tenants 
w ill regard  as fair 15
T he governm ent as a  w hole w as aw are that this w as the case and so w ere able to in troduce 
som e severe legislation  in the area o f  law  and order along w ith  cuts in w elfare spending
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and the pay  o f  public  em ployees H ow ever, in spite o f  the lack  o f  real D ail opposition  
H ogan d id  n o t take advantage o f  the situation by m oving faster than  public  op im on m  the 
area  o f  agricultural legislation  W hen the m ajority  o f  b ills w ere in troduced the opening 
statem ents usually  referred  to the consensus am ongst the farm ing com m unity  fo r the
;
particu lar b ill In  the case o f  rates re lie f  he w as bow ing to extra-parliam entary  pressure  
from  the farm ing com m unity  as w ell as dem ands in the D ail It appears that once the 
necessity  for legislation had been established a bill w as drafted w hich  incorporated  the 
consensus w hich  had been reached through consultation  w ith  those producers w ho w ould  
be affected  H ogan alw ays m anaged to lim it the am ount o f  finance w hich w ould be m ade 
available by the state fo r the w orking o f  the regulatory acts and insisted on m aking  them  
at least partly  self-financing, thus ensuring that they reflected  the free trade ethic in  w hich 
he believed  so firm ly  D uring a  debate on  the agricultural estim ates Jam es R yan po in ted  
out that the regulatory  acts w ere being adm inistered ‘at the expense o f  the agricu ltu ral 
com m unity ’ 16 It clearly differentiates the general th rust o f  his agricultural policy  from  the 
in terventionism  o f  F ianna Fail after 1932
O pposition  from  the m am  protagonists for the farm ers, the F arm ers’ Party, to fees for cattle 
licencing and testing  w as d ifficu lt for them  to  sustain because their case w as w eakened  by 
their obvious in terest in  obtain ing as m uch re lie f as possible for their supporters Speaking 
on com pulsory  tillage m  1922, D enis G orey said that i f  farm ers w ere forced to  adopt it the 
state w ould  have to step m  to subsidise them  To relieve unem ploym ent he suggested  that 
the governm ent should  im prove the infra-structure o f  the country T hat, he said w ould  not 
encroach on  the liberty  o f  anybody 17 M uch the sam e could be said o f  the L abour Party
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w ho drew  their support from  specific sections o f  the com m unity  and as a resu lt the  force 
o f  their argum ents w ere w eakened 18
W hen F ianna Fail entered  the debate on agriculture in the D ail it spoke as a national party  
It is true that in  its early  years, ‘it reta ined’ a ‘very noticeable w estern  bias, very  like Sinn 
Fem  in  bo th  1918 and 1923’ It w as never, how ever, exclusively the preserve o f  the  sm all 
farm er in the w ay that the F arm ers’ Party  w as o f  the m ore substantial m an, because it d rew  
support from  all classes and all counties In  1927 the ‘social and econom ic basis’ o f  its 
support w as no t dissim ilar from  C um ann na nG aedheal 19 In  the D ail F ianna Fail b rought 
the concerns o f  those sm all farm ers w ho w ere not so d irectly  involved w ith  the  export o f  
agricultural goods to the fore Lee quite rightly  says that ‘the interests o f  sm all and  big 
farm ers w ere in  som e respects as d ifferen t as those o f  labourers and farm ers’ H e also says 
that H ogan equated  ‘the ordinary  farm er’ w ith  the 200 acre m an, w hich suggests tha t his 
sym pathies lay w ith  the larger fa rm e r20
D e V alera  w as certainly  o f  th is opinion In  1928 he expressed w hat seem s to have been 
a  w idely  held  v iew  in F ianna Fail during a debate on the A gricultural C redit B ill D e V alera  
asserted th a t H ogan w as determ ined to  reduce the num ber o f  sm all farm s by stealth  by 
denying them  access to cheap c re d i t21
H ogan countered
O f the 8,000 applications for loans, w hich aw ait the passing o f  th is B ill, I should  say 
th a t 90  per cent are in respect o f  loans to farm ers w ith  valuations o f  betw een £10
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and £25 The big  farm ers are not affected by the B ill The big  farm ers can  and
ought to  discharge equities 22
T w o years later the  F ianna Fail TD  T om  D e m g  w as m aking a sim ilar point on expenditure 
on livestock
a great m any farm ers, no doubt, benefit by that expenditure, bu t m  th is as m  o ther 
m atters you  w ill have com plaints from  the sm all farm ers that a  great m any o f  these 
schem es are, in the long run  for the benefit o f  a particu lar class, and that the 
ordinary  sm all farm er is getting no advantage out o f  them  at all 23
T here w ere o f  course, differences betw een the interests o f  the large and sm all farm ers 
H ow ever, the regulations w hich m ade up the bulk o f  his legislation w ere im posed in order 
to im prove the cleanliness o f  food stuffs and the quality o f  livestock T hese w ere necessary  
w hether the produce cam e from  a five acre or a tw o hundred acre farm
H ogan, as son o f  a large farm er in G alw ay, w as a natural target for accusations o f  th is sort
G iven F ianna F a il’s reliance on the votes o f  sm all farm ers in the 1920s it w as in their
in terest to h ighligh t anything w hich appeared to discrim inate against their supporters H ogan 
had g iven  h is critics grounds for their d isapprobation w hen he referred  to the dangers w hich 
faced a society  com posed m ainly o f  sm all farm ers The logical conclusion w hich cou ld  be 
draw n from  this rem ark  w as that it w as better to  have a sm aller num ber o f  farm ers w ith  
larger farm s
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H ogan, how ever, based h is legislation no t on his personal preferences bu t on the  situation  
as it ex isted  a t the tim e The policy o f  gradually  raising  the standards o f  dairy  produce, 
b ee f and eggs w as adopted to allow  the less w ell o f f  farm ers to rem ain  in business w hile  
changes w ere m ade For instance, had H ogan in troduced a national brand  for butter, 
im posed very  strict m om toring o f  bulls for licencing, o r prosecuted eggs dealers for every  
infringem ent o f  the rules, it is very  likely that m any o f  the sm all farm ers w ould  have been 
forced from  the land because they w ould have found it im possible to finance im provem ents 
w hich  the legislation  required
There w as how ever som e justifica tion  for F ianna F a il’s criticism  G iven that larger 
producers o f  m ilk  and b e e f w ere the m am  beneficiaries o f  H ogan’s legislation  sim ply 
because o f  their concentration  on the export m arket this could easily  have been in terpreted  
as lack o f  concern  for the sm all producers H ow ever to go along w ith  this v iew  w ould  be 
to  ignore the integrated  nature o f  the different areas o f  farm ing in Ireland T he sm all 
producers p layed an im portant role in  the chain o f  m ilk  and b ee f production  They w ere 
the group w ho reared  sm all num bers o f  calves and sold them  on to the cattle farm ers w ho 
prepared them  for export o r hom e consum ption The rem oval o f  one link in the chain  o f  
production  w ould have caused severe disruption The health  o f  the dairy  and b ee f industry  
w as dependent on the sym biotic relationship betw een its three com ponent parts A  sound 
dairy  industry  prov ided  the sm all farm er w ith  a steady supply o f  calves w hich he sold  on 
to the b e e f  salesm en A  thriv ing export trade gave them  all a ready m arket for their 
anim als I t is doubtfu l i f  directing assistance tow ards one section o f  the industry  w ould  
have been a success w ithout a dram atic reorganisation  o f  the farm ing industry , w hich w as
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based on the  size, geographic location  o f  farm s and traditional farm ing  practices The sm all 
farm er w ithou t h is part o f  the livestock trade w ould  have found it d ifficu lt to  survive
There does seem  to have been a consensus am ongst all parties in the D ail on the need for 
legislation  to  regulate the quality  o f  Irish  agricultural produce It m anaged to ho ld  together 
until at least 1930 H ow ever, during the report stage o f  the A gricultural P roduce (Fresh  
M eat) B ill, 1929, it show ed evidence o f  strain H ogan said
I thought th is w as a non-political B ill There w as am ple tim e betw een each o f  the 
stages for the consideration  or in troduction  o f  am endm ents It is now  suggested 
that on the next report stage the B ill should be re-com m itted  again T hat show s 
that there is no use m eetm g people h a lf  w ay, even on a m atter o f  th is sort 24
H ogan’s attitude suggests that the consensus on m atters ‘o f  this so rt’, that is legislation  
w hich  w as directly  concerned w ith  m aking laws to pu t som e sem blance o f  o rder into 
agricultural production , and w hich he regarded as ‘non-po litical’, had begun to break  dow n 
O n the sam e day he responded sharply to D e rn g ’s p lea to leave business alone
"Let business alone, do not interfere" T hat is com plete laissez faire H e belongs 
to a party  w ho advocate a control board for w heat, com pulsory  adm ixture o f  grain  
and state regulation  for everything, bu t w hen it com es to this B ill, because I say 
certain  fac to n es have to  be controlled, he says "Oh, no, le t business alone, le t there 
be no state interference" It is m erely  a question o f  h is saying "No" w hen  I say
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T his h ighligh ts the  m ore adversarial type o f  parliam entary  exchange w hich  had  developed 
w ith  the entry  o f  F ianna Fail, w ho fo r the first tim e provided an opposition  w hich  posed 
a real th rea t to  the governm ent A s stated above L abour and the F arm ers’ Party  had shared 
a com m on w eakness bo th  w ere closely identified w ith  special in terests 26 T herefore the ir 
argum ents often  appeared partisan  and narrow  and so could be disposed o f  easily F ianna 
Fail represented  a  m uch broader constituency and w ere in a position  to support a  greater 
variety  o f  v iew points w ithout appearing inconsistent C onsequently  they caused 
governm ent m im sters a lot m ore trouble
The optim ism  that bitterness betw een the tw o m am  parties caused by the T reaty  and the 
C ivil W ar w as in decline expressed by the I r ish  S ta te sm a n  in  O ctober 1927 w as soon
c
dispelled  It had hoped that w ith  F ianna Fail in the D ail m uch o f  the atm osphere o f  Irish  
po litics w ould  im prove It reported  an encounter betw een H ogan and Lem ass in  C arlow  
during the election
W e find  M r H ogan and M r Lem ass in the C arlow \K ilkenny election tossing to see 
w hich  party  w ould  first address the m eeting, and the political duel that fo llow ed 
w as unexceptional in  spirit 27
T here w as little  sign  in the D ail that past disagreem ents had been forgo tten  H o g an ’s w ell 
know n dislike o f  de V alera w as alw ays going to create tension and hostility  betw een the 
tw o parties H is bitterness tow ards de V alera is sum m ed up in a letter to his aunt A fter 
te lling  her tha t he had been ‘all over the coun try ’ during the July 1927 election cam paign, 
he w en t on
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W e did  no t do w ell bu t w e m ight have done a lot w orse T here is no one so 
d issatisfied  w ith  the results as de V alera h im se lf H is party  apparently  expected  
about seventy or eighty seats and they have com e back  w ith  ju s t the num ber they 
w ere going to get - 46 I th ink they have reached their m axim um  T here is only  
one hope fo r them  and that is that tim es should get w orse - prices fall and people 
get poorer W hen people are poor and in debt they vote fo r confusion, fo r confusion  
can do them  no harm  but once the country begins to recover and farm ers are m aking  
even m odest profits they d o n ’t w ant confusion E verything depends, how ever, on 
the conditions o f  the nex t tw o or three years D e V alera’s program m e is very 
ingenious H e tells the farm ers that his governm ent w o n ’t ask them  to pay L and 
C om m ission annuities, he tells the farm ers’ sons that he w ill stop em igration  and 
tha t he w ill find land for every single one in the country w ho w ants it for no th ing , 
and he tells the unem ployed that he will find w ork fo r everybody bu t he tells 
nobody w here he is going to  get to  m oney to do all th is O f course i f  he go t a  
m ajority  he w ould not get a 1\- on  loan, on the contrary everybody w ould  w ithdraw  
their m oney from  the present N ational Loan
H e does no t w an t to  com e into the D ail H is present position  is m uch sim pler H is 
line is "I could get everything I have prom ised i f  I w ere in the D ail, bu t I am  too 
patrio tic  to take the O ath hence I can ’t go in”
T aking the  K ing out o f  the oath  or out o f  the C onstitu tion  m eans going outside the 
B ritish  E m pire, the E nglish could bring us back in three m onths w ithout firing  a  
shot by  econom ic pressure W e send 98 1\2 per cent o f  our goods to E ngland and
201
V
our sales to E ngland represent 98 1\2 per cent o f  our total export trade, [w hich] 
represents about five per cent o f  E ngland’s total purchases I f  the E nglish  p u t an  
em bargo on  our cattle, butter, o r bacon it w ould m ake qu ick  conversions from  the 
pseudo republicanism  that exists here am ongst greedy idealists at the m om ent
H e concluded his le tter w ith  a  gleeful account at de V alera’s d iscom fiture on the  opem ng 
day o f  the D ail
W e had a great day on the opem ng o f  Parliam ent D e V alera turned ou t w ith  h is 
fo llow ing, all looking very nervous W e show ed him  into a  room  in the fron t hall, 
w hich  is abou t fifty  yards from  the hall in w hich the P arliam ent sits T he C lerk  o f  
the D ail inquired as to w hether any o f  them  w ere extrem ely  anxious to  take the 
O ath  D e V alera replied that he, the C lerk, had no righ t to  com pel them  to  take the 
O ath
T he door o f  the Parliam ent H ouse w as then locked and they  w ere left in  the  hall 
They am bled about for about an hour and then w andered aw ay disgusted  28
It is c lear tha t H ogan had little m ore than contem pt for de V alera and his ‘fo llow ers’ T his 
w as re in fo rced  in Ju ly  1927 by the assassination o f  K evin O ’H iggins, p robably  a t the  hands 
o f  an anti treaty  individual or group H ow ever, w hatever his personal feeling  abou t h is new  
opponents w ere the political qualities o f  the individuals w ith w hom  H ogan sparred in the 
D ail a fter the  1927 election w ere high E am onn de V alera, Sean Lem ass, Frank A iken, and 
h is shadow  m inister D r Jam es R yan H is previous opponents D enis Gorey, T hom as
202
Johnson, L iam  D avin  and the like can hardly be com pared w ith  them  w hen  it cam e to 
national status H ogan does no t appear to have been overaw ed by his new  and m ore 
illustrious antagonists The tone o f  h is statem ents and the w ay he p resen ted  h is case in 
debate changed very little H e retained h is faith in com m onsense and flexib ility  o f  response 
and continued to oppose the creation  o f  perm anent rules to cover particu lar cases w hich 
could create m ore difficulties than  they solved H is answ er, during debate, to  those w ho 
w ished to  g ive farm ers a three year period before they had to  pay back  loans to  the A C C  
is typical o f  th is approach
w e all know  that i f  I w ent ou t on a platform  and said "W e w ill g ive you  all 
loans, and you  need not pay a penny back for three years," everyone w ould  cheer 
and th row  up their hats B ut it w ould be tw ice as hard  to pay at the end o f  th ree 
years It is in the interests o f  the farm er to tell him  that he has to pay  "w ith and 
w ith", to  pay b it by  b it as he can, and leave it to the good sense o f  the C orporation , 
in the genuine cases, to try  and m eet them  w ithout m aking it a  general ru le  29
In the sam e debate, on the A gricultural C redit Bill, H ogan w as under sustained attack  from  
F ianna Fail They w anted it know n that it was only because they w ere no t m  a position  to 
p u t through their ow n bills w hich w ould ‘cure the present situation’ that they  w ere 
accepting  H o g an ’s b ill A iken stressed that it w as not to be taken  fo r gran ted  tha t in  
w elcom ing it they w ere adm itting that the policy o f  the m inister w as ‘the correct one fo r’ 
the ‘co u n try ’ 30 T herefore, w hile they accepted that they could no t alter the leg isla tion  in 
any substantial w ay, it w as plain  that they w ere determ ined to  m ake as m any po litical 
points as possib le It w as a  good opportunity  to press the case for the sm all farm er w ho
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they  said w ould  be neglected by the legislation  T hey w anted m ore agricu ltu ral cred it 
societies set up in order that ‘sm all farm ers could obtain  loans to  carry on their 
business’ 31 The inference w as that it w as the two hundred acre ‘farm er th a t’ w as ‘going 
to get m oney th rough’ the ‘schem e’ 32
To th is end they prom oted the cause o f  agricultural credit societies and co-operative cred it 
societies to serve the needs o f  farm ers who needed sm all loans (under fifty  pounds) T here 
w as a  netw ork o f  local societies already in existence, w hich had been chosen as the 
vehicle to distribute re lie f  to farm ers w hen stock had been badly h it by fluke in  1925 after 
a spell o f  very w et w eather The schem e w as adm inistered by the IA O S, w ho sent 
organisers to rural areas to explain  the advantages o f  local cred it societies and  help  set 
them  up E nthusiasm  for the schem e seem s to have been absent in both  rural com m unities 
and the IA O S from  the outset Perhaps it w as the d isappointm ent o f  farm ers w ho had 
hoped to  receive free grants and not loans w hich initially  caused resentm ent tow ards the 
so c ie tie s33 It appears that the official representatives found great d ifficulty  in persuading  
local com m unities to set up a society and getting ‘qualified and reliable secretaries and 
com m ittees to deal w ith  the finance o f  credit socie ties’ The IA O S preferred  to use their 
grant fo r the developm ent o f  the cream ery industry 34 A t the sam e tim e farm ers w ere 
tu rn ing  to the A C C  for credit w hich they found m ore ‘convenien t’ and w hich gave greater 
‘p riv acy ’ 35 F ianna Fail ignored these trends D e V alera criticised the IA O S fo r ‘no t 
devoting  them selves properly  to  the w o rk ’ even though there w as no evidence tha t farm ers 
w ere anxious to  use the so c ie tie s36 W hat they really w anted w as free grants
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D e V alera’s and A iken ’s attacks on the m inister ’s credit policy and the I A O S prom pted  
a characteristic  response from  H ogan ‘The C orporation  could never attem pt, nor w as 
intended, to  deal w ith  the dow n and o u ts’, he said ‘It w as to deal w ith  the cred it-w orthy  
fa rm er’ H e did no t believe that the m ajority  o f  the farm ers w ere ‘dow n and o u ts’ ‘n inety  
per cent o f  the  farm ers w ere in  a  position  to give security ’ for ‘as m uch  m oney as w as good 
fo r th em ’ H e could offer no solution to the problem  o f  a farm er w ith  no security  at all
i f  a m an has no security and is absolutely  dow n and out there is only one w ay  o f  
dealing w ith  h im  and that is to  ask the taxpayer for m oney  and give it to  h im  as a  
grant I know  o f  no other w ay All this philanthropy fo r h im  is very  fine  A ll th is 
concern  fo r the  m an w ho is dow n and out is all very w ell I com e from  G alw ay, 
and the people w hose stock died there are not dow n and out I f  a  m an lost five 
o r six ew es and a  few  yearlings he is not dow n and out, but, i f  he is, it m ay be for 
o ther reasons I am  not dealing w ith them  [dow n and outs] D o not b lam e m e 
fo r no t dealing w ith  them  I never suggested I w ould 37
It is w orth  noting  that H ogan actually  agreed w ith  de V alera that cred it societies w ere the 
best w ay o f  giving cred it to  sm all farm ers
all the difficulties do not h e  w ith the I A O S People are very slow  to go into 
societies, as deputies know  I doubt i f  credit societies w ill be the solu tion  o f  it I 
know  it is the sound solution, bu t I know  it will be extrem ely d ifficu lt to get people 
to  organise them selves into societies 38
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The d ifference betw een the tw o lay in H ogan’s acceptance o f  the lessons learned from  past 
experience o f  credit societies. De V alera preferred  to ignore them . H ogan had persuaded  
the D epartm ent o f  F inance to fund the schem e in the first place. W hen he realised  tha t it 
w as no t being taken up by farm ers he m odified it in order to m ake it m ore accessible. He 
changed the regulations o f  the societies at least three tim es in order to encourage local 
people to participate but w ith little long term  success. B rennan did not favour p rovid ing  
further m oney in the 1926 budget for the schem e w hich had only a  very sm all take up, 
£11,300 out o f  £100,000 allocated in 1925. He said that there could
scarcely be said to be a convincing case for the provision o f  a further £100,000, in 
the next financial year. The schem e is unpopular and I doubt very m uch w hether 
the progress m ade up to the present justifies repetition  o f  the provision m ade during 
the curren t year. I w ould suggest that provision o f  £50,000 w ould be adequate for 
1926-27.39
In June 1926 the take up rate had increased and a total o f  £33,787.10.4  had been advanced. 
H ogan w as, how ever, disappointed by the failure o f  farm ers, particularly  in the w orst h it 
areas, to use the schem e to restock their land. There w ere tw o im portant reasons w hy the 
schem e failed; one, m em bers w ere not m aking deposits and tw o, responsible people w ere 
no t com ing forw ard to serve on the com m ittees o f  the societies. H ogan suggested m odify ing  
the schem e so that advances w ould be m ade to societies w ithout the necessity  for local 
deposits. T he m odified  schem e w ould be in addition to the existing schem e. O n 3 
D ecem ber 1926 H ogan w rote directly to B lythe looking for approval for the new  schem e. 
O n 13 D ecem ber M cE lligott o f  Finance w rote to B lythe saying that
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on the  w hole, I th ink  a fairly  good case has been m ade out fo r the ex tension  o f  the  
schem e in  the d irection  desired by the D epartm ent W e cannot shu t ou r eyes to  the 
fact that funds fo r restockm g, etc , in certain areas are urgently  required  The only  
alternative to the present schem e in som e districts w ould appear to  be the  m aking  
o f  grants instead o f  loans 40
The fear o f  m aking  grants to distressed farm ers m ade the D epartm ent o f  F inance act 
sw iftly T he p lan  w as approved by B lythe on 15 D ecem ber 1926 It can  be seen, therefore, 
tha t beh ind  the  scenes H ogan had tried  hard to m ade credit societies w ork  and had  insisted 
on keeping them  alive even w hen it w as obvious that they w ere never going to achieve the 
hoped fo r results
T he im portance o f  the D ail debate on credit societies lies in the w ay it exposed a  
fundam ental d ifference betw een  the tw o parties H ogan did no t express any sym pathy for 
the dem ise o f  sm all farm ers w ho could not get loans to  enable them  to  stay in  business, 
saym g 6 75 per cent o f  the class w ho are dow n and out, you can  take it, it is th rough  their 
ow n fau lt’ 41 H e w as afraid  that i f  unlim ited credit w as m ade available they w ould  
‘borrow  m oney w hich undoubted ly ’ they ‘w ould not be able to rep ay ’ and the state w ould  
have to accept l ia b ili ty 42 The experience o f  the credit boom  o f  the w ar years and its 
d isastrous consequences for Irish  agriculture m ade him  cautious about lendm g w ithou t 
p roper security  F ianna Fail saw  his agricultural credit policy as one w hich w as designed  
to suit ‘the  large fa rm ers’ w ho w ould be
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the farm ers that the m inister has encouraged to  stick to  the very  bad national po licy  
o f  half-w orking  their land, farm ers who w ill go in  for sum m er dairy ing  and have 
their land h a lf  idle and no t used to the fullest extent T hey are the 200 acre 
farm ers 43
F ianna Fail w ere trying, quite naturally , to m ake life as d ifficu lt as possib le for the 
governm ent by criticising  the b ill and w hat they saw  as its lack o f  p rovision  for sm all 
farm ers T here is, how ever, no escaping the conclusion that there  w as a  very  real 
d ifference o f  em phasis in  the tw o parties F ianna Fail portrayed the sm all farm er as the  
saviour o f  Irish  agriculture w ho through increased tillage w ould reduce unem ploym ent and 
dependence on im ported  gram  C um ann na  nG aedheal w as predisposed to the 
successful\hard-w orking farm er w hether large or sm all In  the long term  help ing  the m ost 
effic ien t and hard  w orking m ay have been the correct policy Prom oting the in terest o f  
com m ercial agriculture w as done for ‘pragm atic reasons’ and w as ‘based on the advice 
availab le’ to  the governm ent, rather than a reflection o f  the dom inance o f  the g ra z ie r44 
H ow ever, w ith  the in ternational econom ic position  getting w orse a t the end o f  the  decade 
it becam e d ifficu lt to retain  farm ers’ support for the policy, w hen the m ajority  o f  them  did 
no t see them selves as successful
D ifferences based on  the best w ay o f  regulating the farm ing industry  existed betw een  the 
governm ent and F ianna Fail They w ere slight and w here they existed they rarely  led to 
heated  debates in  the D ail T his m easure o f  agreem ent betw een the tw o m ajor parties 
vanished w hen the issue o f  protectiom sm  w as raised F ianna Fail m ade pro tection  one o f
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the m ain  p lanks o f  then* policy w hich they pursued w ith  v igour after their m em bers had  
taken their seats in  1927 They could not, how ever, claim  sole ow nership  o f  the  po licy
In  1923 L iam  D avin, L abour, asked the President i f  an em bargo could  be p u t on  im ported  
grain  because o f  the low  prices w hich w ere being paid for barley T he departm ent w as 
against du ty  on im ported  grain  w hich they said could contribute to h igher prices because 
it raised  the cost o f  anim al feedstuffs on the hom e m arket P utting  a duty on im ported  
barley w ould, they said, bring  the governm ent into conflict w ith  farm ers w ho did not g row  
barley and w ho w ere in as great a d ifficulty  as those w ho did The secretary w as 
particu larly  concerned that placing a ta r if f  on gram , w hich w as a  raw  m aterial for a  num ber 
o f  Irish  industries, w ould discourage exporters and bring about a  rise in the cost o f  liv ing 
N either did  he agree w ith  a guaranteed price w hich he said had n o t w orked w ell in  B rita in  
during the w a r 45 T his appears to have rem ained the policy o f  the departm ent at least until 
the  effects o f  the G reat D epression began to be felt in 1930\31 A  report on the price  o f  
hom e grow n grain  in  1925 said that a subsidy on tilled  land w ould have to  be paid  on all 
tilled  land and the country could not afford it, o therw ise farm ers w ould  sim ply sw itch  to 
the crops w hich w ere being supported It reaffirm ed that the departm ent w as against 
singling out barley for a  m inim um  price In  another report on  the condition  o f  the barley 
m arket in 1928, it w as concluded that the suggestion that m alsters be com pelled  to  purchase 
barley w hether they w anted it o r not w as ‘an unw arranted  interference w ith their 
b usiness’ 46
T he debate on  the  necessity  for tariffs to protect Irish  industry  after independence go t under 
w ay as early  as February  1922 It continued unabated for the fo llow ing ten years In 1922
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The Irish Homestead, speaking for the farm ers, took an am bivalent attitude tow ards 
p rotective tariffs In  June 1922 it w as suggesting that a low  ta r if f  on  all goods m igh t be 
the best w ay to  deal w ith  the prob lem  It believed it w ould  be a good w ay o f  increasing  
governm ent revenues w hich w ould be needed by the new  state and an alternative to ra ising  
taxes A  degree o f  pro tection  w ould  lead to  increased production  fo r the hom e m arked  and 
reduce ‘reliance on a  threatened export trade’ In 1922 B ritain  and Ireland w ere still 
suffering  from  the post w ar depression It believed that it w as likely that w hen the new  
‘ch ie f  o f  the Irish  T reasury w as looking for w ays o f  raising m oney the big  im port statistics 
and the sentim ent in  favour o f  p ro tec tion’ m ight lead to  a ‘general duty o f  five or seven 
p e rcen t’ This w as seen as likely because o f  the extra revenue from  duties w hich  w ould  
be n e e d e d 47 A  m onth  earlier they had asked farm ers to consider any policy  fo r p ro tection  
agricu lture carefully  because
it [was] no t enough to ta lk  vaguely about protection for Irish  agriculture I f  they 
w ant[ed] pro tection  they [had to] have clear ideas about w hat they w ant p ro tected  
and w hat duties they desired im posed and they [had] to consider the effects not 
m erely  on  them selves bu t on  the tow nsm en and the possib ility  o f  re ta lia tio n ^
B lythe, w ho w as M inister for T rade and C om m erce in February  1922, did  no t share the 
popu lar sen tim ent in favour o f  protective tariffs H e thought that Ireland w as no t in  a  
position  to adopt p rotective tariffs because
to com m it o n ese lf to a  protective policy m eans that finally  you aim  at a  self- 
supporting  country  w ith  a balance betw een rural and urban production  and you  are
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m uch  m ore concerned about your hom e m arkets than  your foreign  m arkets T here 
is a g reat deal to be said for this ideal B ut w hat perils lie before a country  like 
Ireland, w hich  m ore than any other country m  the w orld, depends at p resen t on  an 
im port and export trade, i f  it m akes hasty changes
H e illustrated  his po in t by saying that it w as estim ated that £100,000,000 w orth  o f  Ire lan d ’s 
exports w ere agricultural, £2,000,000 w ere industrial, the m ajority  o f  w hich  w ent to  
B rita in  T herefore the fu ture prosperity  o f  Ire land ’s agricultural industry lay n o t in hom e 
m arket bu t in the purchasing pow er o f  its n e ig h b o u r49
A gitation  to bring in som e kind o f  ta r if f  or subsidy for barley continued throughou t the 
years up  to 1927 D eputies D avin  and H effernan w ere in the forefront w hen it cam e to 
raising  the  question  in the D ail They were particularly  concerned because they represented  
constituencies w hich  had  a  h igh  proportion  o f  arable farm ers D av in ’s in terest in  the  fate 
o f  the barley  grow ers is a good exam ple o f  coincidence o f  in terest in politics T he L abour 
Party  w as in  favour o f  m ore tillage because they believed it w ould give m ore em ploym ent 
on  the  land L aois\O ffaly, the constituency w hich D avin represented, w as one o f  the m ajor 
barley grow ing areas This led to the spectacle o f  a L abour Party  deputy  
cham pioning the large farm ers who w ere barley grow ers, ‘the m uch better o f f  m an ’, from  
the earliest days o f  the state U nanim ity  did no t exist in the F arm ers’ Party  on  how  the 
p rob lem  should  be solved w ith one deputy against a subsidy for the industry bu t in favour 
o f  e ither p ro tection  or a  penalty  on buyers o f  foreign barley, and another supporting  a 
subsidy In  January  1926, the gram  grow ers w ere dem anding that an em bargo be p laced
2 1 1
on m aize products and th a t no  m aize products should be sold unless they  w ere b lended  w ith  
fifteen  per cent o f  hom e-grow n g ra m 50
The crux  o f  the  m atter fo r the grow ers seem s to have been the m onopoly  position  w hich 
G uinness held  in  the m arket G uinness w as an easily identifiable target T he grow ers and 
their representatives w ere aw are that G uinness w ere producing large profits because o f  the 
drop in  the  w orld  price o f  m alting  barley, a situation w hich they believed w as unfair 
C onsequently  they w anted som e form  o f  subsidy or ta r iff  w hich w ould restore them  to  a 
m ore profitab le  p o s itio n 51 H ogan and the departm ent rejected any attem pt to  m ake barley  
a special case, firstly  because other cereal grow ers w ere also affected  by the drop in w orld  
prices, and secondly because the land used for grow ing barley w as suitable fo r o ther crops 
un like soils w here oats w ere grow n T herefore, barley grow ers had alternatives available 
to them  It w as a difficult position  for H ogan to defend, w hatever its m erits It b rought 
criticism  w hich  w as particularly  unw elcom e from  the G rain G row ers A ssociation, w hose 
m em bers could  usually  be counted am ongst the governm ent’s strongest supporters O ne 
deputy  pu t it like this
the E xecutive Council is no t elected to look after the interests o f  one particu lar 
brew ery here, bu t it w ould  seem  that they are concerned w hen the in terests o f  that 
firm  com e righ t up against the interests o f  a large num ber o f  unfortunate people 
w ho are th row n out o f  em ploym ent through this im portation  o f  m alt 52
G uinness w as the single m ost im portant firm  in the country w ith  an in ternational repu tation  
T hey w ere acknow ledged as good em ployers and w ere large scale exporters as w ell as
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supplying the  hom e m arket w ith  porter and stout w hich m ight otherw ise have been 
im ported  H ogan regarded G uinness as one o f  the great success stories o f  Irish  industry  and 
com m erce H e d id  not w an t to see their trading position dam aged and w as critical o f  those 
w ho ‘dragged them  in ’ He thought it w as ‘hum iliating to have m em bers o f  the H ouse 
constantly  attacking G uinness’s W hat is hum iliating about it is that that concern  w ould  
n o t th ink  it w orth  its w hile to  answ er u s ’ R esponding to the po in t about the role o f  the 
executive council he concluded that ‘w hatever the functions o f  the E xecutive C ouncil are, 
they are certain ly  no t to run  a  business such as a b rew ery’ H ow ever, during  the sam e 
exchange he m ade it c lear that he w as ‘not defend ing’ G uinness’s at a l l 53 B ehind the 
scenes, how ever, H ogan asked the departm ent to check i f  there w ere any technical reasons 
w hy G um ness m ixed  foreign barley w ith  Irish The departm ent w ere unable to  g ive a 
defin ite answ er based on inform ation from  G uinness H ow ever they told  h im  that they  had 
‘good reason  fo r record ing  the op in ion  that the St Jam es’s G ate brew ery could  get on  quite 
w ell w ithout one p ickle o f  Irish  grow n g ra in ’ 54
T hat barley  becam e a m ajor battleground for the debate over pro tection  and subsidy is 
w orth  noting  The significance lies in the fact that barley grow ers w ere com plete ly  
dependent on  the  hom e m arket G row ers w ere faced w ith  com petition  w hich could not be 
m et by im proved efficiency or quality control alone U nlike the dairy  and b e e f  industries, 
cereal g row ers suffered from  natural d isadvantages They did no t have a  dependable 
clim ate, un like C anadian  and US grow ers, nor could they even achieve the econom ies o f  
scale en joyed  by the prairie  farm ers o f  N orth  and South A m erica The barley grow ers 
w anted to re ta in  the h igh  prices w hich they had enjoyed during and after the w ar To 
achieve this w ould  have m eant paying them  a subsidy or placing a prohibitive ta r if f  on
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im ports E ither w ay w hether by m eans o f  tax increases to  pay fo r the  subsidy o r by 
increasing the price o f  barley the d a n y ^ e e f  farm ers w ould be placed at a d isadvantage vis 
a v is their com petitors because o f  the increased price o f  anim al feedstuffs and therefo re  the 
costs o f  p ro d u c tio n 55
Farm ers understood  the ram ifications o f  an agricultural policy  based on pro tection  By 
1924 The Irish Statesman, w hich had succeeded the Irish Homestead, and w as the voice 
o f  farm ing in the 1920s had hardened its attitude tow ards pro tection  W hile o ther sections 
o f  the econom y w ere still debating the m erits o f  pro tection  the ‘farm ers ha[d] recorded  their 
b e lie f  that, w hoever else m ay stand to gam  by protection, they st[ood] to lo se’ The paper 
stated that it w as neither ‘P rotectionist nor Free T rade’ but it w as already clear that they 
had com e dow n on the side o f  the farm ers and the g o v e rn m e n t56
The Irish Statesman had an unusual approach to som e o f  the im portant econom ic issues 
evoked by debate on protectionism  Protection was often  presented  as a  w ay  o f  
encouraging industrialisation  and thus reducing unem ploym ent The jou rnal, how ever, 
w anted  to  know  w hy it ‘seem [ed] to  be assum ed that a factory civ ilization  on the E nglish  
m odel w as the ideal thing to aim  a t’ Encouraging industrialisation  w as tan tam ount to 
replacing ‘the  departed E nglish  G overnm ent by an im ported E nglish  c iv iliza tion ’ It 
suggested that there w as another course, to fo llow  the exam ple o f  D enm ark  and  o ther 
countries w hose econom ies w ere dom inated  by agriculture It found the opportunity , g iven 
by the debate, to strike at Sm n Fein irresistible
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B y a curious coincidence it is the sam e people w ho are m ost anxious to rev ive the 
Irish  language w ho are keenest on introducing the E nglish  factory  tow n w ith  its 
slum s It seem s to be the aim  o f  certain  people w ho call them selves Irish-Ire ianders 
to m ake Ireland as like L ancashire as possible 57
T heir efforts to get debates o f  th is nature going were not successful The argum ents about 
pro tection  had polarised  by the m iddle o f  the decade O n one side w ere those w ho believed  
in pro tective  tariffs as a w ay o f  assisting hom e industries and creating em ploym ent T hey 
included industrialists, the L abour Party and Sinn Fein, later F ianna Fail, and the 
D epartm ent o f  Industry  and C om m erce w hich w as ‘from  its origin , a com m itted  advocate 
o f  an active governm ent po licy  for industry ’ 58 A gainst the proposition  w ere the bu lk  o f  
the farm ing com m unity , large exporting  com panies such as G um ness and Jacobs, the 
C um ann na  nG aedheal governm ent and the Fiscal Inquiry C om m ittee, set up in 1923 59
The period o f  greatest pressure for the introduction o f  tariffs and subsidies coincided w ith  
F ianna F a il’s entry into the D ail It is very likely, how ever, tha t even in their absence 
dem ands for som e kind o f  pro tection  from  cheap im ports w ould have been strong D av in ’s 
and H effem an ’s sustained interest in  the plight o f  the barley grow ers from  early  in the 
decade is evidence o f  a continued b e lie f in som e quarters that governm ent in terven tion  w as 
necessary  to assist grow ers to com pete w ith foreign im ports F ianna Fail w as echoing and 
am plify ing  calls for help from  farm ers w hich were being m ade by their organisations, 
county  com m ittees o f  agriculture and county c o u n c ils60 N or w ere these calls confined to 
opposition  supporters, as an exam ple, the m em bers o f  the G arryhinch branch  o f  C um ann
na nG aedheal passed a resolution  w hich they sent to the m inister calling  on  the  governm ent 
to im pose a ta r if f  o f  10\- a  barrel on all foreign barley to stim ulate gram  grow ing  61
Increasing com petition  on the B ritish  m arket from  E uropean and D om im on countries w as 
eroding the Irish  farm ers’ share o f  the B ritish  m arket By the end o f  the 1920s w orld  
recession  w as beginning to  have a real i f  delayed im pact on  Irish  exports 62 C um ann na 
nG aedheal had never com pletely ruled out the use o f  p rotective tariffs in particu lar cases 
In the 1924 budget they had been im posed on five categories o f  goods, a lthough the 
M inister fo r Finance m ade it c lear that it w as not to be regarded as the beginning  o f  a 
general p ro tection ist policy
the G overnm ent takes up no doctrinaire attitude on the question o f  free trade  and 
p ro tection  It regards the m atter as one o f  expediency w hich m ay be variously  
decided in d ifferen t circum stances The Executive Council is convinced that the 
m atter is one on  w hich the country should feel its w ay 63
The T a riff  C om m ission w as set up in 1926 to assist the fram ing o f  w hat P resident C osgrave 
described as a po licy  o f  selective protection Surprisingly, during its existence it received 
very few  applications H ow ever, the victory o f  the N ational G overnm ent in the general 
election  m  B rita in  in O ctober 1931 w as a tu rning point The prospect o f  a  general ta riff  
in B rita in  led to a w orld-w ide rush to export goods to the U nited K ingdom  before it w as 
in troduced T hat in tu rn  caused deep concern in Ireland 64 A n editorial in The Irish Times 
in  N ovem ber w as reporting  the ‘first m ove’ tow ards a  general ta r if f  in  B ritain
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B ritain , having lingered for som e w eeks on the brink  o f  p ro tection , at last has 
launched aw ay In  the H ouse o f  C om m ons yesterday the P resident o f  the B oard  o f  
T rade, a  sensible convert to necessity, announced his proposals for the stoppage o f  
dum ping The bill w ill apply only to m anufactured  or partly -m anufactured  goods, 
since the  M im ster for A griculture w ill have his ow n plans fo r the prom otion  o f  that 
industry 65
This w as a particu larly  try ing tim e for H ogan His agricultural policy had been based on 
the  b e lie f  th a t as Ireland had to export agricultural produce in  order to  survive It w as, 
therefore, an absolute necessity to keep the overheads o f  farm ers as low  as possib le in 
order tha t their goods w ould  rem ain  com petitive, especially m  the B ritish  m arket H is 
po licy  had sheltered Ireland from  the w orst o f  the depression up to 1930 In  A pril 1930 
he w rote
th is has no t been  a  bad year at all for farm ers C heap gram , oats, barley, m aize, 
etc , is w hat w e w ant, as our production  is m ainly live stock products w hich  w e sell 
on  the E nglish  m arket The cheaper our raw  m aterials the m ore m oney w e m ake 
I d o n ’t know  w hat w ill happen this year One feature o f  the situation  is that 
E ngland is still in  a  bad w ay A ny lack o f  prosperity  in E ngland  re-acts on  us at 
once 66
O ’D onovan confirm s H ogan’s v iew  He says that it w as ‘noticeable tha t the countries 
engaged in the export o f  p ro tein  foods did not feel the im pact as soon as those engaged
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in  the production  o f  p rim ary  com m odities such as g ra in ’ Irish  farm ers at a tim e w hen  the 
m arket for cereals w as very w eak w ere able to reap som e b e n e f its67
H ogan held  ou t against opposition  calls for protective tariffs, subsidies and price controls, 
w hich w ould  have destroyed his export led policy In ternational trading conditions, 
how ever, challenged his adherence to a free trade econom y in a w ay that dom estic critic ism  
and appeals from  particular farm ing interests had never done A lthough he agreed to  the 
in troduction  o f  a ta r if f  on butter in  N ovem ber 1930 it is clear that he rem ained unconvinced  
that it w ould  produce anything but tem porary re lie f for the dairy  farm ers
fo r the first tim e I find that after w e have had an experience for about th ree m onths 
o f  a good sw ingeing tariff, the m erits o f  w hich could be exactly  m easured, unlike 
the  ta r if f  on boots and clothes, at last som e doubts are entering the m inds o f  
deputies as to the efficacy o f  tariffs to solve all our ills I have considerable doubts 
as to w hat the u ltim ate effect o f  this w ill be, and I repeat that I w ant the H ouse and 
the country to have every opportunity  o f  exam ining every relevant consideration  
connected  w ith  th is ta r if f  before it is finally passed 68
H ogan m ade th is statem ent during the com m ittee stage o f  the F inance b ill at a tim e w hen 
he w as supposed to be speaking in favour o f  the ta riff  w hich had been recom m ended by 
the T a riff  C om m ission H is am bivalence w as d ifficult to disguise, he questioned w hether 
the ta r if f  w as ‘going  to be a benefit from  the point o f  v iew  o f  the country as a w hole and 
from  the po in t o f  v iew  o f  the perm anent in terest o f  the farm er’, w hile in the next paragraph
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he said ‘the one branch o f  agriculture w here prices collapsed is dairy ing and  w e gave, 
i f  I m ay p u t it th is w ay, a m uch needed stim ulant to  the industry  by im posing th is ta r i f f  69
The irony o f  the ‘doctrinaire free trader5 struggling to ju stify  h is apparen t volte  face w as 
no t lost on the opposition  Sean M cE ntee rem arked sarcastically th a t the  m in is te r 's  speech 
‘rem in d ed 5 him  ‘o f  the m anner o f  a m an fixing cocktails in that he w as quite obviously  
m ix ing  h is feelings in regard to this ta r i f f  H ow ever, he w as no t the only one to have 
doubts about the ta r iff  and he m ade use o f  the inconsistencies in the argum ents o f  the 
opposition  to relieve his ow n beleaguered position  R esponding to de V a le ra 's  critic ism  
that the  rise in the cost o f  living and production  was dam aging the farm er, he h it back  by
saying that the m am  cause o f  the rise m  the cost o f  goods on w hich tariffs had been  placed
and w hose index figure w as ‘considerably h igher than the index figure for cattle and sheep 
w hich  the farm er5 w as ‘selling5 T herefore m ore tariffs on im ports, the policy  w hich  F ianna 
Fail advocated, w ould  w orsen his p light H e continued forcefully
w e heard  from  the benches opposite that the farm ers w ere suffering from  the great
d isadvantage o f  h igh  prices for w hat they have to buy com pared w ith  the low  prices
fo r everything they have to sell I have been saying that m y se lf for years T he
D eputies on the F ianna Fail side should com e over am ongst us at last 70
H ogan m anaged, despite the w eakness o f  his position, to forestall any outrigh t trium phalism  
from  F ianna Fail, w ho m ight have been expected to m ake him  eat h is w ords on 
pro tection ism  and protective tariffs The governm ent held  their ow n against stronger 
opposition  in the  D ail H ogan w as still as vitriolic as ever
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M r H ogan aptly  said that all this talk  about protection  and ru rahzation  o f  industry  
is due to a  vague idea that w e are chosen people and have to be sheltered from  the 
w orld  and that w e have not the courage or energy or brains to go out and take our 
place w ith  the o ther Philistines 7]
The Round Table again reported  H ogan pouring scorn on F ianna F a il’s proposed po licy  
for increasing tillage ‘H ogan righ tly  describe[d] this w heat grow ing policy as an  a ttem pt 
to alter the trend  o f  w orld  prices by the aid o f  national capital, in o ther w ords to develop  
w hat pays least’ 72 He did this by very cleverly exploiting their uncertainties and by try ing  
to show  that those w ho had been m ost in favour o f  tariffs had not realised w here a policy  
o f  m discrim inative tariffs could lead O n the same them e he attacked ‘the costliness o f  
endeavouring  to encourage som ething w hich the country w as not specially suited fo r’ he 
w as obviously  referring  to F ianna F a il’s efforts to have w heat production  increased w ith  
assistance from  the governm ent The subsidy necessary w ould have been large and there 
w as no guarantee that the  Irish  consum er w ould find hom e grow n w heat an acceptab le 
alternative to the bread m ade from  the w hiter im ported w heats H ogan w as unrepentan t 
about the  1931 ta r iff  on butter
I m ake no apology fo r m aking the experim ent I m ake no apology to the consum er 
- w hile  I sym pathise w ith  h im  - because in this case he is w ell p rotected , fa r better 
p ro tected  than  in the case o f  other tariffs in troduced m  this house A bove all, I 
m ake no apology w hatever to the people who have been advocating tariffs 
ind iscrim inately  for the last four or five years In the past year it w as taken  as a 
m atter o f  course that tariffs w ere inherently sound, that there w as no reason on earth
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- except a  double dose o f  original sin from  w hich every m em ber o f  the governm ent 
suffers - w hy tariffs should n o t be im posed autom atically , w ithou t any exam ination , 
w ithout tak ing  the trouble to find out the reactions and understand  their 
im plications 73
F ianna Fail w ere in alm ost exactly the opposite position  to H ogan A fter years o f  being m  
favour o f  tariffs they w ere now  expressing doubts H ogan referred  to the ta r if f  on butter 
as an experim ent, suggesting that he did  not regard it as a perm anent fix ture F rom  his 
po in t o f  v iew  a ta r if f  on butter w as probably the least dam aging and least likely  to  keep 
prices h igh, and he w as sure that the benefits o f  the ta r if f  w ould  go d irectly  to the farm er 
A nsw ering a question  on w hether the benefits o f  the ta r iff  w ould go to the farm ers or to 
dealers, he said
it is righ t to  say that 92 to 93 per cent o f  the output o f  cream ery butter is con tro lled  
at the presen t m om ent by farm ers, and the benefits, i f  there are any, conferred  by 
th is particu lar ta r if f  w ill go back  straight into the farm ers’ pocket 74
B utter differed  from  other com m odities on w hich tariffs had been placed because fo r eight 
m onths o f  the year surplus quantities w ere produced w hich in  the ordinary  w ay w ere 
exported  The surplus w ould  have the effect o f  keeping prices low  because there w ould  be 
no necessity  to im port butter In  the case o f  boots, by contrast, ‘w here the total 
requ irem ents o f  the ‘coun try ’ w as about £2,000,000 w orth, and the total production  o f  the 
hom e industry  for the last th ree or four years’ w as ‘only £300,000 w o rth ’, he argued 
that a ta r if f  w ould  keep the price artificially h ig h 75
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T here w as little  doubt that in  spring 1931 H ogan’s agricultural policy  w as under sever 
strain  N evertheless h is n im ble m ind w as able to cope w ith  the critic ism s w hich  F ianna  
Fail ra ised  in the D ail and on m any occasions he m anaged to m ake them  look foolish  H e 
even had the  benefit, in  political term s, o f  the L abour Party  retreating from  their earlier 
support fo r the butter ta r iff  In  theory he appeared to be w inning the argum ent B oth  
L abour and F ianna Fail w ere obviously  concerned for their ow n reasons about the  effect 
o f  a  ta r if f  on the price o f  one o f  the staple foods o f  the Irish  diet H ogan, how ever, po in ted  
out that the effects could not be hidden as they affected all consum ers unlike duties w hich  
had been  p laced  on m anufactured  goods H ad he been given points for his debating  skill 
he w ould  have been w ell ahead because, although he had to bring  in a m easure w ith  w hich 
he did  no t agree, he m anaged to use the difficulties w hich it exposed to show  the valid ity  
o f  h is strongly held  v iew s on free trade H ow ever, debating points could not a lter the  fact 
tha t there w as a  collapse in agricultural prices ‘W e can do a lot, w e have done a lo t,’ he 
said, ‘bu t w e cannot prevent w orld  conditions’ 76
H ogan had been  able to defend his policy during previous agricultural crises because 
although they w ere on occasions very severe they w ere seen as tem porary  phenom ena 
w hich could be overcom e through  greater efficiency and m ore careful m arketing  T he W all 
S treet crash o f  1929 heralded a period o f  severe w orld  depression w hich could no t be dealt 
w ith  m  the sam e w ay The general loss o f  confidence in the ability  o f  in ternational trade 
to recover quick ly  from  the depression led the vast m ajority  o f  countries to th row  up trade 
barriers in  order to pro tect their dom estic industries Ireland w as in a pecu liar position  
Firstly , alm ost all agricultural exports w ent to G reat B ritain, w ith  no alternative m arkets 
available W hile the B ritish  governm ent had not reacted  im m ediately  to the slum p by
in troducing  a general ta r iff  their m arket for agricultural goods w as being inundated  w ith  
produce from  their norm al suppliers w ho found other m arkets being closed o f f  Secondly, 
Irish  industry  w as already w eak  and incapable o f  supplying the hom e m arket w ith  all the 
necessities o f  a m odem  state W ith  a few  notable exceptions, neither w as it export o rien ted  
T herefore, even i f  p rotective tariffs w ere pu t m  place there w as not the  dom estic capacity  
to supply the hom e m arket w ith  m any o f  the com m odities necessary to m ain tain  the m ajor 
industry , agriculture, w ithout increasing prices and injuring exports still further The flaw s 
in  C um ann n a  nG aedheal’s free trade policy, w ith its concentration  on agriculture, w ere 
beginning  to show  in a dram atic w ay w hile it had served its purpose w ell in the past it w as 
not flexib le or im aginative enough to deal w ith  the extraordinary  circum stances o f  the late 
1920s and early  1930s B ut w hat policies cou ld9
In  an odd w ay H ogan had been  im plem enting his ow n protective po licy  for agriculture H e 
had tried  to  insulate it from  w hat w as happening in the rest o f  the econom y 
U nem ploym ent, em igration  and poverty  had been given a low er prio rity  in the in terests o f  
keeping agricultural production  costs dow n Even the introduction  o f  the butter ta r if f  had 
this effect It helped the dairy  industry, bu t it raised m ore tax  revenue and increased the 
cost o f  liv ing fo r the entire population, rich and poor W hen it cam e to agriculture he 
appears to  have ignored the basic rule o f  free trade econom ics w hich w as that the m arket 
ru les There w as, how ever, som e logic in his approach, w hich m ight m ore correctly  have 
been called  pragm atic  ra ther than free trade because it took into account the reality  o f  
Ire lan d ’s econom ic structure Ire land ’s thousands o f  sm all farm s, m any o f  w hich lacked 
sufficient capital to  m ake them  profitable, still provided a living for m ore than h a lf  o f  the 
w orking population  They needed som e kind o f  indirect assistance H ogan’s po licy  gave
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them  p ro tec tion  from  high  taxes and price increases at the expense o f  o ther sections o f  the 
com m unity  T his po licy  seem s to have w orked, i f  exports are used as a  criterion  T o  quote 
M eenan
the  vo lum e o f  to tal exports (then alm ost entirely agricultural in  origin) rose betw een  
1926 and 1929 m  the ratio  o f  87 to 104 T heir value in 1929 w as £47m  , a figure 
w hich, incredibly enough, w as not again approached until 1948, and then  in  a sadly 
depreciated  currency 77
The depression o f  the late 1920s and early 1930s did not allow  for subtle po licies w hich  
had depended, to  a very large extent, on self-help, encouraged through education  and the 
d irection  o f  the  regulatory  acts Ireland seven years after independence w as no t in a 
position  to figh t m  the international trade w ar w hich developed after the 1929 stock m arket 
collapse It is unlikely  that it w ould  have been w hatever agricultural policies had  been  in 
place The lim ited  dom estic m arket could not have consum ed the surplus m eat, bu tter and 
eggs w hich w ere being produced nor could m any Irish  consum ers have afforded  to buy 
them  in  sufficient quantities w ithout either a drop in prices w hich w ould  have in ju red  the 
farm er or a m assive subsidy w hich w ould have to be paid for by increased taxation  
A ltering  the balance betw een cattle and dairy farm ing in  favour o f  tillage w ould  have 
required  a  fundam ental shift o f  policy involving heavy governm ent subsidies, com pulsion, 
or bo th  T he experience o f  the w ar years w hen tillage w as increased through com pulsion  
and guaran teed  prices and the im m ediate decline w hich fo llow ed its rem oval g raphically  
illustrates the  p reference o f  farm ers for dairying and livestock w hich they  regarded as m ore 
profitab le  because it suited the conditions in Ireland As M eenan says, there w as a
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‘tendency in Ire land  for the tilled  area to contract except under the pressure o f  exceptional 
c ircum stances’ 78
A s early  as 1923, in response to calls for an em bargo on barley im ports, the departm ent 
exam ined the question  o f  tariffs and subsidies and cam e to the conclusion that du ty  on 
im ported  gram  w ould  lead to  h igher costs On further exam ination  they expressed the v iew  
that pu tting  duty on im ported  barley ‘w ould only cause em barrassm ent to the governm ent 
unless a policy o f  protecting agriculture generally’ w as ‘adop ted’ 79 There does not appear 
to have been  any advice to the contrary given to H ogan by his departm ental adv isers up to 
the tim e he left office in February, 1932
A lm ost im m ediately  after F ianna Fail took office and Jam es R yan becam e M inister for 
A gricu lture there w as a reversal o f  th is policy It is not w ith in  the scope o f  th is thesis to  
exam ine the advice w hich w as given by the officials o f  the departm ent to  the new  
governm ent, but it m ust be assum ed that they gave their advice w ith in  the guidelines laid 
dow n by the policy  o f  protectionism  on w hich F ianna Fail had fought the election  in  1932 
Initially  it appears that the new  m inister radically  altered the d irection  w hich agricultural 
policy  w as tak ing  in 1932 80 This suggests that the new  F ianna Fail m inister had a dram atic  
effect on  the policy o f  h is departm ent H ow ever, the gradual drift tow ards tariffs on 
agricultural produce at the end o f  H ogan’s period as m inister m akes it likely that had he 
rem ained  in office he w ould, like R yan, have gone along w ith a general ta r iff  together w ith 
subsid ies B ut it is ju s t as likely that they w ould not have been regarded as a  perm anent 
so lu tion  by H ogan L ooking at the condition o f  Irish agriculture in the th ree years 1929 
to 1932 m akes the changes w hich took place after 1932 seem  less abrupt H ogan had been
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forced  to  adopt policies w hich  under norm al circum stances he w ould  never have considered 
B ecause he d id  so under duress and against his ow n convictions, he gam ed very  little 
advantage from  their fru its in  political term s F ianna Fail had, by linking self-sufficiency 
and econom ic nationalism , hitched their political w agon to the rising star o f  p ro tection ism  
It w as, therefore, they w ho reaped the rew ards They after all had been  proved righ t
In evidence g iven by the secretary o f  the D epartm ent o f  A griculture, in a m em orandum  to 
the B anking C om m ission in 1935 on the over-dependence o f  Ire land ’s econom y on 
livestock exports, it is c lear that the departm ent had begun to alter their opim on o f  how  
to deal w ith  the problem s w hich  the slum p in w orld  trade had created for agriculture
the defects o f  the system  becam e apparent w hen the depression in  the p rices o f  
livestock and livestock products set in follow ed by the im position o f  Im port D uties 
on  such products and quantitative restriction  o f  im ports o f  certain  o f  the 
com m odities into G reat B ritain  gl
T his suggests that it w as w orld  trading conditions and not ju s t the change o f  governm ent 
w hich altered  their v iew  o f  the efficacy o f  protection He pressed this point, that is the 
connection  betw een  prevailing  conditions and agricultural policy, fu rther during questioning 
by the  C om m ission w here he said
I th ink, in the new  set o f  circum stances that now  exist, that the new  agricultural 
po licy  is better balanced than the policy it succeeded A t the sam e tim e, I w ant to
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m ake it quite clear that I consider the policy adopted in this country  p rio r to  the 
years 1930 and 1931 w as suitable for the circum stances that existed at the tim e  82
It m ay be, o f  course, that he felt that he had to defend the line w hich departm ent officials, 
h im se lf included, had taken m  the past in order to m aintain  h is credibility  H e d id  not, 
how ever, ven ture an opim on on the probable condition o f  agriculture in 1935 i f  a po licy  
o f  pro tection  had been adopted in 1922
T he general election  o f  1932 saved H ogan from  w hat m ight have been for h im  a very  
ignom inious position  T he B ritish introduction o f  a general ta r iff  m ade it increasingly  
d ifficu lt fo r Ireland to  escape the sam e fate It is not easy to suggest w ays in w hich  H ogan 
could  have m aintained som e sem blance o f  his original free trade policy, unless he could 
have persuaded B ritain  to m ake Ireland a special case and give Irish  agricultural im ports 
p referential treatm ent H ogan had been due to visit L ondon to discuss these m atters w hen 
the election  took  place It is im possible, how ever, to say i f  he could have secured 
concessions w hich w ould have allow ed Ire land ’s agricultural trade w ith B ritain  to continue 
as before F ianna F a il’s po licy  o f  protection  and the grow ing dispute over the paym ent o f  
land annuities pu t an end to  the hope o f  any kind o f  preferential treatm ent and presaged  
one o f  the m ost depressed periods in Irish  agriculture
C um ann na  nG aedheal paid  the price o f  being in G overnm ent during one o f  the w orst 
econom ic depressions They lost the 1932 election F ianna Fail m anaged no t only to harness 
the d isconten t caused by the international depression but the active nationalism  associated 
w ith  the figh t fo r independence W hen M ulcahy lcsigned  as a resu lt o f  the arm y m utiny
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in  1924 V aliu lis suggests tha t ‘C um ann na nG aedheal w as left w ithout a  national hero  to 
rival E am on de V alera, leader o f  the anti-T reaty g roup’ 83 This w as significant because it 
allow ed F ianna Fail to  pro ject them selves as the inheritors o f  the 1916 m antle and to 
portray  C um ann n a  nG aedheal as pro-B ritish  and supporters o f  the B ritish  C om m onw ealth
H ogan contribu ted  to this im pression H e continually played dow n his connection  w ith  the 
independence struggle H e m inim ised no t only his role bu t also that p layed  by opposition  
m em bers H is im patience w ith  those w ho w ished to dw ell on  the ach ievem ent o f  
independence w as evident, particularly  in the D ail He w anted the Irish  people to forget 
about ‘reco rds’ and ‘ped ig rees’ and concentrate on increasing agricultural exports in order 
to achieve prosperity  D ebating the past w ould only d ivert attention  from  this ob jective and 
allow  o ther countries to reduce Ire land ’s share o f  the B ritish  m arket
H ogan the realist w as unrealistic in th inking that the traum atic events o f  the p re-T reaty  
period w ould  be easily forgotten  and replaced by the prosaic issues w hich he regarded  as 
m ore im portan t H is no nonsense approach w as adm irable H ow ever it w ould  have been 
m ore politic  to  have taken into account the sensitiv ities o f  the tim e and covered  h is 
irritation  w ith those w ho could no t com e to term s w ith  Ire land ’s independence as easily  as 
he had The Round Table com m enting on the reasons for C um ann na  nG aedheal’s poor 
results in the  1932 election  m ay have H ogan in m ind w hen it said
the G overnm ent itse lf  did  no t act w ith m uch tact, and ju stified  the hum orous 
com m ent o f  a friendly cynic, that it contained several statesm en bu t on ly  one 
politician , nam ely, M r C osgrave h im self 84
228
H ogan re lied  on the ‘good sense5 and ‘soundness5 o f  the electorate to re tu rn  the  governm ent 
in w hich he served H is prescrip tion  for prosperity  w as based on hard  w ork  and  se lf  
reliance It m ay have been in h is ow n w ords "sound” bu t it w as a harsh  m essage H e 
neglected  the spiritual dim ension H is late friend K evin 0 5H iggins w ould have been  proud  
o f  th is om ission CTHiggins w as scathing about traditional nationalists
none o f  these fellow s care a curse about the country or the people in the country  
M cG ilhgan, w ho w a sn 't ”out in 16", has no particular "record” and no particu lar 
"G aelic soul", has done m ore in  tw o w eeks than his p redecessor [M cG rath] in  tw o 
years I have com e to the conclusion that m en like H ogan, M cG ilhgan  could 
do m ore for the country in a year and (even for the realisation  o f  all its ideals) than  
all the C lans and B rotherhoods could effect m a generation  85
H ogan and O 'H ig g in s  w ere the antithesis o f  extrem ist republicanism  D e V alera and F ianna 
Fail w ere the synthesis o f  the tw o argum ents F ianna Fail brought together in a w orkable 
form ula  the idea that constitutional governm ent did not preclude econom ic nationalism  In 
the deteriorating  econom ic situation m  1932 this w as a pow erful m ix F ianna Fail o ffered  
pro tectiom sm  as the new  answ er to Ire lan d 's  econom ic problem s since the old panacea 
‘independence from  B ritain  w ill cure all our econom ic ills5 had proved a failure 86
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RESOLUTION OF THE LAND QUESTION
E lizabeth  H ooker, in  the p reface to  her pioneering w ork  on Readjustments of Agricultural 
Tenure in Ireland, divides the problem  o f  land tenure into five areas (1) the  regu lation  
o f  land lord-tenant relations, (2) the transform ation o f  tenants into ow ners, (3) special w ork  
fo r the  congested  districts, (4) the provision o f  holdings for m en w ith  too little land o r w ith  
no land, and (5) aid  to  rural labourers 1 A ll five w ere im portant bu t it w as the 
tran sfo rm a tio n -o f tenants into ow ners w hich dom inated the debate on  land policy  to  the 
v irtual exclusion o f  all the o thers by 1922 It is a pow erful exam ple o f  a policy gradually  
capturing the support o f  the m ajority  o f  interested parties, the tenants, and establish ing itse lf  
as the new  orthodoxy in the course o f  a generation It w as not ju s t the tenants w ho held 
th is v iew  In  1914 the adm inistration  recognised that it w as ‘the settled policy  o f  all 
political parties to carry  Irish  land purchase through to com pletion’ 2 There had grow n up 
in B rita in  and Ireland a sim ple b e lie f that 4 in occupying ow nership the cure for the  ills o f  
Ireland  had at last been fo und’ 3
Irish  landlords had no t d istinguished them selves as either good proprietors or businessm en 
so there w as little sym pathy for their proposed rem oval
the case against absenteeism  w as accepted on all sides and w as particularly  popu lar 
in  E ngland and the tenants, once they realised  the advantages o f  annuity  paym ents 
w hich  w ere low er than  rents, th rew  them selves w holeheartedly  into the figh t 4
The ten tative  experim ent w ith  peasant proprietorship  w hich began in 1870 developed into 
an unstoppable flood  by the end o f  the century This sw ept aw ay the landlords bu t it left 
the rest o f  the n ineteenth  century  agricultural structure alm ost m tact The d irect
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beneficiaries o f  the L and A cts w ere the tenants E victed  tenants w ere, under specified  
conditions, able to recover their land The num bers involved w ere sm all, 3 ,457 under the 
Land A cts up to 31 M arch, 1922 The num ber reinstated betw een 1 A pril, 1922 and 31 
M arch, 1932 w as 149 A long w ith  tenants and evicted tenants, labourers w ho lost th e ir jo b s  
as a resu lt o f  the  break-up  o f  large estates w ere ‘a class w hich alone shared the  coveted  
priv ilege o f  purchase w ith  the farm  tenan ts’ 5 It w as as i f  the  clock had  stopped and 
w hoever w as m  possession rem ained m  possession irrespective o f  the ir age or ability  
U nfortunately  the legacy o f  n ineteenth  century land hunger m eant that ‘the m en w ho 
w orked the soil w ere no t the m ost able farm ers but the m en offering  the h ighest ren ts’ 6 
C om petence in farm ing did no t becom e a consideration w hen land w as transferred  in  the 
1920s and 1930s W ith 314,249 holdings either transferred  or in the process o f  being 
transferred  to their tenants in 1922 the heat had left the debate on land p o l ic y 7 Few  
questioned its efficacy
T he m agic o f  ow nership, it w as declared, w ould w ork  m iracles, i f  any sceptical 
person  declared  that the spell w ould  not w ork unless o ther form ulae w ere added, 
he w as denounced heartily  as an econom ic heretic B ut the m agic o f  proprie torsh ip  
did  no t w ork according to the prophecies o f  the political m agicians 8
T his w as the opinion o f  the editor o f  the I r ish  H o m estead , w ho w anted the governm ent 
to  try  experim ents in  co-operative farm ing, citing the success o f  cooperative farm ing  in 
Italy  H ow ever, he w as not foolish  enough to advocate com pulsion th rough  legislation , 
believ ing  tha t ‘w e ha[d] too  little national com m on sense or econom ic experience to [have
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m ade] such leg islation  w o rk ’ He show ed his frustration  at the failu re o f  the Irish  farm ers 
to  em brace the co-operative ideal
W e have no m ore learned how  to w ork together in econom ics than  w e have learned 
to  w ork  am icably together in politics Ireland is the country par excellence o f  the 
self-opim onated  individualist w ith  a profound b e lie f in  his ow n invincib le ignorance, 
though his standard o f  com fort is o f  the low est and h is reading o f  the  m ost 
elem entary character 9
T he eventual outcom e w as a foregone conclusion that lands w hich rem ained in the hands 
o f  the landlords w ould  be dealt w ith  sooner rather than later T he m om entum  to effect 
com pletion  o f  tenan t purchases w as such that H ogan w as left pow erless to m troduce any 
a lteration  in the general princip les o f  the policy
In spite o f  this, H ogan w as later accused by F ianna Fail o f  favouring the large farm er at the 
expense o f  the sm all m an H ow ever, this claim  is no t borne out w hen the land acts for 
w hich he w as responsib le are exam ined N othing in their com position  suggests that such 
a po licy  w as ever contem plated H e w as referred to as the ‘M inister for G rass’ by his 
critics, w hich im plies that h is contem poraries believed that he w as no t predisposed tow ards 
the sm all m an W hatever his personal opinions about the num ber o f  sm all farm s w ere, 
how ever, they w ere no t translated  into an active policy aim ed at reducing their num bers 
O n the contrary  he and the m im sters w ho succeeded him  at the D epartm ent o f  L ands did 
nothing to a lter the basic philosophy o f  the B ritish land policy w hich they had inherited  
T hey w orked d iligently  for alm ost a decade to im plem ent it as quickly as possible
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H o g an ’s reputation  as a  courageous politic ian  begs the question  w hy, i f  he believed  there 
w ere too  m any uneconom ic holdings in Ireland, did he not at least a ttem pt to  do som ething 
about it?10 W hile it m ight appear that H ogan w ould  have relished changes in  the  
d istribu tion  o f  land it is unlikely  that he ever considered seriously such a course o f  action  
H e w as a practical m an w ho w ould have appreciated the advantages o f  larger farm s to the 
farm ing  industry  H ow ever he w as also a G alw ay m an steeped in the lore o f  the land 
struggle and surrounded by constituents w hose lives had been, at least tem porarily , 
im proved by the acquisition  o f  their farm s B arely  forty years after the foundation  o f  the 
Land League it is alm ost unthinkable that he w ould have done anything w hich w ould  have 
reversed the basic prem ises on w hich the policy had been established
A close exam ination  o f  the  farm ing press during the decade reveals no pressure from  any 
quarter fo r the reduction  in farm  num bers The only references w hich w ere m ade to  land 
policy  w as the slow ness o f  the L and C om m ission m  com pleting the legal form alities In 
o ther w ords there w as no group or individual w ho questioned the policy publicly
The com pletion  o f  land purchase after independence w as never going to be an easy task 
even i f  it w as accepted as inevitable ‘The rem aining cases included hard  knots it w as 
d ifficu lt to d isentangle under the voluntary system ’ 11 H ogan inform ed the P resident in a 
m em orandum  in A pril 1923
a considerable am ount o f  the estates rem aining unpurchased are sm all estates ow ned 
by doctors, law yers, old  ladies and all that class o f  person w ho reside here in  D ublin  
and elsew here and not on the estates, their estates being entirely  tenanted  land
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These are all poor estates and anything like the term s dem anded by the  tenants 
w ould  leave the ow ners absolutely nothing, in  fact, w ould  leave the  estates 
insolvent and unable to pay their charges 12
T he num ber o f  holdings still to  be transferred  in 1923 w as underestim ated T he Irish  
C onvention  o f  1917/18 believed that the num ber o f  holdings ‘m ust be less than 60,000, and 
possib ly  m ay no t be m ore than 50 ,000’ In  1923 H ogan told  the D ail that the figure w as
70,000, still a serious underestim ate betw een 1923 and 1933 m ore than  110,000 hold ings
(
w ere bought under the Land Purchase A cts 13 The size o f  the task  w hich  the  L and 
C om m ission had to  perform  w as m ade clear by the parliam entary  secretary to the 
D epartm ent o f  L ands and Fisheries, in  1931 The num ber o f  tenancies vested in the seven 
years since the 1923 A ct w as 15,971 In  1930 there were 80,000 holdings w hich  cam e 
under the  acts and 20,000 on estates purchased by the C ongested D istricts B oard  (C D B ) 
aw aiting  vesting  W ithout an enorm ous and expensive increase m  s ta ff it w ould  have been 
im possible to deal w ith  m ore than 8,000 cases a year The 1931 Land A ct w as in troduced  
to overcom e the difficulties caused by the delays and ‘elim inated them  at a s tro k e’ It 
achieved th is by the sim ple expedient o f  publish ing a list o f  holdings w hich w ere declared  
vested and correcting  any errors or om issions and adjusting m atters o f  detail w hich  w ere 
subsequently  found to be necessary 14
In the debate w hich fo llow ed the G overnor G eneral’s address in 1922 H ogan  said ‘this 
[Land Purchase] is a question w ith  a history and we m ust face the fac t’ 15 The governm ent 
w as no t dealing  w ith  "virgin land" By 1923 the process o f  land purchase had been  w ell
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established, so m uch so that it w ould have been virtually  im possible to change the  basis on 
w hich  it had operated  under the B ritish  land acts H ogan adm itted  th a t he had sym pathy 
w ith  those w ho criticised  this process because it gave unlim ited control over land to one 
section  o f  the com m unity  H e w as unable, how ever, to translate this sym pathy into  an act 
w hich w ould  fundam entally  change the schem e 16 This assertion seem s to contrad ict his 
opening rem arks on Irish  legislation ‘w e are left free to settle this and all o ther problem s 
in  our ow n w ay and to bu ild  up our ow n social fu tu re5 17 It is quite clear from  w hat he said 
about the h istorical nature o f  land purchase and rem arks m ade by him  and o ther deputies 
and senators m  the debates on the 1923 land bill that he w as not free to settle th is p rob lem  
as he w ished H e w as going to take a w ell trodden path and had to fo llow  form ulas w hich 
had been developed and refined since the second h a lf  o f  the nineteenth  century  18 H e did 
m ake clear h is m isgivings about the establishm ent o f  a  landow ning class m ade up 
p rincipally  o f  sm all farm ers, referring  to other countries w here land had been w idely  sub­
divided
sm all farm ers, sm all land-holders developed qualities o f  independence and th rift and 
o ther hard-headed qualities o f  that sort w hich m ake the countries that are based on 
the d iv ision  o f  land, great and strong B ut there is another side o f  the p ic ture  I 
know  in those countries w here there is a very large percentage o f  sm all landow ners 
they  are very likely to colour the outlook o f  the w hole nation and to m ake it a little 
aggressive, and the w hole country seem s to  run  on unenlightened indiv idualism  19
H ogan w as no t greatly  enam oured w ith  the situation w hich left such large num bers o f  
sm allholders dom inating  the social, political and econom ic life o f  Ireland
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It is im portan t to  bear this in  m ind w hen looking at independent Ire lan d ’s first land b ill 
The m inister w ho p ilo ted  it through the O ireachtas w as no t to tally  com m itted  to the 
ph ilosophy w hich lay behind it N or did  he think, as som e did, that it w as the so lu tion  to 
all econom ic d iff ic u ltie s20 H e took  a  very realistic v iew  o f  w hat w as happening and w hat 
had to be done L and  purchase had to be com pleted in the in terest o f  ju stice  to the 
estim ated 70,000 unpurchased tenants w ho w ished to be pu t on the sam e footing  as the 
400,000 w ho had already pm-chased their holdings They w ere paying  annuities w hich  w ere 
low er than their original rents There were tw o other reasons w hy it w as im portan t to 
com plete the transfer o f  land Firstly, K evin O ’H iggins and H ogan believed that the issue 
w as being used by the  Irregulars to stir up trouble, particularly  m  the w est o f  I r e la n d 21 
Secondly, at the core o f  the b ill w as an attem pt to solve the problem s o f  the congested  
districts O n th is point, the re lie f  o f  congestion, H ogan did not hold ou t m uch hope o f  a  
com plete solution, because ‘after everything had been done, th e re ’ w ould  ‘still be a 
residue, a big  residue o f  congests undealt w ith ’ The d ifficulty  w as the lim ited  am ount 
o f  land available 22 H e saw  the m easures he proposed as the best w ay o f  m axim ising  the 
use o f  land resources available in these districts 23 U nder the d ifficu lt circum stances o f  1923 
it w as im portan t to the stability  o f  the governm ent to be seen to act at least as decisively  
as the old  B ritish  adm inistration
The lack  o f  critical th inking by politic ians on the issue can be seen in the w ay the L and B ill 
w as debated  in  the D ail In  their initial statem ents m ost deputies w elcom ed its in troduction  
The ideological argum ents w hich T hom as Johnson and other m em bers o f  the L abour Party  
had p u t fo rw ard  in earlier debates w ere so diluted during exchanges on the bill tha t they 
can hard ly  be detected  at all Johnson asserted that he did  not care w ho ow ned the land so
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long as it w as properly  utilised  24 This w as hardly  the line w hich  w ould norm ally  be 
expected from  the leader o f  a party  w ith  socialist aspirations H e had taken  a  m ore radical 
stance earlier w hen he said that it should be m ade know n in the country ‘that righ ts o f  
property  w ere conditioned by the am ount o f  personal service g iven in the use o f  that 
p ro p erty ’ 25
T here w as obviously  a lo t o f  confusion in L abour circles about the d istribution o f  land A 
clear enunciation  o f  a policy o f  land nationalisation w ould have lost them  any support they 
m ight have gam ed am ongst the sm all farm ers w hile outright acceptance o f  the bill could  
have alienated  their support w hich ‘w as predom inantly  rural until 1960, being concentrated  
m  the heartland region and in central M unster, areas w ith  large num bers o f  rural 
labourers’ 26 E veryone, particularly  the F arm ers’ Party, w as anxious to get the leg islation  
th rough  as quickly as possible and as a result m oderated their criticism s A ll political 
parties w ere to a large extent under the same constraints as H ogan
The differences w hich did exist betw een Labour on the one side and the governm ent and 
F arm ers’ Party  on the o ther w ere easier to see w hen L abour attem pted to in troduce a  
com pulsory  tillage schem e in the autum n o f  1922 27 Johnson believed the fu ture o f  the 
country had  to be based on the w orker w hether ow ner or n o t 28 It fo llow ed from  this 
ph ilosophy that the w elfare o f  w orkers w ould com e before short term  goals such as 
fa rm ers’ p ro fits  and w ould lead the governm ent into an in terventionist role L abour w anted 
to  treat the land as a resource w ith w hich to reduce unem ploym ent am ongst farm  labourers, 
the ir m am  source o f  support T he F arm ers’ Party regarded this policy as in terference and 
u ltim ately  a curtailm ent o f  liberty, that is the liberty o f  the ow ner to do w ith  his p roperty
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w hat he though t b e s t 29 T he tw o sides w ere equally  inconsistent L abour fudged the  issue 
o f  exclusive private ow nership  for obvious political reasons, the F arm ers’ Party , the ir 
ideological opposites, w ere am bivalent about state in tervention  w hen they thought it m igh t 
w ork m  their favour They saw  nothing w rong w ith  using state resources to reduce 
unem ploym ent by spending on o ther areas o f  the national infrastructure T heir attitude 
prom pted  L iam  D avin  o f  L abour to say that D enis G orey, leader o f  the F arm ers’ Party , w as 
prepared to see law s m ade on everything in the country and vote m oney for drainage and 
land reclam ation, ju s t so long as it did no t touch his farm , concluding ‘L iberty  H all seem s 
to be the only thing that disturbs the farm er deputies in this D a il’ 30
It w as evident that there w as a considerable g u lf  in understanding betw een governm ent 
supporters and L abour deputies on  this issue E ven rural L abour m em bers w ho w ere 
sym pathetic to the difficulties w hich farm ers w ere experiencing w anted tillage increased and 
w ere inclined to ignore the problem s it could cause 31 T illage w as seen as a panacea, and 
n o t ju s t by the L abour Party , w hich w ould cure grow ing unem ploym ent am ongst farm  
w orkers T he schem e w hich  the B ritish  governm ent in troduced in  1917 to  boost w artim e 
cereal p roduction  w as cited  as an exam ple o f  how  w ell it could w ork H ogan could see no 
real parallel betw een 1922 and the conditions w hich prevailed  in 1917 the near fam ine 
caused by the  w ar and subsidies in the form  o f  guaranteed prices w hich m ade tillage 
p rofitab le  no  longer e x is te d 32 H e saw  an expansion in tillage com ing in the w ake o f  the 
com pletion  o f  land purchase, w hich he portrayed as the real p roblem  33
T here w as, how ever, one area w here there w as a m eeting o f  m inds am ongst all groups in 
the D ail the undesirab ility  o f  the large grazing ranches, particularly  in the w est o f  Ire land
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W hile all parties w ere against large ranches they had diverse grounds for their d istaste o f  
th is system  o f  farm ing. L abour saw  these huge tracts o f  land ow ned or rented  by graziers 
contributing  little to the state by w ay o f  em ploym ent. The F arm ers’ Party  looked on this 
good land w ith  covetous eyes, hoping that their m em bers w ould be lucky enough to be 
included in the share-out w hen they w ere divided. E ither w ay there w as little support in the 
D ail for th is m ethod o f  land use during the passage o f  the land bill.
H ogan w as probably  righ t w hen he said that land purchase w ould bring about an increase 
in tillage in  the C ongested D istricts, w hen the ranches w ere divided, although it w ould  not 
necessarily  increase the num ber o f  labourers em ployed as m ost o f  the holdings w ould  be 
too sm all to em ploy labourers and w ere w orked by the ow ners and their fam ilies. It is 
w orth  m entioning that Johnson did caution the Dail against expecting labourers w ho becam e 
the ow ners o f  sm all farm s to becom e tillage farm ers. He pointed  out that labourers w ho 
had received land in the past w ere using it for g razing.34 T hroughout the fo llow ing decade 
the question  o f  how  to increase the acreage under tillage w as raised. G razing and cattle 
rearing  w ere alw ays regarded, by those w ho did not earn their living from  them  as 
som ehow  not m aking proper use o f  the land, in som e w ay unpatriotic. T hat ‘the area 
under tillage (including fru it after 1906) fell alm ost continuously after 1851’, w ith  
occasional in terruptions such as a ‘tem porary revival during the F irst W orld W ar on account 
o f  the encouragem ent given to tillag e’, seem s to have been regarded as som e kind o f  
aberration  in Irish  agriculture, even though
at no tim e in the period covered by statistics w as the percentage o f  land under
tillage very great. In  the year o f  greatest recorded tillage, 1851, the percentage
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p loughed  w as only 29 per cent, w hich is very low  w hen set against the norm al 
p roportion  tilled  in continental countries A fter the fam ine Ireland  w as never a 
tillage country in the sense in  w hich that term  is norm ally  used  T he trad ition  that 
it w as such m ay be derived from  the coincidence betw een the decline in  the tillage 
area  and the decline in  population , and also from  the fact that som e o f  the  best tilled  
counties in  1851 are in m odem  tim es, the grazing counties 35
It w as an interesting  debate as it show ed that there w ere d ifferences, how ever confused, 
betw een  the governm ent, the farm ing com m unity  and the w orking  class w hich w ere being 
articulated  T hat part o f  the population  w hich was not assisted by the land acts w as try ing  
to m ake itse lf  heard  Socialism , in its least radical incarnation, the Irish  L abour Party , 
m igh t have given it a voice i f  it had no t had to rely so heavily  on one section  o f  the 
w ork ing  class, farm  labourers, w ho w ere probably the least pow erful group in the country  
in the 1920s A gainst the conservatism  o f  the farm ing lobby in all its m anifestations - 
C um ann na nG aedheal, the F arm ers’ Party  and eventually F ianna Fail w ho received  a large 
portion  o f  its support from  sm all farm ers in the w est o f  Ireland - any party  w hich h in ted  
at land nationalisation  or collectivism  w as lost Subsidies and protective tariffs w hich w ere 
the policy o f  F ianna Fail w ere as m uch an answ er to the serious condition  farm ers found 
them selves in after the slum p o f  the late 1920s as an attem pt at self-sufficiency The idea 
o f  peasan t proprie torsh ip  as a  cure for the econom ic ills o f  Ireland had becom e deeply 
entrenched over the previous fifty years A ny policies, therefore, w hich did  no t take the 
interests o f  Ire lan d ’s 500,000 farm ers into consideration and give them  priority  w ould  not 
have had enough  support to  m ake them  effective
251
O n another level the m atter illustrated an issue w hich is still relevant today  It ra ised  the 
question  w ho should  decide agricultural policy Should it be the farm ers w ho w ere the 
‘experts’, o r governm ent9 W ho should have the largest say in w here the m ajor investm ent 
in agriculture should  go9 It w as a critical question w ere farm ers to invest in the areas 
w hich  had proved  successful and expand them , the production  o f  livestock and dairy ing, 
o r should self-sufficiency in all the basic farm ing com m odities be encouraged even w hen 
m any o f  these crops throve less w ell in the Irish clim ate and w ere produced cheaper and 
better elsew here9 This debate has no t yet been resolved and can still generate considerable 
heat The roots o f  the controversy are to be found, not in socialism  or in the Sinn Fein  
doctrine o f  econom ic independence, bu t in the d ifficulty  o f  striking a  balance betw een  tw o 
conflicting  needs one, to produce w hat is likely to y ield the best p rofit, the o ther to  m ake 
sure that a t all tim es and under every circum stance the country can feed itse lf  In  the 1920s 
and 1930s a synthesis had yet to be achieved
It w as clear w here H o g an ’s sym pathy lay In  Ins opinion, even regulatory  legislation  w as 
an im position  on the farm er, w hich he introduced as a last resort D espite his b e lie f m  free 
enterprise, H ogan tried  to steer a m iddle course betw een the tw o factions H e had to tread  
carefully , as unem ployed labourers w ere likely to be troublesom e and have connections 
w ith  ‘irreg u lan sm ’ 36 H ow ever, h is task w as m ade easier because o f  the
decline in the num ber o f  farm  labourers in post-fam ine Ireland w hich sim plified  the 
social pattern  o f  rural Ireland W ithout such sim plification  the transfer o f  land 
ow nership  to the tenant w ould have failed to act as an answ er to agrarian unrest 37
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T he national situation m  the autum n o f  1922 m ade H ogan w ary o f  deliberately  antagonising 
the labourers or the trade unions w hich represented them  D enis G orey pu t the fa rm ers’ case 
forcefully , allow ing full re in  to his prejudices against Irish  labourers ‘w h y ’, he said, ‘you 
w ould  w ant a m icroscope to w atch their m ovem ents’ 38 This left H ogan free to p lay  the  ro le 
o f  the  m oderate ready to exam ine the situation in depth, even though he had h is ow n 
serious reservations about the policy, before he cam e to a final conclusion H ogan d id  no t 
w ant w hat he saw  as ‘red  herrings draw n across the path o f  land purchase in the fo rm  o f  
fanciful schem es o f  tillage w hich w ould lead now here’ j9 H is m oderate approach expressed 
itse lf  in h is agreem ent to set up the A griculture C om m ission in 1922 to th row  new  light on  
the subject and on the needs o f  agriculture in general T his m ove cooled the debate and 
led to  the tillage b ill being w ithdraw n 40 All o f  the parties involved agreed to get together 
to decide on term s o f  reference for the C om m ission, and present them  to  the  D a i l41
The perceived  necessity  to get the land bill passed speedily caused the debate on  th is 
im portan t issue to revolve around its technical m achinery rather than differences o f  ideology 
or approach The price o f  untenanted land and how  it w as calculated , ren t reductions, rent 
arrears, together w ith  the sensitive issue o f  w hether the tenants or the landlords w ere 
getting the better deal attracted  m ost com m ent The question o f  w hether landlords w ere 
en titled  to  anything at all w as aired but not in an analytical w ay T he view s expressed w ere 
em otional and quite obviously  the legacy o f  m any harsh  years o f  cam paigning fo r land 
reform  The im plications o f  som e o f  the proposals on evicted and displaced tenants w ere 
farcical O ’H iggins rem arked sarcastically  that i f  they were to take up Johnson’s suggestion  
that they go back to the beginnings o f  the landlord problem  they w ould end up bringing the
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O ’D onnells back from  Spain H e also referred  to a letter w hich he had received  from  a M r 
P O ’R orke in N ew  Y ork w ho w anted to pu t in a claim  for his ancestral lands in C avan, 
L eitrim  and ‘certain  o ther areas around th e re ’ 42
O ne o f  the m ost in teresting contributions to the debate cam e from  T hom as Johnson, w hen 
he questioned the very  legitim acy o f  the D ail He referred  to a p ropaganda poster w hich 
quoted  a  speech by the M inister for A griculture pointing to the D ail as fully representative 
o f  all parts o f  the country and a  place w here all people had a  righ t to  express their v iew s 
H e asked the m inister i f  the parliam ent through w hich the bill w as passing w as the 
parliam ent he had in m ind w hen he m ade the speech A t m ost sixty m em bers a ttended  and 
there w ere ten  to tw elve vacancies w hich w ere no t being filled H e suggested that a  
m easure o f  th is k ind  ought to have a m ore representative body dealing w ith  i t 43 It w as an 
im portan t po in t and acted as a counterw eight to O ’H igg in ’s o ften  stated v iew s on the  duty 
o f  the state to act strongly against individuals w ho challenged its pow er, believing that 
Ireland had a governm ent entitled  to these pow ers because it had been elected  by the 
m ajority  o f  the people 44
H ogan w ould not have regarded the lack o f  representation as a  hinderance to the 
in troduction  o f  the land bill It w as after all a continuation  o f  a process w hich had been 
started by the B ritish  governm ent It had evolved during the second h a lf  o f  the n ineteenth  
century  and had  received practical support from  the large num ber o f  farm ers w ho had used 
it in order to  purchase the ir farm s H e called the 1903 L and A ct revolutionary  and he ranked 
it above every o ther recent event except the revolution w hich led to the 1922 T reaty  45 T he 
1923 bill w as supposed to com plete the revolution in landow nership W as Johnson not
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righ t to ask i f  this w as the sort o f  parliam ent to carry through such im portan t legislation? 
It is c lear from  the debate w hich follow ed that the deputies w ho w ere presen t w ere not 
in terested  in such n iceties but w ould rather engage the m inister on m ore im m ediate issues 
such as the difficulties caused by landlords taking proceedings to recover the full am ount 
o f  ren t arrears.46 W hether or not the m issing deputies w ould have contributed  anything 
substantially  d ifferent to  the debate is hard to say. There w ould m ost likely have been 
m ore venom ous attacks on landlords and m ore colourful reasons given w hy they should  not 
receive any com pensation for the com pulsory purchase o f  their estates i f  the Sinn Fein  
deputies had been present. A part from  a greater num ber o f  outbursts o f  this kind it is no t 
easy to see w here they could have had a real effect on the basic prem ises o f  the bill. It is 
also true that all the relevant groups w ere represented although in differing  degrees. H ogan 
had taken up the cause o f  the congests and show ed no signs o f  being deflected from  it in 
spite o f  w ell organised  attacks on com pulsory purchase o f  untenanted  land for that purpose, 
particu larly  in the Seanad. It w as the m ost radical part o f  the legislation.
G orey, "enfant terrible" o f  the Dail, w as never shy about putting the case for the farm ers 
he represented , the large com fortable men. L abour w ith  the bulk o f  its deputies 
representing  rural constituencies w as w ell placed to voice the com plaints and uphold  the 
interests o f  the farm  labourer and landless m en even if  it had little chance o f  success. In 
the Seanad the case o f  the large farm er and landow ner w as adequately  defended. The one 
group w hich w ere som ew hat neglected w ere those on farm s w hich w ere ju s t m arginally  
above the level o f  the uneconom ic holding: too sm all to be represented by the F arm ers’ 
Party  and too large to benefit from  H ogan’s involvem ent w ith  the re lie f  o f  congestion  and 
the upgrading  o f  tiny  holdings to m ake them  econom ically  w orkable. T herefore, apart
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from additional anti-landlord rhetoric, it is unlikely that the absence of Sinn Fern deputies 
materially affected the main thrust of the debate or its outcome
Responding to Johnson’s statement that ‘landlordism is confiscation’ and that if  justice were 
- done there would be very little coming to the landlords, O’Higgins put the case for dealing 
with them fairly into perspective47 In his opinion the rights of the landlords had been 
recognised in law m Ireland and elsewhere for centuries Land had been sold, mortgaged 
and transferred so that to challenge something which had become part of the ‘w oof of the 
Irish social system would have caused reactions and repercussions which he was sure 
Johnson would not desire48 In other words if the rights of landlords were ignored what 
was to stop anyone from questiomng the rights of the thousands of tenants who had 
purchased those rights under the earlier land acts from the landlords
The anti-landlord bias in the opening debate and the committee stage of the bill, combined 
with the belief o f those who spoke about the ‘generous treatment which they [landlords] 
were getting’, were probably caused by the raised expectations which some deputies had 
for Ireland’s first land act Gorey said that his followers were disappointed with the 
term s49 An additional irritation to the farmers and their representatives m the Dail were the 
decrees for the recovery of rent arrears which were being enforced with the help of the 
military under the Enforcement of Law (Occasional Powers) Act, 1923 The Enforcement 
of Law (Occasional Powers) Act 1923 was introduced by O’Higgins in an attempt to 
prevent the problems envisaged if there was a breakdown in commercial credit He 
expressed the rather extreme view that such a circumstance could lead to a ‘breakdown in 
civilization’ 50 The fact that it had been passed with their approval earlier in the year did
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not make it any easier to bear at a time when they expected to be relieved of paying rent 
forever Hogan pointed out to deputies that while there were areas of contention in the bill, 
there had been no great campaign waged against it in the press 51 Deputies responded that 
the press was controlled by the landlords Hogan agreed that it might be so but suggested 
that Gorey knew that there was not an honest tenant in the country who would not jump 
at the terms o f the bill The minister added that the only critical letters he had seen had 
been on arrears52 It would have been surprising if there had been a concerted attack on the 
1923 bill since it was so much in the image of those which had preceded it and had been 
seen to work well The principle of the bill was never in danger of being criticised as it 
had become the one unchanging tenet of Irish politics It was only on matters of detail that 
there was any debate in the press The Connaught Telegraph, which was a Mayo paper, 
but which was widely distributed in County Galway, expressed the concerns of its readers, 
many of whom lived in the congested districts
if  it [the Dail] acts wisely it will first take up the congested districts, complete land 
purchase in them and finally deal with them the minister for Agriculture does not 
seem to grasp the effect of a land purchase scheme of the scope he adumbrated in 
his recent speeches and hard facts compel us to say that things are not ripe for the 
birth of his comprehensive scheme The Free State is not in a position to finance it 53
In the Dail the same was true Gorey agreed that he had little quarrel with the price which 
tenants would have to pay 54 But he went on to attack the terms on arrears which he thought 
were harsh m certain cases55 Not unnaturally Gorey wanted to improve the scheme which 
the minister was offering unpurchased tenants However the blustering attitude he adopted
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probably owed a lot to what Hogan called ‘political’ reasons56 Gorey said unequivocally 
that Hogan regarded his own bill as confiscation and it was forced on him by the 
unpurchased tenants, inferring that the Minister was on the side of the landlords This was 
an interesting comment Hogan may not have been on the ‘side’ of the landlords but from 
what he said in his opening remarks on the bill neither was he totally m favour of the 
situation which gave the small fanners considerable power in the community 57 The 
exchanges between the Farmers’ leader and the minister became heated and there was 
undoubtedly a ‘political’ element in Gorey’s posturing Hogan saw the small man hardly 
being affected by what Gorey saw as a major issue, the payment of rent arrears, because 
the amounts were so sm all58 In Gorey’s opinion the richest element of the community, the 
landlords, were going to be satisfied at the expense of the unpurchased tenants This would 
‘cripple and bring misery and starvation to a big proportion of the 70,000 tenants’ 59
The minister defended his position by linking payments to landlords with foreign 
perceptions of Ireland’s creditworthiness He enlarged on this point when he explained that 
defaulting on debts by landlords would not just affect them but could weaken the state’s 
ability to bonow money on the international markets at low rates of interest Pragmatism 
was probably the most likely reason for the executive council’s determination to be fair to 
all parties in the bill, but a wish to confound their enemies’ belief that the Irish were unfit 
to rule themselves and would plunge the country into chaos cannot have been far behind 
m their list of objectives 60
That there was resentment and bitterness over real and imagined wrongs connected with the 
ownership of land was a fact in the 1922-1924 period The vulnerability of certain sections
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of the land owning community is clear from accounts of cases of land seizure, cattle 
driving, trespass and intimidation The huge number of incidents of this kind which are 
recorded in the Department of Home Affairs files indicates that a state of anarchy could 
have developed if firm action was not taken
It is not possible to draw exact conclusions about the nature of these events without a 
detailed examination of all the relevant files However after looking at a very large sample 
it is possible to identify areas where cases differ and the elements which they have in 
common There appears to have been four main reasons why a particular holding was 
attacked Firstly, the owner was absent Secondly, the owners were regarded as supporters 
of the Umon This can be extrapolated from the number of victims who had English 
sounding names Thirdly, a large number were single women and widows Fourthly, the 
land in question had been or was believed to have been acquired in the past by a ‘grabber’, 
that is someone who bought the land of an evicted tenant There were hardly any attacks 
on the farms of large farmers per se Large farms which were interfered with belonged as 
a rule to absentees or unpopular Unionists There was however one factor which was 
common to all those who were attacked, they were people whose plight elicited little local 
sympathy
Throughout the passage of the bill, Hogan sounded like the voice of moderation and reason 
in the Oireachtas In emotive areas, such as the reinstatement of evicted tenants, deputies 
put forward demands and schemes with little consideration for their consequences should 
they be adopted Speaking about the provisions for such tenants in the bill the minister said 
sarcastically
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of course everyone loves evicted tenants If you have any sympathy to spare you 
always stand up and talk about evicted tenants and the wounded soldiers o f the land 
w ar61
In no uncertain terms he told the Dail why he could not go back beyond 1878, it could 
have led to four or five claims on each holding Since 1878 there were nothing like the same 
number o f evictions, therefore it was possible to deal with those who had been unjustly 
evicted since then62 He showed the impracticability of an amendment put down by Liam 
Davin which would have given rights to tenants evicted prior to 1878 63 This could have led 
to some of them being reinstated on farms of one to two hundred acres and might have 
interfered with the relief of congestion The experience of reinstatement under the 1903 
Act had been that ‘50 per cent of the reinstated tenants’ had ‘sold their holdings’ 64 Hogan 
did not want a situation to develop whereby anyone evicted for any reason would be in a 
position to resume ownership, it ‘could go back to the time of Brian Boru’ 65 This could 
have led to further agitation especially as Gorey wanted ‘grabbers’ evicted and the original 
tenants restored to their land This sensitive issue was brought down to size by Hogan who 
painted a dramatic picture of a ‘grabber’s’ grandson being removed from his farm to make 
way for someone who might then sell the holding to another who had no claim to i t 66
Hogan was right to be cautious about widening for the scope for reinstating evicted tenants 
or their heirs Any weakening in the government’s lesolve to maintain the system of land 
ownership as it was would have led to other criteria for ownership being questioned In 
turn this could have led to chaos Violent incidents relating to ownership and possession
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of land were not confined to the poorer western and north western counties There was no 
county in Ireland during 1922-1924 without a large number of reported cases The gardai 
and the courts were under severe pressure trying to exert control and arbitrate in land 
disputes Any further pressure would have made their task impossible 67
Hogan’s defence of his bill was skilful and reasoned Criticism and opposition were often 
based on deeply rooted convictions which were connected with injustices in the past 
Feelings about evicted tenants, landlords, ranchers and the Congested Districts Board, m 
other words all elements of the ‘land question’, were close to the surface and so easily 
stirred There was always somebody or some group willing to use this sensitivity for their 
own purposes Hogan probably had this m mind when he said that the government never 
intended to right all the wrongs done under the aegis of English rule for the past thirty to 
forty years m the bill For one thing it would have been impossible, for another, if  farmers 
were entitled to such treatment so would be the rest of the community 68 In other words the 
act, when it was passed, was going to be difficult to work because of the very real and the 
imagined problems which history had bequeathed to land policy in Ireland Therefore the 
arguments which both government supporters and the opposition used inside and outside 
of the Dail, would not always be amenable to reason
If a distinction can be drawn between the Labour opposition and the government parties an 
even greater gap existed between the concerns of the Seanad and those of the Dail Seanad 
objections centred around the issue of definitions what lands came under the heading of 
untenanted land, what constituted an uneconomic holding9 These questions had important 
implications for landowners and large farmers for they would decide how much and which
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lands would be acquired compulsorily and what price would be paid for them The 
looseness of the definition of uneconomic holdings in the bill led to the fear that m the 
name of relief of congestion, lands would be acquired and used for other purposes such 
as giving farms to landless men Sir John Keane, an extensive landowner and member of 
Waterford County Council, was particularly concerned He had been involved in a serious 
strike by farm labourers in Waterford in 1923 The strike was not unconnected with 
agitation for a fairer redistribution of land Sentiments were being expressed by Irish 
Transport and General Workers’ Union [ITGWU] representatives such as ‘the fanners of 
Ireland’ did ‘not own the land they occupied’ 69 Keane believed that the bill would not end 
agrarian violence and that the Land Commission’s power to take land anywhere for the 
relief of congestion deserved ‘on our part most careful consideration’ 70 The concern was 
understandable even if it was not borne out by subsequent events
Hogan would not tie himself to any specific definition of what constituted an uneconomic 
holding He showed on this issue, as he had done on many others, a degree of flexibility 
He did not regard valuation or farm size as an adequate measures because they did not take 
into account the quality of the land 71 Bearing in mind the limited amount of land available 
for redistribution Hogan would have been foolish to have given a hostage to fortune by 
indicating the minimum size of an economic farm When pressed to say what he meant by 
untenanted land he had no such hesitation ‘Untenanted land was land held in fee simple 
and not just land held by landlords’ 72 Untenanted land in the congested districts would not 
be acquired compulsorily by the Land Commission but would vest with them automatically 
It is not difficult to see why this section of the bill was exercising the minds of senators 
If the powers of the,bill were to be invoked in full it could destroy the security not only
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of large landowners but of purchased tenants even in the Congested Districts The 
broadness of the definition of untenanted land along with Hogan’s reluctance to say what 
constituted an uneconomic holding led to a widespread uneasiness amongst landowners that 
land could be acquired by the Land Commission anywhere for the relief of congestion This 
* vagueness must have made it almost impossible for large landowners to work out whether 
or not their property was at risk of compulsory acquisition Hogan, however, msisted that 
the power to take land outside the congested districts for relief would be used only in 
exceptional cases73 This could occur where no other land was available to make a large 
number of small holdings viable A large farm in a congested district might be taken and 
divided amongst the surrounding holdings The owner would then be migrated to a holding 
of a similar size, possibly outside the Congested Districts 74 The complexity of such an 
operation made having a blanket power, such as this bill gave, imperative, as otherwise 
there would have been endless wrangles over every transaction 75
He had great difficulty in persuading his opponents in the Seanad that land would not be 
taken for purposes other than the relief of congestion Throughout the debates in both 
houses he appeared to be explaining the bill not only in its legal form but in the form which 
he saw it taking when applied to actual cases He agreed that he was taking wide powers 
but did not see them being abused, although he admitted that it could happen 76 He did not, 
however, see the act as a forerunner to the ‘nationalisation’ of land Senator Coumhan said 
that some clauses of the bill ‘ savour[ed] very strongly of Karl Marx’ 77 In the Seanad, 
Hogan pressed home the point by comparing the 1923 bill to the 1920 bill which would 
have had similar effects and to which the landlords had agreed at the Irish Convention 
where they had been represented78 Hogan had to deal with the situation as it existed he
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was not, as he put it, ‘legislating in a vacuum’.79 His main fear appeared to be continual 
confrontations in the courts over decisions made by the Land Commission or the Judicial 
Commissioner. On price he was adamant that he would not allow decisions made by the 
Judicial Commissioner to be appealed. He did allow an amendment by Sir John Keane 
which attempted to define the expression ‘relieving congestion’ but this did nothing to alter 
the fact that all untenanted land would vest with the Land Commission on the ‘appointed 
day’. It may however have relieved the minds of those senators, farmers, and landowners 
who had feared the wholesale redistribution of land taking place under the proposed act.80
On financing land purchase there was surprisingly little interest shown in either the Dail or 
Seanad. Some deputies commented positively that the minister was doing all he could for 
tenants under the circumstances. It does not seem to have occurred to either senators or 
deputies to ask exactly what those circumstances were. It is true of course that the scheme 
would to a large extent be self-financing but in the initial stages the government had to put 
up the money for Land Bonds with which to pay the landowners. The scheme would not 
cover the ten per cent which the government added to the purchase price to make it more 
acceptable to the vendors and the purchasers. Nobody asked how much this ‘bonus’ would 
cost the exchequer and what administration of the scheme by the Land Commission would 
add to the national tax bill. Johnson raised the issue of the ten per cent reduction and other 
costs involved in land purchase. He wanted a totally new arrangement whereby landlords 
would be given a terminable annuity. His opposition to the financial arrangements in the 
bill seem to have been informed more by his dislike for landlords than any principle of 
equity. Again he stated that he did not regard who owned the land as important. This 
could be interpreted as meaning it was not important to him who owned it so long as it was
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not the ‘landlords’. Johnson’s attitude is criticised by Deputy Milroy who referred to 
himself as a ‘landless man’. He had, he said, expected ‘vigorous criticism and searching 
analysis’ from Johnson but had been disappointed. He compared Johnson’s dissertation to 
‘the teaching of a mystic Christianity which we heard the other night in the Mansion 
House’- clearly a reference to Sinn Fein - in a way which was obviously meant as a 
criticism.81
Hogan gave a glimpse of the condition of the national finances when he said that the civil 
war had been costing the country one million pounds a week, enough he suggested to 
finance land purchase.82 He referred to the financial constraints on his policy but the point 
was not taken up or questioned. Deputies preferred to complain about the size of arrears 
reductions, or that the landlords were being treated too well. It was not the thought that the 
country could not afford a generous settlement with the landlords which caused the 
objectors to speak out but the fact that landlords belonged to a hated class and so were not 
deserving of ‘fair’ treatment.83
The lack of interest shown by the Oireachtas in the financial aspects of land purchase 
contrasts vividly with the singular lack of interest in the British House of Commons in 
anything other than the financial arrangements which were being made between Britain and 
Ireland. British MPs gave little consideration to the way future land purchase acts would 
work. All they wanted to know was how much it would cost the taxpayers in their 
constituencies and if the government had committed itself to any costly agreements.84 
During questions on Ireland MPs constantly asked if the British government were making 
payments to the Irish government in assorted areas including land purchase.85 The
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Chancellor of the Exchequer managed when answering questions on British and Irish 
financial arrangements to give nothing away which would have annoyed MPs or their 
supporters 86 British MPs were right to be surprised by the lack of information since the 
Financial agreements between the British Government and the Irish Free State 
Government was signed on 12 February 1923 Under this agreement the British 
government would continue to provide the stock and cash necessary to finance purchase 
agreements under the land acts passed by the British parliament They also agreed to 
guarantee the financing of the 1923 act even though to a parliamentary question the 
government replied that the ‘opinion of the House would be sought’ before a guarantee was 
given87 When the Chancellor was asked m view of the assertion that the government of 
Ireland was ‘able to meet their expenditure out of revenue’, if that meant that he had no 
‘conversation with the President of the Dail on the question of finance’ on his recent visit 
to London, he replied ‘I think it meant nothing but what was in the answer’ he had given 88 
Throughout the spring and early summer of 1923, MPs continued to harry government 
spokesmen on how much disengagement from Ireland was costing The attitude of most 
MPs was summed up by Neil Mclean of Labour, who said ‘it is rather peculiar that, in the 
winding up of the affairs of Ireland, this country is going to be asked to pay such enormous 
sums’ What makes their efforts to get at the truth interesting is the fact the agreement 
covered all the areas about which the MPs were concerned That they did not find the 
question which would lead to the disclosure of the contents of the agreement shows not 
ineptitude on their part but, rather, great skill on the government side at evading difficult 
questions If  the British government had been forced to disclose their involvement, deputies 
in the Dail might have taken a keener interest in how the act was to be financed and been 
astonished and perhaps dismayed by the degree to which the United Kingdom could have
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been involved in the formulation of Irish land policy The agreements stated that any new 
scheme of land purchase which the Irish government proposed should ‘be subject to the 
concurrence of the British Government in consideration of the guarantee ’ 89 It is almost 
certain that the British cabinet took no active part in drafting the 1923 bill However, 
during an executive council meeting in April, Hogan mentioned that he was meeting the 
Duke of Devonshire in London to discuss the principles of the Irish land bill He also told 
the council that Judge Wylie had already secured from the British government official 
acceptance of the ‘main points’ At no time was there any suggestion that the British 
government tried or were likely to try to impose conditions which would prove 
unacceptable to Hogan or the Irish government As far as the British were concerned once 
the financial arrangements would not cost them more than they had allowed they were quite 
happy not to interfere 90
\
The American writer Paul Canning believes that there was more behind the questions which 
some MPs raised than the interests of the British taxpayer He makes the case that the 
‘diehards’ who had been against the treaty were determined to see that it would not work
by December [1922] it was already clear that in the new year the major problems 
of the Free State Government would be not military but financial -indeed bankruptcy 
seemed imminent
They rallied around the demand for high compensation for damages incurred during the 
Anglo-Irish war m order ‘that the Free State might yet be undone’ 91
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The Colonial Office was afraid of a financial collapse in Ireland This may have been the 
reason for the adroitness with which the British government spokesmen handled the queries 
about the cost to the Exchequer of land purchase The diehards
were determined to use his [Baldwin’s] and their strength on the Cabinet’s Irish
Affairs Committee to wreck the Treaty The target was the Irish Land Bill and
the issue was the familiar one of MbetrayalM of Irish Loyalists
There was more at stake, therefore, for Bonar Law’s government than taxpayers’ money 
There was fear that the diehards could destabilise relations between the new state of Ireland 
and the British government and undermine the treaty The government believed that it 
would have led to a ‘revolution in Great Britain if they had to set about the re-conquest of 
Ireland’ 92
This may be why there seems to have been a tacit agreement between the British and Irish 
governments not to disclose the financial arrangements for land purchase under the 1923 
bill and why Hogan did not draw attention to conditions attached to the British 
Government’s agreement to guarantee the funds needed to complete land purchase The 
section concerning the payments of annuities to the British Government had been inserted 
in the Land Act 1923 However, the remainder of the agreement was not published until 
1932, after Cumann na nGaedhael was out of power A question had been put by Deputy 
Conor Hogan to the President in 1926 asking for information about the text of the 
agreement W T  Cosgrave suggested that Blythe say that ‘it is proposed to have the 
Agreement printed and published at an early stage5
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Blythe responded that he was not keen on publication as it was
bound to lead to a certain amount of wrangling about the points involved The 
question to be considered is, I think, simply one of whether publication or non 
publication is politically best
Later Hogan tried to insist that because the section concerning the annuities had been 
published it was wrong to say that the agreement had been secret It was disingenuous of 
Hogan to have taken this line when it was quite plain that the executive council had no 
intention of publishing the document unless they were forced When the amendment to 
incorporate decisions made in the agreement into the bill was put before the Dail, Hogan 
played it down and never mentioned that the Land Act 1923 had been subject ‘to the 
concurrence of the British Government’ He admitted the omission but did not try to 
excuse i t 93
It may also have been the case that in the Dail deputies who took part in the debates were 
more interested in how the bill would affect their farmer constituents on an individual basis 
and so chose to ignore its possible political and financial implications Perhaps, as Thomas 
Johnson suggested, it was the realisation that the bill had to be passed that muted Labour 
Party opposition They shied away from outright criticism of the bill even though they 
recogmsed that tenant purchasers were receiving a disproportionate amount of scarce 
financial resources Seventy thousand unpurchased tenants made a powerful lobby, 
especially when they held a strong trump card in the form of almost 400,000 tenants who 
had already purchased under the British land acts They were expecting to do as well if not
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better now that Ireland had its own parliament Hogan had been promising a bill since 
1922 The need for it had increased because of the link between ‘irregularism’ and land 
seizures It was very important to show that the government was serious in its efforts to 
settle the land question, important also to show that they had gamed control of all areas of 
civil administration Land Commission powers so feared by senators and some members 
of the Dail were important tools with which to demonstrate to the country and particularly 
those who had been taking the redistribution of land into their own hands that the 
government meant business 94
The need for the government to show that it was in control is evident in non routine reports 
for district justices throughout the country, which give a far from peaceful picture Some 
district justices believed that it would take action from the military to restore order while 
others suggested that the presence of the Gardai would bring peace to their districts The 
difficulty o f interpreting these reports and deciding on how much force would be necessary 
to restore order is vividly illustrated by two reports, one written in January and the other 
in February 1923 by different men but about the same county, Donegal In the first District 
Justice Louis J Walsh referred to the state of lawlessness in Gweedore which he described 
as ‘strongly Irregular’ He exonerates politics as the cause and blames the trouble on 
‘blackguardism’ His verdict on the Gardai was that they ‘should never have been sent to 
such a district But they were and were promptly burned out of it ’ A month later District 
Justice Padraig O’Sulleabhain gave a completely different picture of Donegal He 
illustrated how peaceful it was by relating an anecdote about a servant in the hotel in 
Carndonagh who was horrified when he heard that District Justice Louis Walsh was being 
sent to Dublin
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Isn’t it awful sir that they are taking you up to that wild country All we can do is
pray that nothing will happen you And we’ll do that May the Lord preserve you
O’Sulleabhain used this story to illustrate the
peace and order and perfectly normal life to which the people of North West 
Tirconaill have now become accustomed The presence of the Civic Guard has had 
an admirable effect in securing the respect for the property of others
He went on to instance a case of a Garda sergeant who singlehandedly arrested seventeen 
men who had been stealing timber He assured the Department of Home Affairs that ‘there 
was no defiance of the law m the County’, neither had he observed any feeling ‘hostile to 
the Government’ The two reports give two extreme versions of conditions in Donegal 
The truth probably lay somewhere in the middle However the general impression o f the 
reports from around the country left no room for complacency It was vital that the rule
of law be established as quickly as possible 95
Hogan had, therefore, to pitch the appeal of his bill at the correct level in order to win the 
support of the landlords and the tenants and avoid antagonising the trade unions and 
landless men It was necessary to take a firm line with the two negotiating groups The 
‘drastic’ nature of the compulsory element of the bill Hogan tried to defend in the Seanad 
by comparing it with the 1920 land bill He insisted that the provisions of the bill were 
almost the same 96 He also put himself m a stiong position vis a vis the opposition in the 
Seanad by stressing at every opportunity the connection between compulsion and the relief
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of congestion To attack compulsion could be seen therefore as an attack on relieving the 
poorest tenants on the western sea-board The need to improve their conditions had become 
an unquestioned policy even before the setting up of the Congested Districts Board m 1891 
The only area of conflict was how best that help could be given
Was the Mimster of Agriculture correct when he said the 1923 bill and the 1920 bill were 
almost identical7 Was it just a useful tactic to allay the fears of the landowning classes in 
the Seanad^ Denis Gorey certainly believed it was the sam e97 Hogan caused much irritation 
in the Seanad by continually quoting the failed bill He alluded to it when responding to 
criticism from senators about what they saw as confiscation of land ‘Cromwelhanism is 
nothing to Hogamsm’ He said that ‘the land question, in one form or another’, would 
‘never be settled’, but he believed that the bill bore ‘extremely favourable comparison from 
the landowners’ point of view with the Bill drafted by the Land Conference of 1918’ 98 
While senators were fearful of large scale confiscation, Hogan was conscious of the attitude 
of the tenants at the land purchase and arrears conference m April where they had 
threatened that they ‘could take the land for nothing if  they wished’ 99 The irritation may, 
of course, have come from the knowledge that the differences in the aims and intentions 
of both pieces of legislation were very small Since agreement had been reached with the 
landlords prior to the 1920 bill there was little which they could say without repudiating 
their earlier assent and m so doing give the impression that it was not the substance of the 
bill which they disliked but the fact that an Irish government would be implementing it
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Senators did raise important issues of principle in connection with compulsory acquisition 
and the right to appeal decisions made by the Judicial Commissioner It would be naive 
to suggest that they raised these queries only out of a spirit of altruism, but allowing for 
their more practical motives, chief amongst which was the wish to retain their lands, these 
were questions which did impinge on the liberties and freedoms of a citizen in any 
democracy Dail deputies, on the other hand, had not seen fit to raise them m the lower 
chamber where they were more concerned with the mundane application of the bill rather 
than general ideas about liberty and freedom O5 Higgins did speak in the Dail of the right 
of the state to enforce its laws but his statements did not open up any serious discussion 
on the topic Perhaps with so many other attacks on the liberty of the citizen during that 
period both from within and outside o f the Oireachtas the right to acquire land 
compulsorily, especially since that right was going to apply in practice only to the class 
which was least popular in the state, landlords, makes it easy to understand why there were 
few champions to be found in the Dail to defend the rights of these unpopular fellow 
citizens
Everyone was anxious to see the bill pass into law, even though some had misgivings 
Each group had their own reasons The landlords feared a deterioration in their position 
if  no act were put on the statute book They might have found themselves in receipt of a 
pittance if they waited too long 100 Unpurchased tenants wanted their rents converted into 
annuities which were considerably lower Congests just wanted relief as soon as possible 
The rest of the population were, no doubt, pleased at the thought that it would bring an end 
to land agitation and agrarian violence which had been endemic for generations It was 
clear from the outset that nobody was going to get everything for which they had been
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looking The bill would be a compromise between the landlords’ slight hopes of market 
value for their estates and the tenants buying their land for a ridiculously low price To 
have reached such a compromise under difficult circumstances is a tribute to the parliament 
which produced it and it is also a tribute to the mam players outside parliament who agreed 
to accept it
The 1923 act was amended and improved over the following decades It brought to its 
conclusion the transfer of land to the tenants of Ireland and began what Hooker calls ‘the 
period of universal land purchase’ 101 Hogan had very little that was new to add to the 
legislation on land His mam contribution was his ability to get all the parties concerned 
to agree to accept the financial aspects of the act This was no mean feat In a 
memorandum to the president in April 1923 he describes the attitude of the tenants at the 
land purchase and arrears conference which he attended
they informed the landlords in all moods and tenses that a great change had come, 
that they were now in a small minority, and an unpopular minority, that they could 
take the land from them for nothing if they wished, that the people meant to have 
the land cheaply, and if the present Government did not meet the wishes of the 
people in this respect they would put in a Government next time who would 102
He regarded the landlords as ‘in a sense’ being unreasonable but they were forced to take 
up a ‘non possumus position by the attitude of the tenants’ 103 The tenants on the other hand 
had a strong case for preferential treatment by Ireland’s first independent government which 
was reinforced by the precedent of earlier British legislation which recognised their special
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position However, neither group pushed their case to the limit It is not always easy to 
say why a controversial measure is accepted without a major conflict developing between 
the parties concerned In this case the reasons are quite clear The landlords had accepted 
the 1920 bill, therefore it was almost impossible for them to demur from the contents of 
the 1923 bill Hogan constantly reminded them of this fact Many of them were in fear 
of physical attacks on themselves and their families and of arson of their property and were 
anxious for a settlement The unpurchased tenants wanted to be put on the same footing 
as the thousands who had already purchased their farms They were impatient and did not 
want to engage in a lengthy battle which was unlikely to achieve much more than they were 
being offered The remainder of the population had no way of expressing any misgivings 
which it might have had since it had become generally accepted that the tenants should 
have their land In any case they would have been no match for the farmers who were a 
strong force within Irish politics, with a tradition stretching back to the Tenant’s League 
of the 1850s 104 The successful passage of the bill can also be attributed to Hogan He did 
not allow himself to be intimidated by either the unpurchased tenants or the landlords His 
actions in support of O’Higgins5 unpopular measures to enforce decrees to recover debts 
showed that he was determined to see the rural areas returned to law and order as well as 
to address the underlying roots of agrarian unrest
Hogan, however, was the prisoner of nineteenth century British land policy based on the 
notion that the cure for Ireland's difficulties lay in the reform of land law This view 
survives to the present day Every Minister for Agriculture since independence has had to 
contend with the results of this policy Agricultural policy in Ireland has, as a result, been 
dictated by a land policy formulated in an attempt to end endemic poverty and agrarian
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unrest in Ireland Ultimately the government of the Union took the line of least resistance 
and gave in to popular pressure They also hoped that ‘the creation of a stable peasant 
proprietary’ would be the ‘solution of the problem’ of agrarian unrest and would put an end 
to pressure for Home Rule 105 The greatest deficiency of this policy was that it put too much 
stress on the positive effects of the transfer of ownership of land This policy ignored the 
landless labouring classes which made up the bulk of the population ‘"the land for the 
people”, despite Davitt’s hopes, left no doubt as to who constituted the people’ 106 Hogan 
feared that they would not continue to acquiesce as they had m the past He reckoned that 
there would be one and a half million acres left after the unpurchased tenants had had their 
holdings vested
This one-and-a-half millions represents demesnes and untenanted land in the hands 
of landlords At least half of it would be needed for the relief of congestion, and 
that is to say making uneconomic holdings economic The balance, about three- 
quarter million acres would be demesne lands All untenanted lands outside 
demesne lands being required for the relief of congestion by taking half the 
demesnes from the landlords - and the demesnes have not been touched up to this - 
there would be only thirty thousand holdings of twenty-five acres each available for 
landless men There are about five hundred thousand tenants in Ireland, there are 
about three times as many landless men as tenants, so that the fact is that you have 
about one-and-a half million landless men and only about thirty-thousand holdings 
for them, and these landless men are at present prepared to enforce their claims with 
the gun and the torch 107
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Hogan’s fears that the agricultural labourers would press their claim to be included in the 
redistribution of land proved to be unfounded. Their leaders were probably able to work out 
that it was impossible to achieve land ownership for all their members; there simply was 
not enough land left to achieve this goal. Therefore they concentrated on getting them 
better wages and conditions. 108
The 1923 act was the last major piece of land legislation.109 However the powers of the 
Land Commission were increased by the 1933 Land Act. They were given the ‘right of 
expropriating land required not only for the relief of congestion, but to furnish holdings to 
the persons of the classes made eligible for them in 1923, i.e. sons of tenants, agricultural 
labourers, evicted tenants, ex servicemen’. In 1936 Fianna Fail introduced another bill in 
favour of the landless man. The provisions of this bill led to charges that the new powers 
of the Land Commission were politically dangerous. The opposition asserted that local TDs 
had ‘been called down to discuss with local Fianna Fail Cumainn the distribution of land 
in a particular parish’ and that the TDs used their influence ‘to get land divided ... Dozens 
of the members of the Fianna Fail party do it every time their influence is flagging in a 
particular part of the constituency’. Hooker concludes that ‘the powers of the Land 
Commissioners were gradually extended so that they came to possess considerable political 
influence’. During the 1922-1932 period there was no suggestion that this was the case.110
The government’s economic policy for Ireland which was based on agriculture which in 
turn was based on the hope that the general economic health of the country would improve 
when ownership was transferred to the tenants and increased numbers were living on the 
land had serious shortcomings. Hogan may have over estimated the number of
2 7 7
landless men in 1923 but they, along with women and children, still represented the 
majority of the population This policy has left Ireland, since 1922, with the same system 
o f land distribution that it had in the 1850s, minus the landlords Ministers for agriculture 
have therefore many of the same problems which existed in the nineteenth century It also 
failed to challenge the premises on which the policy was based Making a dramatic change 
of direction was unlikely given the circumstances in 1923 when the bill was introduced 
However, the lack of any serious questioning meant that land policy as an issue which had 
a significant bearing on agricultural policy and on national economic policy was ignored 
and continued to be ignored Hogan referred to the negative side of the scheme m 1923 
but he did not develop his criticism beyond a geneial warning of the consequences to the 
character of the nation if its land tenure system was based on large numbers of small 
farms 111 This may have been because Hogan’s views on land policy were not very different 
from the conventional ideas of the time
De Valera suggested that Hogan was not committed to the small farmer Speaking on the 
Agricultural Credit Bill 1928, he said
The minister for Agriculture hopes that time will solve everything for him He will 
get his 200-acre farm in time by the simple process of driving out everybody from 
the small farms
by denying them access to cheaper cred it112 However, it is probable that it was Hogan’s 
farming background which made de Valera believe he was predisposed towards large 
farmers De Valera was also interested in establishing his own credentials as the champion
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of the small farmers of Ireland There is not any evidence that Hogan had developed any 
formal policies to reduce the number of small farmers On the contrary he seemed satisfied 
to leave things as they were Hogan the realist appreciated the impossibility of disturbing 
the consensus on land policy, and therefore, he did not try
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HOGAN’S LAST YEARS 1932-1936
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‘Sick at heart and thoroughly disillusioned’ is how one writer described Hogan’s reaction 
to the defeat of the Cumann na nGaedheal government at the 1932 election 1 Hogan had 
been at the centre of Irish politics for a decade as Minister for Agriculture His close 
friendship with O’Higgins made him privy to and concerned with broader political issues 
and after O’Higgins’ assassination, he took on the role of parliamentary scourge of 
republicanism which O’Higgins had fulfilled so energetically now the republicans had won
Perhaps that is why Hogan’s participation in political life declined Even as a front bench 
spokesman, his energy or talents were not sufficiently stretched He must also have felt a 
sense of helplessness as he saw the policies to which he had adhered m the face of strong 
opposition in the late 1920s being dismantled State intervention on an increasing scale 
undermined many of the objectives for which he had worked, while de Valera’s disputes 
with the British appeared to threaten the foundations of Irish agriculture
During a debate on the Sugar Manufacture Bill, which proposed setting up three new sugar 
factories, Hogan was unequivocal in his denunciation of the proposal on the grounds that 
it was ‘unsound and uneconomic’ Carlow, which m his opinion, had been managed and 
run most efficiently, ‘cost £400,000 a year of good State money to make sugar and provide 
a 10 per cent dividend’ He maintained growing mangolds and feeding them to cattle 
would give a better return Therefore, he asked, ‘why have you sugar beet at all?2
He could not understand how the government could hope to increase the number of people 
working on the land unless there was a fundamental change m the way that agriculture was 
organised Fianna Fail in his opinion ‘wanted to have it both ways’, that is to maintain ‘the
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high standard of living associated with livestock5 at the same time as they were ‘dropping 
the economy that brought it about5 The tone of his contribution had about it, despite its 
well thought out arguments, an air of desperation His closing remarks reinforce this 
impression
But I suppose there is no way out of it This is going ahead, and this complete 
waste of money that the country cannot afford is going to occur no matter what I 
say 3
There was a sad irony for Hogan, which he can hardly have missed, in the knowledge that 
he had been one of the prime movers in the establishment of the sugar beet industry in 
Ireland While it had not achieved all its objectives - there had been serious differences 
between the growers and the management at Carlow - the factory proved that beet could 
be grown and sugar refined albeit with a subsidy It had generated full time employment 
m the town as well as increased tillage The excitement which the opening of the first 
factory had caused m other country towns had not been dampened by the difficulties 
experienced at Carlow No town in 1933 would have refused a sugar factory
Hogan's prediction that the three new factories would not be a success was eventually 
proved correct Today only Carlow remains The others closed because they were not 
economically viable However they did provide employment for more than 30 years in 
towns where jobs were scarce, which was probably their mam political objective in 1933
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Hogan, according to one deputy in the course of the same debate, had ‘been living in a 
spirit of defeatism’ for some time. It would have been difficult to ignore the bitterness and 
resentment which he did nothing to hide. However, he did not abandon his clear and well 
reasoned approach to the issues on which he spoke. He was as effective as ever in 
dissecting weak arguments and pointing out contradictions. During the debate on the 
removal of the Oath of Allegiance he quoted de Valera’s opening sentence which said that 
the Bill was ‘To remove the Article of the Constitution which makes the signing of the 
Oath of Allegiance Obligatory to members entering the Dail’, and he continued: ‘The 
following note was added: "This Article is not required by the Treaty"’.4
He contrasted this statement with Fianna Fail’s assertion during the election
that the Oath was optional on the wording of the Treaty itself and that it was only, 
if you like, the malice or the weakness, or the political bias of the last government 
that had it in the Constitution, and the country was told that, in fact, we had already 
got the consent of England for the removal of the Oath, because the Oath was a 
matter of choice.
He asked why had not the country been told at the last election about the ‘great advances 
we had in our constitutional position, which on the showing of the President and the 
Attorney General, [made] us an independent nation today’.5
The bitterness and recriminations of his public utterances while they add a degree of spice 
to what he said tended to distract attention from the important points he was making, and
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helped turn the debates in which he participates into verbal brawls. Hogan when in 
government attacked the opposition for bringing up the past because he regarded arguments 
about past behaviour irrelevant to the majority of the issues discussed in the Dail. He, 
when in opposition, found the temptation to hark back to the past exploits of members of 
Fianna Fail during the Civil War irresistible. He referred to the opposition party who 
‘committed murder and robbery and numerous other nameless crimes in order to effect their 
policy’.6
There was no point at which Hogan and Fianna Fail met and agreed. In an obituary it was 
said that
between Fianna Fail and such a man there could be no bridge of understanding. 
They put the soul of Ireland first, and he held the immediate need was to put our 
people on their feet financially. Fianna Fail and Hogan hardly spoke the same 
language. 7
Reading any of the major debates in which Hogan took part confirms this view. It was not 
just that he opposed Fianna Fail, he hated both the party and its leader. The gulf between 
them had existed while Hogan was in government but it became enormous once he was 
released from the constraints of office. His language was less than temperate and he never 
lost an opportunity to direct his venom at his opponent. His lack of restraint when 
criticising the government seems to have come from his deeply held conviction that the 
Cumann na nGaedheal style of government was the best for the country. It was not 
based on sentiment but grounded on the simple belief that 'we [the Irish] are as good as the
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English, and that if  the English make a success of democracy, we could do it’ 8 He thought 
that Cumann na nGaedheal had achieved a degree of success
All during our tenure of office we tried to keep something democratic and free, 
something first-class, if  you like, in the way of government before the people, and 
all the time we were attacked, the people were corrupted and propaganda of the 
most unscrupulous kind was used against us 9
His attitude may appear arrogant and patronising to the electorate But it was not He had, 
unlike the republicans, accepted the inevitability of dealing and trading with Britain and the 
Commonwealth for the foreseeable future He did not love the British but he respected 
their power and status Unlike many politicians at that time, he had not over indulged 
himself on the rhetoric of nationalism In his opinion Ireland was a small country 
Therefore it should act sensibly because a ‘small country can never afford to make a fool 
of itself Countries that are ‘small and weak [have] to be particularly careful and [have] 
to have even more austere standards than the standards of big powers’ Nor could he see 
any point m antagonising the British 10
It must therefore have been particularly annoying for Hogan, who prided himself on his 
high standards m Government when he came under fire from the Fianna Fail government 
over the Financial Agreement between the British government and the Irish Free State 
Government which was being used as an excuse for the retention of the land annuity 
monies by the government Fianna Fail taunted Cumann na nGaedhael by referring to it 
as a secret agreement n
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Hogan’s Dail appearances between 1932 and his death m 1936 became less and less 
frequent It is possible that his disillusionment with Irish politics was not the only reason 
why he stayed away In 1931 he had married Mona Devitt, a widow with a young son 
She bore him four daughters in quick succession Whereas before his marriage he had no 
ties and devoted himself to his politics and to a lesser extent to his legal profession and his 
farm, he now had a family to provide for After the 1932 election he concentrated on 
building up his legal business in East Galway with great success With the farm at 
Kilrickle, his legal business and a wife and young family he did not have much time for 
politics, though had Cumann na nGaedhael been reelected it is very likely that he would 
have returned to office 12
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When Patrick Hogan became Minister for Agriculture in 1922 he was a young man with 
little practical experience of politics or national administration In 1932 when he left 
office he had become a skilful parliamentarian, an excellent administrator and one of the 
leading members of Cumann na nGaedheal He had achieved this status despite the 
national and international difficulties which had beset the decade
Hogan’s wit and ability as a debater and legislator in the Dail did much to enhance his 
position within the party and with the electorate He could always be relied upon to put 
across his policies in both the Dail and the Seanad in a forceful and efficient way His 
handling of the 1923 Land Act is a good example Throughout he showed great 
understanding of the difficulties facing the various parties who were directly concerned 
However, his sympathy did not weaken his resolve to have the bill passed with all its 
important sections mtact The ‘Hogan Act’ is a monument to his parliamentary skill even 
though, as he often stated, it was almost identical to the 1920 bill
It was fortunate that Hogan had such a good working relationship with the senior 
members of his department as much of his administrative and legislative work depended 
upon their co-operation and ideas He most important task when he became minister was 
to work with them to revive the flagging export trade They had all the intelligence upon
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which he could base his policy decisions He was very conscious of the growing 
threat to Ireland’s exports from increased competition from countries which were 
organising their marketing efforts on a national level He quickly abandoned his hopes 
of voluntary regulation and with the support of the department began to introduce a 
series of bills to make producers adhere at least to a minimum set of standards Passing 
the legislation was relatively easy but implementing it was not a simple undertaking 
However, by the end of the decade the number of complaints about the quality of 
exported goods had declined dramatically
Critics have accused Hogan’s agricultural policy of being over cautious, of not being 
radical enough These criticisms very often fail to take into account the conservative 
nature of the farming community and the need to introduce changes slowly as indeed 
the department did They also fail to appreciate that after six traumatic years the farming 
community would not have welcomed another upheaval However, it must be said that it 
is very likely that even if the preceding six years had been peaceful Hogan would not 
have tampered with the status quo His prescription for success was based on the idea 
that hard work and carefully invested capital would revitalise the farming industry It is 
not easy to say if his invocations to work hard and invest wisely were heeded The 
slump of the late 1920s damaged the short lived recovery which had begun in 1928 and 
the economic war which started in 1932 put pay to any hope of an orderly growth in 
agriculture
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Hogan had to face three serious obstacles in the way of a prosperous agricultural 
industry The first was the poor quality and handling of a large proportion of agricultural 
exports
The second was the growing threat from competitors with consequential demands from 
British customers for lower prices and better quality The third was the depression 
which succeeded the Wall Street crash He tried to deal with the first two through 
education and regulation with some success, the third was beyond his control
Land reform was also beyond his control By the time Ireland had gained its 
independence the pattern had been set and nothing could have been done to alter it 
Hogan was aware that thousands of uneconomic holdings did not make economic sense 
but also knew that it was too late to change the basis on which land was acquired by 
tenants Hogan, a practical man, therefore, introduced an excellent piece of legislation 
and saw it efficiently through the Dail
One of his most admirable qualities was his independence When he voted against the 
censorship bill in 1928 he was not only defying his government colleagues but he was 
also disagreeing openly with some of his closest friends Even though the late Kevin 
O’Higgins had been concerned with the bill from its inception he had no compunction in 
voting against it Neither did he spare friend or foe in his denunciation of the bill and 
the hypocrisy of those who supported it That a Minister is voting against his own 
government is an extraordinary event However, it does not appear to have damaged his 
career in any way and there were no calls for his resignation It is possible, therefore, to
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conclude that his stand was accepted by members of the executive council as being 
characteristic of the man and therefore not a resigning issue
His independence may have been one of the reasons why he was chosen as Minister for 
Agriculture, a post which m 1922 did not have cabinet status As an extern minister he 
would have been expected to act in an independent way as he would have been elected by 
the Dail and not appointed by the President However, because of the absence on any real 
opposition in the Dail he never had a chance to exercise his independence, because he 
was in effect elected by his own party and not by a cross section of opinion
There were several area where he failed to make any serious impression on the prevailing 
ethos In the early 1920s his attention was drawn to the need to develop alternative 
markets for agricultural produce, especially cattle He did little in practical terms to 
encourage the opening up of new markets in Europe It possible that he ignored the 
prospective trade because he was aware from information he received from his officials 
that farmers would not divert livestock from their traditional markets without a special 
subsidy The dead meat trade was similarly constrained because of lack of regular 
supplies from the farmers Finally he did not push for primary and secondary schools to 
include agricultural science in their curriculums This is one area where his conservatism 
did have a serious negative effect
Criticism of Cumann na nGaedheal and Patrick Hogan’s policies begs the question would 
any other group of ministers have done better The answer lies not just with the people 
who made up the government but in the condition of the country when they came to
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power m 1922 It was weary after the Anglo-Irish war The decade which followed 
began with a bitter civil war and ended with the great depression It was hardly 
surprising, therefore, that Fianna Fail won the election in 1932 However, Hogan’s 
single minded approach to agriculture’s place in the economic life of Ireland may have 
been a hinderance to its long term development Regarding the farming community as 
the ultimate arbiters in agricultural matters in one sense was a contradiction of his oft 
proclaimed opinion that agriculture was the most important industry in the country If 
this was true then surely it should have been playing a far greater role in the 
development of the economic life of the whole economy By trying to insulate it from the 
rigours which were being endured by other sections of the community he was limiting 
the role which it played in the economic success of Ireland In a sense defending 
agriculture against encroachment from other interests at government level may have 
stopped it from becoming involved in other areas of the economy which would have 
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